The political science of David Hume : an inquiry into the polemical intent of behind Hume's political writings by Holt, Stephen James
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE OF DAVID HUME
AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLEMICAL INTENT
BEHIND HUME'S POLITICAL WRITINGS.
STEPHEN HOLT
This thesis is submitted for the degree of Master of Arts 
in the Australian National University.
June 1973.
This thesis is my own work. 
All sources are acknowledged.
C \ V
b  “3 0 '
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to 'thank Mr, W. F. Mandle for his willing supervision of the 
research involved in preparing this thesis.
CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS
Page
V
INTRODUCTION 1
I
PART I: THE THEORIST OF POLITICAL
HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN SOCIETY
OBLIGATION
6
II HUMAN NATURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 38
III
PART II: THE ESSAYIST
THE MIXED' GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 68
IV THE SOCIOLOGY OF FREEDOM 95
V THE RANCOUR OF FACTION 115
VI
PART III: THE HISTORIAN
COURT AND COUNTRY POLITICS AND ENGLISH HISTORIOGRAPHY 141
VII THE SPIRIT OF INNOVATION UNMASKED 162
VIII CONCLUSION 204
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217
ABBREVIATIONS
Caesar to Henry
DNB
HGB
HL
Leviathan
NHL
Phil. Works
Second Treatise
The Tudors
Treatise
VII David Hume, The History of England
from the Invasion of Julius Caesar 
to the Accession of Henry VII, 2 
vols., London, 1762.
Dictionary of National Biography
David Hume, The History of Great 
Britain, 2 vols., Edinburgh and 
London, 1754-57.
The Letters of David Hume, ed.
J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols., Oxford, 
1932.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. 
Michael Oakeshott, Oxford, n.d.
New Letters of David Hume, eds. 
Raymond Klibansky and Ernest 
Campbell Mossner, Oxford, 1954.
David Hume, Philosophical Works, 
eds. T. H, Green and T. H, Grose, 
4 vols., London, 1882.
John Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 
Cambridge, 1960.
David Hume, History of England under 
the House of Tudor, 2 vols., London,
1759.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 
Oxford, 1964.
1INTRODUCTION
In the mid twentieth century David Hume is studied more as 
a philosopher than as a writer on history and politics. In his own day, 
however, this was far from being the case. The Annual Register for 1776, 
when it came to evaluate Hume's major achievement as a man of letters 
following his death in the summer of that year, made it clear that it 
considered that if he were to retain his reputation as 'a writer unequalled 
in his age, or in his province, one of the most eminent and extensive in 
the empire of science', he would do so primarily as a historian rather 
than as a philosopher. The Treatise of Human Nature, the most systematic 
of all his works, had been 'entirely overlooked, or decried at the time 
of its publication, except by a few liberal-minded men'. Indeed, by 
1776 copies of the Treatise had become so 'very scarce' that the Annual 
Register deemed it proper to restate some of its central doctrines.
Hume's History of England, on the other hand, was 'a favourite performance', 
a state of affairs which the Annual Register considered to be entirely 
proper; it felt that this work, 'taken as a whole, ... may be consid­
ered as one of the most excellent productions of human genius, and is 
certainly the greatest historical work of modern times'.^
This assessment on the part of the Annual Register was very 
much in accord with Hume's own thinking concerning his reputation as 
expressed during the last months of his life. In the spring of 1776, 
being about to enter his sixty-sixth year, he had decided to preserve 
for posterity his impressions of a life devoted almost entirely to
'literary Pursuits and Occupations' by composing a brief autobiography,
2which he entitled My Own Life. Feeling that he was about to undergo 
Annual Register, XIX (1776), pp. 27-31.
2 Printed in HL_, i, pp. 1-7.
2a speedy dissolution, Hume believed that he had at last attained the 
proper degree of detachment which an autobiographer needed. He also 
considered that he could bring a due amount of modesty to his task as 
well, for when he recalled the sort of public response which most of 
his works had initially received, he found that it was not such as to 
be an object of vanity. Few of his writings had had a friendly recep­
tion; for the most part they had been either run down by 'Ebullitions
3of ... Fury' or 'entirely overlooked and neglected'.
But notwithstanding these fluctuations of fortune, Hume drew
comfort from the fact that as a result of his literary activity he had,
in the long run, become downright opulent. He felt, moreover, that
he could 'see many Symptoms of (his) literary Reputation's breaking
4out at last with additional Lustre'. In My Own Life itself there is 
no precise indication as to just what Hume meant by this comment, but 
we can get an inkling of what he had in mind by considering other 
literary projects which he had in hand during the last year of his life. 
For one thing, he was preparing a new edition of his multi-volume 
History of England, the first volumes of which had been published more 
than twenty years before. He was also preparing a new edition of his 
Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, whose four volumes contained 
the bulk of his output as an essayist as well as his less heavy-going 
philosophical works.3 Not all of his writings, however, had proved so 
hardy; his earliest and most strictly philosophical work, his Treatise 
of Human Nature, had had an especially unfortunate reception,^ and by
3 ibid., i, pp. 1, 3-4, 7.
 ^ ibid., i, pp. 5, 7.
3 For Hume's literary activity during the last year of his life see ibid., 
ii, pp. 302, 304, 308-309, 313-315, 318, 322, 329-331; for the essen­
tial facts concerning his literary activity generally see T.E. Jessop,
A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy, New York,
1938.
6 My Own Life, HL, i, p . 2.
31776 Hume was of the opinion that the time had come for him to disown
7it as a juvenile work.
But the fact remains that, for all the misfortunes it
suffered in the eighteenth century, the Treatise - or to be more
precise, the epistemological section of the Treatise - attracts much
more critical attention today than do Hume’s writings on history and
politics. At first glance, there seems nothing particularly remarkable
about this state of affairs. It is unquestionable that Hume's most
strictly philosophical piece of writing is the product of a powerful
and probing mind, whereas when we cast an eye over his political opinions,
we are initially tempted to describe them as merely the stock ideas
which we would expect any enlightened eighteenth-century gentleman-
philosopher to subscribe to. Indeed, it has actually been asserted that
8Hume was 'a typical eighteenth-century liberal', a point of view which, 
superficially at least,is supported by abundant evidence; when it is 
stated in a very summary fashion, Hume's conception of the good com­
munity is found to be very much in accord with standard liberal thinking 
on this question as expressed in both his own and subsequent ages. A 
mere listing of some of the features which he attributed to such a society 
makes this clear: the rule of law and constitutional government; an
absence of gaping ideological divisions, an absence brought about by 
faith in the value of moderation, compromise, balance and self-restraint; 
a prosperous, property-owning middle class forming the backbone of the 
social structure; a broad set of civil liberties, including religious 
toleration and freedom of thought and expression; and a minimum of 
restrictions upon economic activity. Moreover, Hume arrived at all 
these ideas in the course of defining his attitude towards the British
 ^ ibid., ii, p. 301; Phil. Works, iii, p. v.
g
John B. Stewart, The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume,
New York and London, 1963, p. 302.
4Constitution as it stood in his day, an attitude which in practice 
amounted to a complete commitment to the preservation of the status quo, 
a commitment as total as that to be found exhibited by a Blackstone or 
a Paley. Given all these considerations, it would seem that we ought 
to be able to unhesitatingly dismiss Hume's political opinions as mere 
reaffirmations of the conventional wisdom of the day.
However, one of the great characteristics of Hume's whole
cast of mind was that, while being prepared to fall in with a whole host
of prejudices and stock ideas, he was never content to accept the reasons
commonly put forward as to why he should do so. This state of affairs
prevailed in the case of both his philosophical and political opinions.
In his capacity as a philosopher Hume never for a moment sought to discredit
such common sense notions as causality and the existence of an external
world; what he really set out to do was to question the validity of some
9of the arguments put forward in defence of these notions. Similarly, 
in his writings on politics he was prepared to fall in with many of the 
dominant prejudices of the day; he saw himself as a perfectly loyal 
adherent of the British constitution as it stood in the eighteenth 
century, even though he frequently felt compelled to criticize the reasons 
usually put forward as to why it was in fact deserving of support. But 
in both cases his contemporaries viewed what he was doing in a totally 
different light; they considered that his criticism of the way in which 
they rationalized their prejudices and values was in truth a particularly 
insidious and cunning attempt to discredit the actual prejudices and values 
themselves, and as a result they fell upon him with all the more fury and 
ferocity. In his capacity as a philosopher Hume eventually found himself 
denounced as a complete sceptic, as an irreligious scoffer. In his 
capacity as a student of politics he eventually found himself denounced
9 Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, London, 1949, pp. 8-12.
5as a brazen apologist for tyranny and despotism. Such talk, of course, 
tended to be wildly extravagant. But so far as his political opinions 
were concerned, it was not devoid of a kernel of truth; Hume's con­
temporaries were right to believe that he stood for a way of thinking 
completely at variance with some of their most cherished political myths 
and assumptions. Just what form this divergence took is the concern of 
this thesis.
P A R T  I
T H E  T H E O R I S T  OF 
P O L I T I C A L  O B L I G A T I O N
6CHAPTER I
HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN SOCIETY
(i)
David Hume was born in Edinburgh on 26 April (O.S.) 1711.
His father was a country gentleman who combined a legal practice in 
Edinburgh with the duties involved in running the family estate at 
Ninewells in Berwickshire. Not being an eldest son, the young Hume 
could count upon receiving only a 'very slender Fortune' as a start in 
life, even though he was of 'good Family' - he never ceased to be proud 
of the fact that he belonged to a cadet branch of one of the great 
border families, the Homes. In the winter of 1722-23 he entered 
Edinburgh University and stayed there until some time in 1725 or 1726, 
when he left without taking a degree, as was customary at the time.
Since he could not hope to muster the capital needed to set himself up 
as a landowner, his family assumed that he would enter one of the 
professions, and his 'studious Disposition, ... Sobriety, and ...
Industry' suggested to them that the law would be his best choice. Hume, 
however, had other plans. From his 'earliest Infancy' he had 'found 
alwise a strong Inclination to Books S Letters', and by the time he 
left university he had developed 'an unsurmountable Aversion to every 
thing but the pursuits of Philosophy and general Learning'. By 1729, 
after some three or four years during which time he devoted his attention 
'almost equally to Books of Reasoning $ Philosophy, $ to Poetry § 
the polite Authors',he had openly renounced the 'nauseous' study of the 
law and had instead fully committed himself to 'Philosophical Enquiries', 
or to be more precise, to the study of 'moral Philosophy', to the study of 
'human Nature'.^
1 This account of Hume's early life is based upon information drawn from the 
following: (i) My Own Life; (ii) an autobiographical letter which Hume wrote 
to an unnamed physician some time in the spring of 1734 (to be found in HL, 
i, pp. 12-18); (iii) Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume, 
Edinburgh, 1954, chaps. 2-5.
7It is important to bear in mind here that in the eighteenth
century moral philosophy was not exclusively a matter of 'Ethics strictly
so called', to use words applied to Adam Smith, himself one of the
2greatest of the eighteenth-century moral philosophers. It was not yet 
the age of specialization; the old idea that the whole of human know­
ledge could be comprehended within a single science, within a single 
philosophy, was still very much alive. For scholars and men of letters, 
the complete unity of the study of the moral world, that is to say, the 
study of man's mental and social activity, was still very much a reality; 
as Alexander Pope was to put it in his Essay on Man (1733-34), the 
function of the student of human nature was to draw up 'a general Map
of MAN, marking out ... the greater parts, their extent, their limits,
3and their connection'. That the young Hume shared this vision to the 
full is clear. As it has come down to us, his Treatise of Human Nature 
is incomplete; Hume originally meant it to be a comprehensive multi­
volume treatment of all the moral sciences. The first two volumes would 
examine man in his capacity as a creature subjected to the influence of 
both reason and feeling. The next two volumes would examine the nature 
of moral and aesthetic judgements. A fifth volume would traverse 
politics, that is to say, 'men as united in society, and dependent on 
each other'. Taken together, these five volumes would comprise a 
complete moral philosophy, a complete science of man; in them Hume 
intended 'to march up directly to the capital or center of (the moral)
2 For Adam Smith's conception of the scope of moral philosophy see his 
Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, ed. Edwin Cannan, New 
York, 1956, pp. xi-xv, xxiv-xxxiv.
The Poems of Alexander Pope, ed. John Butt, London, 1968, p. 502.3
8sciences, to human nature itself'.
All this being so, it necessarily follows that we must never 
look upon Hume's ability to blithely traverse what to us seem totally dis­
parate disciplines - demography and ethics, history and sociology, political 
science and political economy, to name just a few - as a kind of dilettan­
tish virtuosity. As far as Hume himself was concerned, all these fields 
of study were fundamentally at one in that they all fell within the 
ambit of moral philosophy as he conceived of it; for him they represented 
so many different ways of contributing to a better understanding of human 
nature. Furthermore, he also saw them as being fundamentally at one in 
that he believed that they were all capable of sharing a common methodology; 
he meant his whole moral philosophy to take the form of an 'application of 
experimental philosophy to moral subjects'. Deeming Sir Isaac Newton to be 
'the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruc­
tion of the species', Hume early formed the intention of placing moral 
philosophy upon a foundation of 'experience and observation', thereby 
emulating the achievement of the natural philosophers. It was ever his 
aim to develop a wholly empirical science of man; it was ever his 
aim, in short, to become the Newton of the moral sciences. The search 
for 'the ultimate original qualities of human nature' would have to be 
abandoned; a truly worthwhile moral philosophy could be developed only 
after experiments drawn from 'a cautious observation of human life, ...
(of) men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures' 
had been 'judiciously collected and compared'.4 5 As we shall see, Hume's
4 For Hume's original intentions concerning the scope of the Treatise 
see the 'advertisement' and introduction to the first two volumes 
(Treatise, pp. xii, xvii-xxiii); for further evidence of his wide 
interests as a moral philosopher in this early period of his life see 
Ernest Campbell Mossner, 'Hume's Early Memoranda, 1729-1740: The Comp­
lete Text', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (1948), pp. 492-518.
5 For Hume's attitude towards Newton and the Newtonian method see HGB, 
ii, p. 452 and the Treatise, pp. xx-xxiii.
9self-proclaimed commitment to a purely empirical approach did not mean 
that he eschewed conjecture and speculation. But whenever he indulged 
in hypothetical reasoning, he was perfectly certain in his own mind that 
he was doing nothing more than merely framing tentative propositions 
which had been extrapolated from, and which could be tested against, 
the facts of moral science; all aspects of his moral philosophy, 
including his study of politics, his political science, had as their 
ultimate foundation a particular conception of the chief principles of 
human nature.^
By 1734, after some five years of ardent application to his
studies, Hume's health had become 'a little broken' and his financial
circumstances were straitened. He was forced, therefore, to enter 'a
more active Scene of Life'. Leaving Ninewells, he moved to Bristol
and took up a post in a merchant's office; after only a few weeks,
however, he found his job totally disagreeable and he soon threw it up.
He at once decided to resume his studies, but this time in France, where
7
he lived until 1737, firstly at Reims and then at La Fleche in Anjou. 
During these three years on the continent he was able to write the firstg
three volumes of the Treatise, so that he did not return to Scotland 
when he recrossed the channel, going instead straight to London, where 
he sought a publisher. In January 1739 he was at last able to make his 
first appearance in print; in that month the first two volumes of the
9
Treatise, Of the Understanding.and Of the Passions, were published.
 ^ For more detailed discussions of Hume's Newtonianism see J.A. Passmore, 
Hume's Intentions, Cambridge, 1952, chaps, i and iii and Kemp Smith, 
Philosophy of Hume, pp. 53-62.
 ^My Own Life, HL, i, pp. 1-2.
 ^Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 73-74; My Own Life, HL, i, p. 2.
9
Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 105-115.
10
Lacking as he did 'any great Name or Authority', Hume did not expect to
obtain any sudden success, and he deemed it prudent to sit out the
initial reception to the Treatise at NinewelIs.^  As matters turned
out, his fears were soon shown to be entirely justified; the two volumes
failed to make the slightest impression upon the reading public. They
did, it is true, succeed in attracting a scatter of reviews and notices
in literary journals on the continent as well as in London throughout
1739 and 1740. But this was no real compensation, the general tone of
these reviews being one of strong hostility, especially so far as Of
the Understanding was concerned, with expressions such as 'evil intentions',
'unheard-of paradoxes' and 'Pyrrhonism' being freely bandied about.'*''*’
Towards the end of 1739, in an effort to kindle a more friendly attitude
towards this latter volume in particular, Hume wrote a pamphlet in which
he summarized some of its key tenets, but this venture proved in the event
12to be totally ineffective. Hume's debut as a man of letters was, in
short, an unmitigated disaster.
But although greatly disappointed by the complete failure
of the first two volumes of the Treatise to attract any sort of
sympathetic attention, Hume was 'naturally of a cheerful and sanguine
13Temper', and he 'very soon recovered the Blow'. His lack of success, 
he became convinced, indicated that a fondness for new ideas had made 
him overstep the bounds of prudence, and that to harbour any discontent 
would thus be to indulge only in folly» By the middle of 1739 he was 
once again prosecuting his studies, still determined to bring out a
10 HL, i, pp. 26-28.
'*■'*' Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 118-125, 128-132.
12 For the history of this venture see David Hume, An Abstract of a 
Treatise of Human Nature, eds. J.M. Keynes and P. Sraffa, Cambridge,
1938, pp. v-xxix.
^  My Own Life, HL, i, p.2.
11
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  t r e a t i s e  which would ' p r e v a i l  . . .  over  th e  I n d i f f e r e n c e
S O p pos i t ion  o f  the  W o r l d ' . ^  Acting in  accordance  wi th  the  o v e r a l l
p la n  he had s e t  h i m s e l f ,  he had devoted th e  t h i r d  volume o f  th e  T r e a t i s e
to  e t h i c s ,  the  branch  o f  ' a b s t r u s e  r e a s o n in g '  which he f e l t  was o f  most
i n t e r e s t  t o  the  g en e ra l  r e a d in g  p u b l i c :  'M o ra l i t y  i s  a s u b j e c t  t h a t
i n t e r e s t s  us above a l l  o t h e r s :  We fancy  th e  peace o f  s o c i e t y  t o  be a t
s t a k e  in  every  d e c i s i o n  conce rn ing  i t ;  and ' t i s  e v i d e n t ,  t h a t  t h i s
concern  must make our  s p e c u l a t i o n s  appea r  more r e a l  and s o l i d ,  than
where t h e  s u b j e c t  i s ,  i n  a g r e a t  measure ,  i n d i f f e r e n t  to  u s ' . ^  Hume's
commitment to  h i s  t a s k  must have become even more i n t e n s e  as 1739 gave
way to  1740, f o r  in  th e  autumn he was ab le  to  s t r i k e  up an acqua in tance
w i th  F r a n c i s  Hutcheson,  t h e  P r o f e s s o r  o f  Moral Ph ilosophy  a t  Glasgow
U n i v e r s i t y ,  who immedia te ly  gave him h i s  w h o le -h e a r t e d  e n c o u r a g e m e n t . ^
By th e  s p r in g  o f  1740 Hume had f i n i s h e d  to u c h in g  up the
t h i r d  volume o f  th e  T r e a t i s e , and in  t h e  autumn, having  e n t i t l e d  i t
17Of M o r a l s , he had i t  p u b l i s h e d  in  London. The f a t e  i t s  two p r e d e c ­
e s s o r s  had s u f f e r e d  made him wary o f  e n t e r t a i n i n g  h igh  hopes o f  success  
in  a t t r a c t i n g  r e a d e r s ;  by now he was i n c l i n e d  t o  su spe c t  t h a t  few o f  
th e  id e a s  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  work would become ' P r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  w i l l  
augment th e  Stock o f  Knowledge t h a t  must pa s s  t o  f u t u r e  A ges ' .  He was,
however,  c o n f id e n t  t h a t  Of Morals  would succeed i n  ' f u r n i s h i n g  H in ts
18§ e x c i t i n g  P e o p l e ' s  C u r i o s i t y ' .  But no t  even t h i s  modest aim was 
t o  be a t t a i n e d ;  in  terms o f  i t s  appea l  to  t h e  marke t ,  Of Morals  was an 
ignominious  f a i l u r e ,  making no impact  a t  a l l  upon the  r e a d i n g  p u b l i c  and
NHL, p. 5.
^  T r e a t i s e , Bk. i i i ,  p t . i ,  s e c t ,  i  (p. 455).
^  Four l e t t e r s  w r i t t e n  by Hume to  Hutcheson may be found in  HL, i ,  
pp. 32-35,  36-40,  45-48.
17 Mossner,  L i f e  o f  Hume, p p . 136-137.
18  ----------------------
HL, i ,  p.  39.
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19attracting little attention in the literary reviews. Following this
second severe rebuff at the hands of the reading public, Hume abandoned
for good his attempt to produce a philosophical treatise with popular
appeal; there being in fact no desirable career that he could think of
20other than the life of 'a Scholar § Philosopher’, the decision of
the market had to be regarded as final. Within a few years Hume was to
discover that the Treatise had not been forgotten; he was to discover
that, as a result of the unfriendly reviews which Of the Understanding
had attracted, he had obtained a reputation as an irreligious scoffer,
a reputation which it seems representatives of conservative presbyterian
opinion in Scotland had sought to further blacken by rummaging
21through Of Morals in search of unpopular opinions. But of course 
this was not the sort of attention which Hume had hoped for; he was 
not cheered by the fact that the attitude of most contemporary readers 
towards Of Morals, as was the case with the Treatise as a whole, was 
one of either complete indifference or outright hostility.
But notwithstanding its complete failure to attract 
sympathetic attention at the time of its publication, Of Morals is of 
all Hume’s works the one which the student of his political science can 
least afford to ignore. In later chapters it will be shown that for
Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 137-138.
HL_, i, p. 13.
For an assessment of the effects which the unfriendly reviews which 
greeted Of the Understanding had upon Hume’s reputation see Mossner, 
Life of Hume, p. 123; for Hume’s attitude towards early presbyterian 
attacks upon him see the pamphlet he wrote in 1745 in an effort to 
clear his name of charges of ’Universal Scepticism’, A Letter from 
a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, eds. Ernest Campbell Mossner 
and John V. Price, Edinburgh, 1967. The bulk of this pamphlet is 
directed against criticism of the argument advanced in Of the 
Understanding (see pp. 17-18, 19-30); but Hume also makes an 
attempt to deny that Of Morals is designed to bring about the 
’sapping (of) the Foundations of Morality’ (see pp. 18, 30-32).
13
Hume political science was a matter of inquiry into the conditions 
conducive to good government. But what we need to note here is that 
whenever Hume talked about good government, he could hardly avoid doing 
so other than in normative terms; the concrete meaning given to this 
concept cannot but be a reflection of the political ethic of the person 
making use of it, of his conception of the nature and purpose of civil 
society and of the behaviour appropriate to its members. The questions 
Hume chose to ask as a political scientist were derived from opinions 
he held as a moralist, from the opinions he held concerning the attri­
butes of a proper political order. To discover just what these opinions 
were, we need to scrutinize the argument advanced in Of Morals, for it 
was in this work that Hume chose to outline his basic political stance; 
a work on ethics, it represents the most authoritative statement of his 
ultimate political values which he ever put together. In it he set out 
all the basic assumptions he made about human nature as it expresses 
itself in social activity in general and political behaviour in parti­
cular, assumptions which were to shape and colour everything he ever 
wrote about actual civil societies. In it we find him using these 
assumptions as a base upon which to construct a theory of political 
obligation, a theory of the essential framework of civil society, of 
the absolute preconditions for organized government and political life. 
Of Morals is, indeed, the foundation upon which the whole of Hume's 
political science rests; all that he was to write about politics after 
he wrote it has to be seen as an application of its central doctrines 
to specific political situations,
Yet while recognizing the fundamental importance of the 
argument put forward in Of Morals, we must never forget that the vast 
majority of Hume's contemporaries were ignorant as to its true signi­
ficance. This of course meant that they inevitably judged the worth 
of his political science upon the basis of an examination of its super-
14
structure rather than of its foundations, a state of affairs which was
eventually to result in their being amazed, and even enraged, at the
direction Hume's political opinions took. Hume's nineteenth-century
biographer, too, was unacquainted with the real meaning of the political
philosophy outlined in Of Morals, and as a result he also came to
regard the sort of political stance Hume had adopted as 'unexpected and 
22inexplicable'. To avoid such puzzlement and yet at the same time to 
understand why it should have arisen, it is imperative that we should 
examine the line of reasoning which Hume unfolded in those sections of 
his argument in Of Morals in which he was concerned with the framework 
of civil society.
(ii)
Of Morals starts off as a general discussion of the nature
of moral concepts. To be more specific, Hume's intention in the opening
stages of its argument is to make out a case on behalf of the proposition
that notions of right and wrong are the offspring of feeling as opposed
to reason. According to one of the theories canvassed amongst British
ethical theorists in the first few decades of the eighteenth century,
man's ability to form moral concepts had ultimately to be accounted for
in terms of the existence of certain eternal and immutable moral truths
which were discernible by, and binding upon, man in his capacity as a
rational being. This theory attracted many distinguished advocates,
being most clearly expounded in certain passages of John Locke's Essay
23concerning Humane Understanding (1690), in Samuel Clarke's Boyle 
22 John Hill Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume, 2 vols., 
Edinburgh, 1846, i, pp. 122-124, 402.
John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander 
Campbell Fraser, 2 vols., Oxford, 1894, i, pp. 64-65, 70, 353,
364-366, 474-482; ii, pp. 234-235, 350-351.
23
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24Lectures of 1704-05, and in William Wollaston's The Religion of
25Nature Delineated (1724). It was, however, by no means unembattled,
being rejected by, amongst others, Francis Hutcheson, for whom the
formation of moral concepts was more a matter of sense and feeling than
26of ratiocinative processes. It was the ultimate aim of the ration­
alist school of moralists to make ethics as a priori a science as 
27mathematics, an ideal which Hume, with his ideal of a purely empiri­
cal science of man, totally rejected. Already in the course of
correspondence with Hutcheson he had ventured the opinion that
28'Morality... is determin'd merely by Sentiment', and when he came
to outline a general theory concerning the origin of moral judgements
in Of Morals, a desire to refute the rationalists was very much to
the fore in his whole approach.
To state the matter very baldly, in Of Morals Hume hoped
to put the rationalist school of moralists to rout by proving that
human reason comprised but two mental activities - the comparing of
objects in order to discover their relationship and the inferring of
matters of fact - neither of which was involved in the formation of
moral concepts. His attempt to show that notions of right and wrong do
29not arise when objects are compared is purely negative in intention.
But the same cannot be said of his attempt to show that moral concepts 
are not the offspring of inference, for it is in the course of his
These were published as A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes 
of God (1705) and A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations 
Bf Natural Religion (1706). Key extracts from the latter work may be 
found in D.D. Raphael (ed.), British Moralists 1650-1800, 2 vds., 
Oxford, 1969, i, pp. 191-225.
25 Key extracts from this work may be found in ibid., i, pp. 237-258.
26 For Hutcheson's ethical thought see William Robert Scott, Francis 
Hutcheson, Cambridge, 1900.
27 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, ii, pp. 208-209. —
HL, i, p. 40.
Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. i, sect, i (pp. 463-468).29
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efforts to prove this point that he first sets out his own positive
views as to the origin of moral judgements. Whenever we examine any
action commonly deemed to be moral or immoral, he argues, we simply
cannot find any matter of fact which can be called virtue or vice.
The only things we find are certain passions, motives, volitions and
thoughts. Virtue and vice are not qualities in objects and thus their
existence cannot be inferred by reason. They are instead the offspring
30of feeling, of sentiment. Everyday experience indicates that the
distinguishing characteristics of virtue and vice are the pleasure and
pain they respectively cause. Virtuous conduct invariably arouses
pleasure, whereas immorality is always a source of uneasiness to all
those who witness it. To have a sense of virtue or vice is to draw a
particular satisfaction or uneasiness from the contemplation of human
31conduct; the very feeling constitutes the praise or censure. Being
'determin'd merely by sentiment', moral judgements ought to be analysed
purely in terms of 'human Nature § human Life':
If Morality were determind by Reason, (it) is the same 
to all rational Beings: But nothing but Experience
can assure us, that the Sentiments are the same. What 
Experience have we with regard to superior Beings?
How can we ascribe to them any Sentiments at all?32
Hume's theory concerning the formation of moral judgements
in general, with its stress upon the importance of feeling as opposed
33to reason, is very much the product of a disciple of Francis Hutcheson; 
we have to turn to the attempts he made to test it against particular 
sets of individual virtues and vices before we can say what are the
3(3 ibid., Bk. iii, pt. i, sect, i (pp. 468-469).
3  ^ ibid,, Bk. iii, pt. i, sect, ii (pp. 470-471).
32 HL, i, p 0 40o
33 For a discussion of how Hume stood in relation to Hutcheson's 
ethical thought see Kemp Smith, Philosophy of Hume, chap. ii.
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distinctive features of his moral theory. Before doing so, however,
we need to examine the implications of a proposition which Hume regarded.
as vital in the unfolding of his argument. This proposition was that no
action could be called virtuous unless it sprang from some motive other
than a sense of duty. Whenever we judge conduct, Hume believed, we
assess it merely as an external sign of some internal motive, the only
true object of a moral judgement. But man's sense of duty, no matter
how virtuous it may be esteemed, can never be one of the virtuous motives
which bestow merit on any action, for before anyone can perform an action
out of a sense of duty, that action must already be virtuous. The
original virtuous motive which bestows merit on any action must, there-
34fore, be both antecedent to, and distinct from, a sense of duty.
Hume then proceeded to apply this line of reasoning to the 
case of justice and injustice, the first set of individual vices and 
virtues which he chose to scrutinize; he proceeded, that is to say, to 
set out 'to find some motive to acts of justice and honesty, distinct 
from our regard to the honesty'. When he came to consider this question 
closely, he found that any attempt to answer it in terms of some inherent 
human quality was bound to meet with great difficulty. If it should be 
suggested that men perform acts of justice out of a sense of self-interest, 
it could be pointed out in reply that self-interest, whenever it is 
allowed to act freely, becomes the source of all injustice and violence 
and that men cannot overcome these two vices 'without correcting and 
restraining the natural movements of that appetite'. Nor do private 
benevolence or a regard for public interest make men perform such acts;
35they, too, lack sufficient force to serve as the foundation of justice.
In short, Hume felt that man's sense of justice did not spring
34 Treatise, Bk„ iii, pt. ii, sect, i (pp. 477-479); see also HL_, i, p. 35. 
^  Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, i (pp. 479-483).
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spontaneously from some innate propensity other than a sense of duty.
He believed instead that justice was in reality an artificial virtue; 
he believed that there was a particular sort of morally approved behav­
iour which essentially represented an artifice or contrivance devised in
36response to 'the circumstances and necessity of mankind', and the
core of his argument concerning justice consists of an attempt to show
that it is the most important aspect of this particular sort of
behaviour, that it is the most important of all the artificial virtues.
Eager to avoid giving offence with his contention that man's
37sense of justice was artificial rather than natural in origin, Hume
took care to surround this claim with a number of qualifications,
arguing that such a distinction could be made only because man's designs
and projects were commonly set in opposition to the other principles of
nature despite their being 'as necessary in their operation as heat and
38cold, moist and dry'/ and contending that in reality there could be
no virtue more natural than justice;
... I must here observe, that when I deny justice 
to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, 
natural, only as oppos'd to artificial. In another 
sense of the word; as no principle of the human mind 
is more natural thqn a sense of virtue; so no virtue 
is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive 
species; and where an invention is obvious and 
absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to 
be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately 
from original principles, without the intervention of 
thought or reflexion. Tho' the rules of justice be 
artificial, they are not arbitrary.
Indeed, Hume was prepared to state that, 'if by natural we understand
what is common to any species, or even if we confine it
^  ibid, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, i (pp. 477, 483).
^  ibid, B k i i i ,  pt ii, sect, i (p. 484).
38 ibid, Bk. iii, pt. i, sect, ii ( p. 474).
to mean what
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is inseparable from the species', then it was not improper to call the
39rules of justice 'Laws of Nature1.
Hume's choice of terminology here - his willingness to discuss 
justice in terms of laws of nature, but not in terms of a law of nature - 
is extremely significant; indeed, it allows us to discover just what 
he had in mind whenever he contended that justice was an artificial, not 
a natural, virtue. To bring out the full significance of his usage, we 
have to place it in relation to the sort of language we find in John 
Locke's Second Treatise of Government and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan.
When we do this, we find that in talking about laws of nature rather 
than about a single great law of nature Hume was in effect flying in 
the face of Locke's authority and was instead reverting back to term­
inology which Hobbes had used in Leviathan. In the Second Treatise we
find Locke making a conscious decision not 'to enter ... into the
40particulars of the Law of Nature'; but as we shall see, throughout 
Leviathan Hobbes's approach is completely different, with 'the first, 
and fundamental law of nature' being depicted very much as but one of a 
whole host of individual laws of nature. To understand why Hume should 
have preferred Hobbes's usage to Locke's, we have to bear in mind that 
throughout the Second Treatise Locke describes the law of nature in such 
a way as to make it clear that he sees it as a fully-fledged moral law, 
a moral law grounded in God's purposes and in essence constituted by 
reason. In an early reference to the law of nature in the work Locke's 
attitude comes out very clearly. Speaking of the state of nature, of 
the 'State all Men are naturally in', he says the following:
^  ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, i (p. 484). 
40 Second Treatise, par. 12 (p. 293).
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But though ( the  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e )  be a S t a t e  of  L i b e r t y , 
y e t  i t  i s  no t  a S t a t e  o f  L i c e n c e , though Man in  t h a t  
S t a t e  have an u n c o n t ro i e a b l e  L i b e r t y ,  to  d i spose  o f  
h i s  Person o r  P c s e s s i o n s ,  ye t  he has not  L i b e r ty  to  
d e s t r o y  h i m s e l f ,  o r  so much as any C re a tu re  in  h i s  
P o s s e s s io n ,  bu t  where some n o b le r  u s e ,  th an  i t s  ba re  
P r e s e r v a t i o n  c a l l s  f o r  i t »  The S t a t e  o f  Nature has a 
Law o f  Nature to  govern i t ,  which o b l i g e s  every  one:
And Reason,  which i s  t h a t  Law, te a c h e s  a l l  Mankind, who 
w i l l  b u t  c o n s u l t  i t ,  t h a t  be ing  a l l  equal  and 
in d e p en d en t ,  no one ought  t o  harm a n o th e r  in  h i s  L i f e ,
H e a l th ,  L i b e r t y ,  o r  P o s s e s s io n s .  For Men be ing  a l l  the  
Workmanship o f  one Omnipotent ,  and i n f i n i t e l y  wise 
Maker; A ll  the  Se rvan ts  o f  one Sovereign  M as te r ,  
s e n t  i n t o  t h e  World by h i s  o r d e r  and about  h i s  b u s i n e s s ,  
th e y  a re  h i s  P r o p e r ty ,  whose Workmanship they  a r e ,  made 
t o  l a s t  du r ing  h i s ,  not  one an o th e r s  P l e a s u re .
Nowas we have a l r e a d y  n o te d ,  Hume saw th e  fo rm at ion  o f
moral concep ts  and th e  workings o f  human reason  as two a b s o l u t e l y
d i s t i n c t  p r o c e s s e s .  His whole argument in  Of Morals was based  upon th e
premise t h a t  r eason  lacked  th e  power t o  make a p e rson  i n h a b i t i n g  the
s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e ,  a p e r s o n ,  t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  fo l lo w in g  th e  untrammelled
ben t  o f  h i s  b a s i c  human n a t u r e ,  come t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  t h e r e  was an
o v e r r i d i n g  moral law which had t o  be obeyed.  Moral concep ts  were th e
o f f s p r i n g  o f  the  p a s s io n s  a lo n e ;  t h i s  meant t h a t  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of
j u s t i c e  cou ld  n o t  be ex p la in e d  i n  terms o f  man hav ing  a r a t i o n a l
awareness o f  h i m s e l f  as God's workmanship.  But i f  he wished t o  do more
than  mere ly  in du lge  i n  n e g a t iv e  c r i t i c i s m ,  Hume obv ious ly  had t o  be
ab le  t o  p u t  forward  an a l t e r n a t i v e  s u g g e s t io n  as t o  why no one ought
t o  harm a n o t h e r ,  and i t  was he re  t h a t  he looked towards  Hobbes and h i s
laws o f  n a t u r e  f o r  helt>.
The e x ac t  s t a t u s  o f  Hobbes 's  laws o f  n a t u r e  i s  a major 
focus o f  deba te  amongst modern s tu d e n t s  o f  h i s  th o u g h t ,  w i th  d i s c u s s io n  
r e v o lv i n g  around th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  whether  t h e y  a re  t r u l y  moral  laws which 
a re  to  be obeyed as d iv i n e  commands o r  whe ther  t h e y  a re  merely -p ruden tial
41 i b i d . ,  p a r s .  4 ,6  (pp. 287, 288-289).
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in  form, mere maxims o f  s a f e t y  a r r i v e d  a t  by the  e n l a rg e d  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  
42o f  amoral e g o i s t s .  This  deba te  has become h o p e l e s s l y  complex,  bu t  at
l e a s t  one i r r e f u t a b l e  f a c t  has emerged from i t  - Hobbes was d e f i n i t e l y
no t  an i s o l a t e d  and u n m f l u e n t i a l  f i g u r e  l u r k i n g  around t h e  f r i n g e s  o f
th e  mains tream o f  p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h t .  R a th e r ,  he was a t  t h e  very  c e n t r e
o f  p o l i t i c a l  debate  th roughou t  th e  middle and l a t t e r  decades o f  the
s e v e n te e n th  c e n tu ry ,  and h i s  d o c t r i n e s  a t t r a c t e d  much sym pa the t ic
43a t t e n t i o n  as well  as h o s t i l e  c r i t i c i s m .  What r e a l l y  needs  to  be
emphasized,  however,  i s  t h a t  a l l  o f  Hobbes 's  contemporary c r i t i c s  and
fo l l o w e r s  sha red  one b a s i c  assumption  - th e y  a l l  took i t  f o r  g r a n te d
t h a t  he b e l i e v e d  t h a t  man l i v e d  in  a wor ld  devoid  o f  any d i v i n e l y
s a n c t i o n e d  moral law. The a t t i t u d e  o f  c r i t i c s  l i k e  S i r  Robert F i lmer
who a t t a c k e d  Hobbes f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  'God would c r e a t e  man in  a
44c o n d i t i o n  worse than  any b e a s t s '  i s  well-known. But what must be
s t r e s s e d  i s  t h a t ,  t o  a man, a l l  t h e  v a r io u s  a l l i e s  and f o l l o w e r s  whom
Hobbes a t t r a c t e d  d e s c r ib e d  h i s  achievement i n  b a s i c a l l y  s i m i l a r  terms -
th e y  a l l  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  he had produced a p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo sophy  c o n s t r u c t e d
45wholly in  te rms o f  th e  needs and p a s s io n s  o f  amoral e g o i s t s .
For an o u t l i n e  o f  some o f  t h e  i s s u e s  a t  s t a k e  in  t h i s  deba te  see
Quentin S k inner ,  'H obbes ' s  
(1964) ,  pp.  321-333.
L e v i a t h a n ' ,  The H i s t o r i c a l  J o u r n a l ,  VII
This has  been proved  by Quentin Sk inner  in  two im por tan t  a r t i c l e s :  
' H i s t o r y  and Ideo logy  in  t h e  Eng l ish  R e v o l u t i o n ' , The H i s t o r i c a l  
J o u r n a l , V III  (1965) ,  pp,  151-178 and 'The I d e o l o g i c a l  Context  of  
Hobbes 's  P o l i t i c a l  T h o u g h t ' ,  The H i s t o r i c a l  J o u r n a l , IX (1966),  
pp. 286-317.
For F i l m e r ' s a t t i t u d e  towards  the  s t a t e  o f  n a t u r e  as d e p i c t e d  by 
Hobbes see P a t r i a r c h a  and O ther  P o l i t i c a l  Works o f  S i r  Robert  F i lm er ,  
ed. P e t e r  L a s l e t t ,  Oxford,  1949, pp.  241-242; f o r  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  
o f  Hobbes 's  con temporary  c r i t i c s  g e n e r a l l y  see John Bowie, Hobbes 
and h i s  C r i t i c s , London, 1951 and Samuel I .  Mintz ,  The Hunting o f  
L e v i a t h a n , Cambridge,  1962.
S k inne r ,  'H obbes ' s  I d e o l o g i c a l  C o n t e x t ' ,  pp.  297-312.
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When viewed in this context, Hume's decision to revert back to Hobbesian 
terminology is seen to be indicative of a much deeper commitment; once 
having rejected Locke's notion that the principles of human sociability 
were an aspect of man's rational awareness of himself as God's property, 
Hume in effect turned by way of reaction towards Hobbes, a writer who 
in his own lifetime had seen himself become accepted as the chief 
exponent of a wholly naturalistic way of explaining man's sociability.
That Hobbes should have come to be seen as a proponent of 
the view that man does not inhabit a world governed by an overriding 
moral law becomes explicable when we realize just how easy it is to 
extract from Leviathan a political philosophy geared entirely to the 
needs of calculating egoists living in a completely godless and amoral 
world. Whether Hobbes would ever have approved of such an exercise is
46another question; but the fact remains that it is eminently feasible.
In any wholly prudential interpretation of Leviathan - as in any moral­
ized interpretation - Hobbes's attitude towards the laws of nature plays 
the key role. In Leviathan he defines the essence of these laws thus:
A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or 
general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is 
forbidden to do that, which is destructive of his life, 
or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to ^  
omit that, by which he thmketh it may be best preserved.
It is to be observed that a Hobbesian law of nature is not an end in
itself; it is a means to an end, and that end is self-preservation,
not respect for others. Hobbes in fact believed that self-preservation
was best ensured whenever men felt that nobody ought to harm another;
the first and fundamental law of nature was, then,'to seek peace, and 
48follow it'. But self-preservation always remained the paramount
I am following here a suggestion made in John Plamenatz, Man and 
Society, 2 vols., London, 1966, i, pp. 131-132.
Leviathan, chap, xiv (p. 84).
ibid., chap, xiv (p. 85),
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consideration, and should a situation arise in which respect for others
was not conducive to it, men were not obliged to seek peace - there
had to be a background of security for this to be so:
The laws of nature oblige m  foro interno; that 
is to say, they bind to a desire they should 
take place: but in foro externo; that is, to
the putting them in act, not always. For he 
that should be modest, and tractable, and per­
form all he promises, in such time, and place, 
where no man else should do so, should but 
make himself a prey to others, and procure 
his own certain ruin, contrary to the ground 
of all laws of nature, which tend to nature’s 
preservation.49
Whenever self-preservation and peacefulness are incompatible, men are 
free to do anything to keep themselves alive, they are free, that 
is to say, to use the 'RIGHT OF NATURE' ('the liberty each man hath, 
to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his 
own nature; ...and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his 
own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto') to the full,^ a state of affairs which culminates 'in 
that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every 
man, against every man' . ^
Man obviously had the ability to avoid a life of perpet­
ual warfare with his fellows, an ability which Hobbes saw origin­
ating partly in the passions and partly in reason. Passions such as 
fear of death and a desire for commodious living drive men to seek mutual
accommodation and 'reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace',
52articles 'which otherwise are called the Laws of Nature'. It is, 
then, 'as the means of peacable, sociable, and comfortable living',
ibid., chap, xv (p. 103).
^  ibid., chap, xiv (p. 84).
^  ibid., chap, xiii (p. 82).
^  ibid., chap, xiii (pp. 83-84).
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as 'a means of the conservation of men in multitudes', that the laws
53of nature come to be praised. By seeking mutual accommodation men
fulfil the first law of nature, but they can only make a lasting peace
by agreeing 'to lay down this right to all things' and since agreements
are only effective when they are upheld by 'a common power ... with
right and force sufficient to compel performance', it follows that in
laying down the right they have to do anything to keep themselves
alive - which is to observe the second law of nature - men must submit 
54to a sovereign. Once they have done this, they can begin to make all
sorts of valid agreements or covenants amongst themselves, the essence
of a valid covenant being that it is sanctioned by a common power. When
this happens, the third law of nature - 'that men perform their covenants
made' - comes into operation, and men can begin to frame notions of
justice and injustice, injustice being for Hobbes 'the not performance
of covenant'.^ In other words, Hobbes felt that justice could exist
only within the confines of civil society:
Where there is no common power, there is no law: where
no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the 
two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none 
of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they 
were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, 
as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, 
that relate to men in society, not in solitude.
The case is the same with all the other laws of nature - sixteen, to 
be precise - which Hobbes discusses in Leviathan. As he portrays 
them, they essentially involve the suppression of anti-social feelings 
and behaviour and since nobody would perform such acts of self-abnega­
tion without being certain beforehand that everybody else would, if
^  ibid., chap, xv (pp. 103, 104).
54 ibid., chap, xiv (pp. 85, 89-90). 
^  ibid., chap, xv (pp. 93-94).
^  ibid., chap, xiii (p. 83).
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necessary, be made to reciprocate, they all depend for their
57effectiveness upon the existence of a sovereign. In a state of 
nature all the laws of nature would be necessarily inoperative and 
as a consequence man's life would be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, 
and short'.^
We can now state in a general way what Hume meant
wherever he claimed that justice was an artificial rather than a
natural virtue, for when he is seen in relation to Hobbes, his
overall approach becomes clear. What he was in effect achieving by
staking out such a position was broadening and deepening his rejection
of Locke's concept of a natural moral law by adopting for his own
purposes Hobbes's laws of nature in their capacity as 'the means of
peacable, sociable, and comfortable living'. As we shall come to see,
in terms of the function they perform, Hume's artificial virtues are
the exact equivalents of Hobbes's laws of nature. As portrayed in
Of Morals, they are social conventions; they represent the basic
mutual adjustments which men have to make if they are to maintain
a social existence. Being efficacious in holding society together,
these conventions come to be regarded as virtues, and so they are
59usually performed because of a sense of duty. But in terms of their 
ultimate raison d'etre, they are wholly prudential in form; they 
exist in the first place only because of enlarged self-interest, only 
because man must lead a social existence if he is to enjoy 
commodious living. Now for Hume a sense of self-interest was a 
natural, that is to say, an inherent, human quality; but this did 
not mean that he believed that man was spontaneously and naturally 
social. We have already seen that he considered that man had to
ibid., chap, xv (pp. 99-102).
C Q
ibid., chap, xiii (p. 82).
59 For Hume's account of this process see Treatise, Bk. iii, pt.ii, 
sect, ii (pp. 498-500).
26
check the natural movements of his selfishness before he could live 
as a social being; Hume viewed the various basic conventions which 
held society together as restraints and restrictions which men had 
imposed upon the spontaneous flow of their selfish passions, albeit 
in an effort to secure the optimum satisfaction of these very same 
passions.
As a result of believing that the whole purpose of the
artificial virtues was to hold society together, Hume considered
that it was a priori impossible that they should be found existing
amongst the inhabitants of the state of nature; wherever the
artificial virtues existed, society existed, and wherever they did
not exist, society did not exist and a state of nature prevailed
in its stead. Convinced as he was that justice was one of the
artificial virtues, Hume thus rejected Locke's notion that the
inhabitants of a state of nature had the power to regulate their
conduct according to ideas of fairness and honesty; reason, he
believed, could not make men act in such a way, only their passions
could, and then only when their spontaneous movements had been
subjected to restraint, a process which of necessity meant the end
of the state of nature. Hume did not consider justice to be the
sole artificial virtue; others he was prepared to name in Of Morals
60include chastity and modesty. But he was certain that it was by 
far the most important of all the social conventions. He considered 
it, indeed, to be the sine qua non of human society; as we have 
already seen, he believed that its various branches formed the laws
ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, xii (pp.570-573).
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of justice, that is to say, the really vital social conventions.^ This 
being so, it follows that when we turn to examine what Hume says in 
Of Morals concerning the foundations of justice, we find ourselves 
confronted with what is virtually a theory of society; if he wished 
to establish that justice had primarily to be seen as the sine qua non 
of human society, Hume had to succeed in showing that a satisfactory 
explanation of the reasons why men obeyed the various rules of justice 
amounted to a satisfactory explanation of the reasons why they were 
social beings.
(iii)
When Hume turned to examine this question of the way in 
which men came to accept the various restraints which a social 
existence demanded, he began his inquiry by considering man as a 
member of the animal kingdom, a natural enough step for someone who 
did not believe that human reason was some sort of semi-divine faculty 
whose existence placed an unbridgeable gap between man and the beasts.
When Hume viewed man in this context, he discovered that his lot was 
far from enviable. Of all the animals loaded with numberless wants 
and necessities only man had but slender means of satisfying his needs; 
in him alone could be seen the unnatural conjunction of weakness and
^  Hume basically followed the method which Hobbes adopted whenever 
he came to determine whether or not a particular social convention 
ought to be classed as a law of nature: 'These are the laws of
nature, dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men 
in multitudes. There be other things tending to the destruction 
of particular men; as drunkenness, and all other parts of 
intemperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those 
things which the law of nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary to 
be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place'. Leviathan, 
chap, xv (p. 103).
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innumerable needs. It was only because they had pooled their resources, 
it was only because they were social beings, that men were able to 
acquire the force they had to have if they were to properly feed, 
clothe and shelter themselves. Had man never entered society, had he 
chosen to labour apart and only for himself, it would have been his 
lot to have remained weak, primitive and constantly exposed to ruin 
and misery. But by leading a social existence he had been able to 
avoid such a fate: 'Society provides a remedy for these three 
inconveniences. By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented:
By the partition of employments, our ability encreases: And by mutual
succour we are less expos'd to fortune and accidents. 'Tis by this 
additional force, ability, and security, that society becomes 
advantageous'. ^
For Hume, however, the mere fact that a social existence 
was extremely advantageous to man was in itself irrelevant; what 
really mattered, he believed, was that man had to be aware that this 
was in fact the case, and when he examined how this awareness was 
arrived at, he found yet another example of the primacy of passion 
over reason:
... in order to form society, 'tis requisite not only 
that it be advantageous, but also that men be sensible 
of these advantages; and 'tis impossible, in their wild 
uncultivated state, that by study and reflexion alone, 
they should ever be able to attain this knowledge. Most 
fortunately, therefore, there is conjoin'd to those 
necessities, whose remedies are remote and obscure (the 
need for food, clothing and shelter), another necessity, 
which having a present and more obvious remedy, may 
justly be regarded as the first and original principle 
of human society. This necessity is no other than that 
natural appetite betwixt the sexes, which unites them 
together, and preserves their union, till a new tye takes 
place in their concern for their mutual offspring. This 
new concern becomes also a principle of union betwixt the 
parents and offspring, and forms a more numerous society ...
It is primarily the family which impresses upon man an awareness of
62 Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, ii (pp. 484-485).
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t h e  many b e n e f i t s  o f  a s o c i a l  e x i s t e n c e ,  w hile  a t  t h e  same t ime p r e p a r i n g
6 3him f o r  i t  by s o f t e n i n g  h i s  n a t u r a l  s e l f i s h n e s s .
Hume, t h e n ,  d id  n o t  deny t h a t  man had a c a p a c i t y  f o r  showing 
concern  f o r  t h e  needs o f  o t h e r s .  But he a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  c a p a c i t y  
was s e v e r e l y  checked by t h e  fo r c e  o f  man's  s e l f i s h  and a n t i - s o c i a l  
p a s s i o n s ;  he was convinced  t h a t  few men ex tended t h e i r  concern  fo r  
o t h e r s  beyond t h e  immediate c i r c l e  o f  t h e i r  kinsmen and f r i e n d s .  This  
be in g  so ,  t h e r e  was s t i l l  c o n s id e r a b l e  scope f o r  f r i c t i o n  amongst 
mankind. For Hume, however,  human s e l f i s h n e s s  d id  not  become a major  
o b s t a c l e  to  th e  c o n t in u e d  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s o c i a l  groups l a r g e r  than  th e  
fami ly  u n t i l  i t  was coupled  wi th  ' a  p e c u l i a r i t y  i n  our  outward c i r c u m s t a n c e s ' .  
This  p e c u l i a r i t y  l a y  in  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  v a r io u s  s o r t s  o f  p o s s e s s io n s  
which men could  e n jo y .  I n t e r n a l  mental  s a t i s f a c t i o n  and e x t e r n a l  
p h y s i c a l  advan tages  cou ld  no t  be enjoyed  by anybody o t h e r  than  the  
p e rsons  t o  whom th e y  had been endowed. But th e  enjoyment o f  th e  
v a r io u s  m a t e r i a l  p o s s e s s i o n s  a c q u i r e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  i n d u s t r y  or  good 
fo r tu n e  was a n o t h e r  m a t t e r  a l t o g e t h e r .  These goods were bo th  exposed 
t o  t h e  v i o l e n c e  o f  o t h e r s  and ab le  t o  be t r a n s f e r r e d  w i th o u t  s u f f e r i n g  
any lo s s  o r  a l t e r a t i o n .  The improvement o f  t h e s e  goods was t h e  c h i e f  
advantage  o f  s o c i e t y ;  bu t  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e i r  p o s s e s s i o n ,  along 
w i th  t h e i r  s c a r c i t y  in  a world  o f  s e l f i s h  men, was a p o t e n t i a l  source  
o f  complete s o c i a l  d i s r u p t i o n . ^
Hume was convinced  t h a t  t h i s  l a ck  o f  s e c u r i t y  in  the  
p o s s e s s i o n  o f  e x t e r n a l  goods was a problem which man could  not  remedy 
mere ly  by e x e r t i n g  one o f  h i s  i n h e re n t  q u a l i t i e s  or  c a p a c i t i e s .  Man 
was no t  sp o n ta n e o u s ly  s o c i a l ;  had he remained a c h i l d  o f  ' u n c u l t i v a t e d  
n a t u r e ' ,  had he i n s i s t e d  upon fo l lo w in g  th e  n a t u r a l  f low o f  h i s  p a s s i o n s ,  
he would never  have come to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  was a moral a c t  t o  r e s i s t  
t h e  te m p ta t io n  to  s e i z e  f o r  o n e s e l f  th e  e x t e r n a l  p o s s e s s i o n s  o f  o t h e r s .
^ i b i d . ,  Bk. i i i ,  p t . i i ,  s e c t ,  i i  (p .486) .
i b i d ,  Bk. i i i ,  p t .  i i ,  s e c t ,  i i  (pp. 486-488).
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Indeed, had the state of nature remained intact, the very opposite would
be the case; were men to make their moral judgements according to their
natural uncultivated ideas of morality, their selfish passions would
be given additional force and influence. Being the offspring of the
passions, moral judgements are heavily influenced by the usual flow of
the passions. Whenever a man's conduct is in harmony with the regular
flow of his passions, he feels contented and thus considers himself to
be acting properly; wheneverthis is not the case, he feels uneasy and
thus considers himself guilty of a moral defect. Thus, if men had
not imposed restraints upon the natural flow of their passions, they
would in fact look upon all manifestations of their selfishness as
moral acts, for man's nature is such that he is strongly and
consistently partial to his own interests, or at the very most, to the
interests of his kinsmen and friends.^
Hume believed that only through artifice could men
overcome the socially disruptive effects of their natural selfishness;
that is to say, he felt that there was 'a remedy in the judgement and
understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections'.
Although he was convinced that men were governed primarily by their
passions, he still felt that reason was not without some influence upon
their conduct; most notably, it was able to inspire action by informing
6 7men of ways in which they could best satisfy their passions, a state 
of affairs which Hume saw exemplified in the process by which stability 
came to be conferred upon the possession of material goods. As a 
result of their experience of family life, men are made aware of, and 
prepared for, the many advantages of social existence, so that when 
they come to see that the chief threat to the existence of social
65ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sects . i, ii (pp. 483-484, 488
6 6 . iibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect. ii (p. 489).
67ibid., Bk. iii, pt. i, sect. i (p. 459).
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groups larger than the family is posed by the looseness and easy
transition from one person to another of material goods, they are driven
to seek some means by which these goods may be placed as far as possible
upon the same footing as the fixed advantages of mind and body. But
if this is to be done, if the possession of material goods is to be
made secure, men have no option but to heed the advice which reason gives
them concerning the proper course to be followed, to heed, indeed, what
is a law of nature, namely, that they should modify their natural
selfishness to the extent of agreeing amongst themselves to abstain
from seizing each other's material possessions. Given that their
natural selfishness means that they all have an insatiable desire to
acquire for themselves as many material goods as possible, it would
appear impossible that they should ever be prepared to accept such
self-restraint. However, although it cannot be counter-balanced by
any other passion, the acquisitive urge is able to check itself, for
it is best satisfied when restrained. If society is to exist, men have
to resist the urge to seize for themselves the goods of others, but
in society they enjoy far more opportunity for satisfying their love
of gain than ever would be the case in the solitary and forlorn
condition which would follow upon violence and universal licence. It
is not the selfish passions themselves, but rather their blind motions
6 8which have to be kept in check.
In Hume's opinion, then, human society had to be classed 
as an artificial entity in the sense that it would never have come 
into existence had men not been prepared to check the spontaneous flow 
of their natural passions. The only reason why they were prepared to 
accept this restraint was because they felt that by so doing they could
68
ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, ii (pp. 489, 492-493).
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secure the better satisfaction of these very same passions; but the 
actual form the restraint took was the outcome of artifice, of a 
process of co-operation and mutual adjustment which men entered into 
in an effort to overcome a common problem. Hume was certain that the 
chief threat to the continued existence of large social groupings was 
immediately removed once this process was entered into, that is to say, 
once men agreed amongst themselves not to seize each other’s material 
possessions. He felt that, apart from the acquisitive urge, all the 
various human passions were either easily restrained or devoid of 
pernicious effects upon society; the selfish desire of each individual 
to acquire for himself as many material possessions as possible was the 
only passion which could be described as 'insatiable, perpetual, universal, 
and directly destructive of society’. This same acquisitive urge was, 
nevertheless, the main source of human sociability, for men were 
prepared to submit to the constraints of a social existence only 
because they were aware that society presented them with far more 
opportunity for satisfying their acquisitiveness than the state of 
nature ever could.^
In Hume's estimation, it was the convention bestowing stability
upon the possession of material goods which provided the context
within which notions of justice and property could arise. Justice was
all that conduct which upheld the distinction of 'mine and thine'
70which resulted from such a convention. Property was all those 
material goods whose possession had been made secure as a result of 
such a distinction; it was 'nothing but those goods, whose constant 
possession is establish'd by the laws of society; that is, by the laws 
of justice'. In other words, being the offspring of justice,
k^ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, ii (pp. 491-492).
70ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, ii (pp. 494-495).
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p r o p e r ty  was an a r t i f i c i a l ,  not  a n a t u r a l ,  e n t i t y .  I t  could  no t  e x i s t
o u t s id e  t h e  conf ines  o f  th e  a r t i f i c i a l  v i r t u e s ;  had men neve r  r e s t r a i n e d
th e  n a t u r a l  flow o f  t h e i r  s e l f i s h  p a s s io n s  to  th e  e x t e n t  o f  e n t e r i n g
i n t o  t h e  conven t ion  by which th e y  agreed  to  a b s t a i n  from s e i z i n g  each
o t h e r ' s  p o s s e s s i o n s , t h e r e  would neve r  have been such a t h i n g  as f i x e d
71r i g h t  o f  ownership.
But a l though  he was convinced t h a t  w i thou t  s t a b l e  p o s s e s s io n  
o f  p r o p e r t y  s o c i e t y  would c o l l a p s e ,  Hume was s t i l l  d i s t u r b e d  by th e  
'g rand  inc o n v en ien c e '  which he saw o c c u r r i n g  whenever,  as a r e s u l t  o f  
th e  s t r i c t  exec u t io n  o f  j u s t i c e ,  p r o p e r t y  f e l l  i n t o  t h e  hands o f  
people inc a p a b le  o f  p u t t i n g  i t  t o  p ro p e r  u se .  He co n s id e re d  t h a t  i t  
would be i n t o l e r a b l e  t o  al low everybody to  s e i z e  by v i o l e n c e  any p ie c e  
o f  p r o p e r t y  which th e y  f e l t  was no t  be ing  pu t  t o  good u s e ;  t h i s  would 
lead  to  a complete breakdown o f  s o c i a l  o rd e r .  Yet he s t i l l  f e l t  t h a t  
t h e r e  had to  be some a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  an e x c e s s iv e  r i g i d i t y  in  the  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  the  laws o f  p r o p e r t y .  The s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  dilemma, he 
soon concluded ,  was p l a i n :  ' p o s s e s s i o n  and p r o p e r t y  sh o u 'd  always be 
s t a b l e ,  excep t  when the  p r o p r i e t o r  consen ts  t o  bestow them on some 
o t h e r  p e r s o n ' .  Consent be ing  in v o lv e d ,  t h e  t r a n s f e r e n c e  o f  p r o p e r t y  
in  t h i s  way could  not  endanger s o c i a l  p e ac e ,  w h i le  a t  th e  same t ime 
i t  could f u l f i l  a u s e f u l  s o c i a l  purpose  by e n s u r in g  t h a t  t h e r e  was a 
means by which p r o p e r ty  cou ld  p a s s  i n t o  t h e  hands o f  peop le  ab le  to  
pu t  i t  t o  b e s t  u se .  D i f f e r e n t  a rea s  o f  th e  e a r t h  produced d i f f e r e n t  
commodit ies and d i f f e r e n t  men p o s s e s s e d  d i f f e r e n t  s k i l l s ;  a l l  t h i s  
r e q u i r e d  mutual  exchange and commerce, so t h a t  in  a r e a l  sense  th e
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r ty  by consen t  formed t h e  second g r e a t  law o f
,  72n a t u r e .
^ i b i d . ,  Bk. l i i ,  p t .  i i ,  s e c t ,  i i  (pp. 490-491).
^ i b i d . ,  Bk. i i i ,  p t . i i ,  s e c t s ,  i i  - i v  (pp. 497-498,  501-502,  514).
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Hume believed that by following the laws of nature 
enjoining stability of possession and its transference by consent men 
became tolerable and to a certain extent mutually advantageous to each 
other. But he also felt that something more had to be done if all 
the potential benefits of a social existence were to be realized; he 
felt that men had to submit to a further basic social convention, to 
a further law of nature, if they wished to be as 'serviceable to each 
other, as by nature they are fitted to become.' Hume considered that 
stability of possession and its transference by consent did not by 
themselves make up the framework of a fully-developed form of social 
existence; for this state of affairs to prevail, men also had to show 
themselves capable of entering into a mutual exchange of services, 
one man doing something for another in the expectation that sometime 
in the future an equivalent service would be given in return. There 
obviously had to be a background of mutual trust and a sense of common 
interest for this form of commerce to take place; in a situation 
where property had been established and yet where man's inherent selfishness 
was otherwise allowed to run unchecked it would be blighted by 
mutual fear and suspicion. Knowing this to be so, however, and 
knowing just how beneficial self-interested commerce could be, men had,
Hume believed, put their selfish passions under even greater restraint 
to the extent of repaying all the advantages they received in the 
course of their dealings with each other. Once again, then, they 
had set out to satisfy their selfishness not through 'headlong and
73impetuous motion' but rather 'in an oblique and artificial manner'.
Self-interested commerce was sanctioned by promises. For 
Hume, a promise was 'a certain form of words', 'certain symbols or 
signs', which men had invented or contrived in order to give each
73ibid., Bk. in, pt. li, sect, v (pp. 519-521).
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other security for their conduct whenever they took part in a mutual 
exchange of services; men who promised to perform some future service 
in effect bound themselves to perform it, for by making use of an 
agreed set of words whose purpose it was to encourage a sense of 
security they exposed themselves to the penalty of not being trusted 
again, of being totally excluded from all the benefits of self- 
interested commerce, if they failed to live up to their word„Promises 
thus facilitated all forms of this commerce by creating the requisite 
sense of mutual trust and confidence; this being so - and given the 
important role of self-interested commerce in the development of a 
complete social existence - the keeping of promises took its place 
as the third law of nature, as the third truly essential social 
convention» ^
Hume looked upon his analysis of the social function of
promises as the virtual completion of his overall analysis of the
foundations of justice. In his estimation, stability of possession,
its transference by consent and the performance of promises were
easily the most important of all the various artificial virtues, the
peace and security of human society being entirely dependent upon
their strict observance. They represented the sum-total of all the
laws of nature, of all the truly fundamental social conventions, and
together they made up justice, the sine qua non of human society. Their
whole function being to hold society together by keeping man's
natural selfishness in check, it followed that they were completely
artificial in form, a point which Hume was at pains to hammer home:
Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of 
men; and these (three laws of nature) are as necessary 
to the support of society. Whatever restraint they 
may impose on the passions of men, they are the real
^ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, v (pp. 516, 521-523).
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offspring of those passions, and are only a more artful 
and more refin’d way of satisfying them. Nothing is 
more vigilant and inventive than our passions; and 
nothing is more obvious, than the convention for the 
observance of these rules. Nature has, therefore, trusted 
this affair entirely to the conduct of men, and has not 
plac'd in the mind any peculiar original principles, to 
determine us to a set of actions, into which the other 
principles ^  our frame and constitution were sufficient 
to lead us.
Being absolutely necessary for man's well-being, concepts
of justice and property need not be placed in the mind as inherent
qualities and are thus entirely artificial: in reaching such a
conclusion Hume obviously felt that he had at last hit upon a neat way
of disposing of all questions concerning the respective roles played
by spontaneity and artifice in the maintenance of human society. Man
was naturally selfish and anti-social, but in order to satisfy his
selfish passions, he was driven to put them under restraint and become
a social being; Hume clearly believed that to resort to a concept of
natural sociability was an example of seeking to explain a given
phenomenon by positing the existence of some occult quality operating
behind the surface of things, an approach which was anathema to all 
76good Newtonians. Hume was convinced that the laws of nature, the
basic principles of human sociability, were in no sense superior to
the positive laws of specific civil societies so far as naturalness 
was concerned; being wholly artificial in form, they could not aspire 
to being founded upon any more sound a base than enlarged self-interest,
and for Hume, as we shall come to see, this meant that they could in
no way form the foundation of these same positive laws. Indeed, if 
we wish to understand why Hume proved so insistent in denying the 
naturalness of his laws of nature, we have to examine the way in which
^ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, vi (p. 526). 
76Passmore, Hume's Intentions, pp. 48-49.
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he converted Of Morals from an analysis of the foundations of justice 
and property into an analysis of the foundations of political 
obligation, for it is here that the real cutting edge of his rejection 
of the concept of natural sociability is to be found.
CHAPTER II
HUMAN NATURE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
(i)
Until a few years ago most students of English political
thought tended to assume that the reason why Locke wrote his Second
Treatise of Government was because he wished to produce a commentary
upon, and a defence of, the events of 1688-89; they were apt to see
him as the ideologue of the Revolution'*' and indeed of the whole
2eighteenth-century constitution in general. Because they were rarely
questioned, these two assumptions managed to achieve the status of
unassailable fact, and as such they graced the pages of various general
3histories of eighteenth-century England, Their whole validity has, 
however, been completely thrown into doubt as a result of recent 
scholarship. For one thing, it has been shown that it was the Exclusion 
Crisis and its aftermath (1679-83) rather than the Revolution which was 
uppermost in Locke's mind when he came to write both of his treatises 
on government; 'Two Treatises in fact turns out to be a demand for a 
revolution to be brought about, not the rationalization of a revolution
4in need of defence'. Similarly, given that the Second Treatise was prim- 
1Two notable proponents of this point of view were T,H. Green and Sir 
Frederick Pollock; the former believed that 'Locke and Hobbes wrote 
with a present political object in view, Hobbes wishing to condemn 
the Rebellion, Locke to justify the Revolution' (Lectures on the 
Principles of Political Obligation, London i931> p< 76j( while the 
latter saw the Second Treatise as ' an elaborate apology for the 
Revolution of 1688' (An Introduction to the History of the Science of 
Politics, London, 1890, p, 65).
2In Sir Leslie Stephen's opinion, 'Locke expounded the principles of 
the Revolution of 1688, and his writings became the political bible 
of the following century'. (History of English Thought m  the 
Eighteenth Century, 2 vols., London, 1902, li, p, 135).
^See e„g. Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy 1714-1760, Oxford, 1945,p.3.
4See Laslett's introduction to Two Treatises, chap. iii.
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arily subversive rather than apologetic in intent, it would seem extremely 
unlikely that the supporters of any status quo should ever find its 
doctrines particularly appealing, a supposition whose applicability 
to the eighteenth century has also been borne out by recent Locke 
scholarship. Throughout the English-speaking world at this time, we 
are told, Locke was widely seen as an apologist for the Revolution; 
but in terms of the real impact of his political doctrines, it was not 
the defenders of the status quo but rather those who felt alienated 
from it  ^for example, Anglo-Irish patriots and the spokesmen for 
the radicalized artisans of the French Revolution period - who were the 
true Lockeans.^
If for no other reason, Hume's argument in Of Morals is 
worthy of close scrutiny in that it provides us with a further reason 
for calling into question the supposed authoritativeness of Locke's 
political doctrines in the eighteenth century. When Hume came to 
convert this argument from an analysis of the various basic restraints 
which underpinned any social group larger than the family into an 
examination of the reasons why some societies lived under organized 
government, he in effect sought to outline a theory of political 
obligation which had as one of its corollaries an insistence upon 
the need for a total acceptance of England's existing political system. 
Had he seen Locke as the most effective ideologue of the contemporary 
British constitution, he would obviously have either adopted the 
doctrines of the Second Treatise for his own purposes or at least have 
commented favourably upon them. But he did not do this - indeed, he
See John Dunn, 'The Politics of Locke in England and America in the 
Eighteenth Century', John W. Yolton (ed,) , John Locke: Problems and
Perspectives, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 45-80, especially pp. 56-60, 
65-69.
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did the very opposite. When we come to examine in detail the theory of 
political obligation outlined in Of Morals, we shall find that Hume 
meant it to form a complete refutation of much of what Locke had said 
on the same subject and that in fact it represents a reversion to a 
basically Hobbesian political stance; Hume's neo-Hobbesian conception 
of the basic social conventions underpinned a neo-Hobbesian conception 
of the basic framework of civil society, Hume obviously would not 
have set out to refute Locke had not the Second Treatise enjoyed 
some sort of prestige in the realm of political ideas; but it is 
surely not without significance that one of the firmest contemporary 
supporters of the eighteenth-century constitution should have considered 
that the best way he could set about becoming its ideologue was by 
writing a critique of the Lockean theory of political obligation.
That this was Hume's basic frame of mind as a political philosopher 
cannot be overemphasized. In seeking to refute Locke, Hume was not 
indulging in futile obscurantism; as a political philosopher he 
accepted completely the new world of politics that had come into being 
since the Revolution, and it was from this point of view alone that he 
criticized Locke.
Hume's opposition to Locke's theory of political obligation 
was an aspect of his rejection of the concept of a natural moral law; 
by attacking the latter he was in effect rejecting the former, for Locke's 
whole conception of the nature and purpose of civil society was 
irrevocably shaped by his overall belief in the existence of such a law. 
Irrespective of whether or not they lived within civil society, all men, 
Locke believed, were obliged by the law of nature to treat each other 
justly, to respect each other as God's workmanship. The reason why 
civil society existed had to be explained in terms of the way in which 
those who refused to live up to this obligation were punished; wherever 
the state of nature prevailed, this power was lodged in the hands of 
private individuals, whereas in civil society the law of nature was upheld
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by the power of the state, 'by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and
the same to all Parties; and by Men having Authority from the Community,
for the execution of those Rules'. Locke did not see the difference
between the state of nature and civil society as a clear-cut difference
7between war and peace, but he still felt that the 'Controversies' 
which were apt to break out amongst mankind were far less likely to 
degenerate into violence when there was a common power to which men 
could appeal to settle their differences than when there was no such
g
common power0 It was to secure full protection for 'their Lives, 
Liberties and Estates' that men lived in civil society; in order to 
secure this protection they consented to give up their right to 
personally execute the natural moral law and entrusted it instead to 
a common power, to the stated
The whole purpose of a civil magistracy being to overcome 
the problems which arose whenever the individual was 'Judge in his 
own Case', it necessarily followed that civil society and absolute 
monarchy were incompatible; an absolute monarch, not being subject to 
a common power, was in a state of nature with respect to the people he 
governedo Should a person to whom the community had entrusted 
political power seek to escape from the yoke of fixed and known general 
laws, he in effect dissolved civil society and restored the state of 
n a t u r e . i n  seeking to gain absolute power over the people, he at 
the same time created a state of war and thus rendered himself liable 
to be treated in the manner in which any determined enemy of the law
^Second Treatise, pars. 7-8, 87 (pp. 289-290, 341-342).
ibid., par. 19 (pp. 298-299).
Öibid„, pars. 20-21 (pp. 299-300).
9 ibid., pars. 95-99, 123-127 (pp. 348-351, 368-370).
19ibid., pars. 13, 89-94, 131, 142 (pp. 293-294, 343-348, 371, 381).
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of nature had to be treated - he 'may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger, 
one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society 
nor Security'.^ In short, in Locke's scheme of things subjects who 
resorted to armed resistance in an effort to prevent the rise of 
arbitrary authority could under no circumstances be justifiably accused 
of endangering the continued existence of either civil society or 
social peace.
When he came to outline his theory of political obligation, 
Hume in effect set out to develop a critique of what he saw as the 
excessive alacrity with which Locke had embraced the concept of a 
right of revolution. Once having posited the basic artificiality of 
human society, he felt obliged to take care to insist upon the need for 
subjects to strictly obey their magistrates. Beyond the context of 
the family, men did not spontaneously come together in embryonic or 
rudimentary social groups, so that the breakdown of social order could 
not but have grim consequences; this meant that a breakdown of 
political obedience was to be avoided at all costs, given that political 
obedience was clearly the most important of the factors promoting 
social peace within the context of civil society. Being convinced 
that all large human social groupings rested upon restraint and 
self-abnegation, Hume went on as a theorist of political obligation 
to insist that a similar situation prevailed with respect to civil 
society in particular.
To be more precise, as a theorist of political obligation 
Hume set out to unfold what, as we have already asserted, can only be 
called an essentially Hobbesian attitude towards the question of how 
far civil magistrates ought to be obeyed; in Of Morals we find him
11ibid,, pars. 11, 16-18, 202, 222 (pp. 291-292, 296-298, 418-419, 430- 
432) .
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developing a theory of political obligation which indeed stresses
that civil magistrates have to be strictly obeyed and yet which at
the same time also points out that the basic loyalty of subjects ought
to be directed not so much towards a particular set of civil
magistrates or form of government but rather towards government as
such. As we have already seen, Hobbes considered that the difference
between civil society and the state of nature essentially took
the form of a difference between peace and perpetual warfare. This
meant that he felt that no price was too high to be paid for
preserving the existence of civil society; he considered that
subjects were scarcely in a position to complain about the fact
that they had to pay strict obedience to a sovereign if they wished
12to continue to enjoy the benefits of social peace. But Hobbes 
did not consider that each individual civil magistrate could 
demand unbroken loyalty from his subjects irrespective of how he 
got on in the topsy-turvy world of politics. Rational self-interest 
- the only true foundation of government - dictated that subjects 
should pay obedience to any person who possessed the power to uphold 
social peace regardless of whether or not he happened to be a 
conqueror or a usurper; a civil magistrate had to be able to extend 
protection to his subjects if he wished to receive obedience in return, 
so that it followed that, no matter how unwarranted his fall from 
power may have been, a deposed civil magistrate was scarcely in a 
position to expect continued obedience on the part of subjects whom 
he was no longer able to protect. When viewed in the context of 
the radical difference between the state of nature and civil society, 
all disputes to do with political, legal and constitutional niceties 
faded into complete insignificance;self-preservation dictated that the 
ultimate loyalty of subjects should be directed towards government
12 Leviathan, chaps, xviii, xx (pp. 120, 136).
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as such, towards whoever had the power to protect them.
In many ways it is tempting to conclude that both the structure 
of Hume's thought and the exigencies of the general political situation 
of his day were such as to make it a perfectly logical step for him to 
convert his denial of the concept of natural sociability into an 
argument on behalf of the proposition that subjects were best advised 
to obey all de facto rulers. There is nothing at all surprising about 
his preparedness to subscribe to such a theory of political obligation, 
given his belief that the state of nature was not an embryonic form of 
social existence. Similarly, living in what after all was a post-revolut­
ionary society, living at a time when England's settled political 
arrangements were scarcely in need of the assistance of a revolutionary 
or subversive ideology, Hume may well have thought that he would serve 
a useful social purpose if he took care to insist upon the need for 
strict compliance with all aspects of the status quo in politics, But 
this line of reasoning is scarcely an adequate explanation of the precise 
circumstances under which he was actually driven to formulate a rival 
theory of political obligation to that canvassed by Locke. After all, 
throughout the eighteenth century many Englishmen showed an amazing 
ability to accept the inhibition appropriate to the politics of a
post-revolutionary society without at the same time eschewing high 
14Lockean rhetoric. Hume, in contrast, felt so compelled to bring about
a reconciliation of language and practice that he was prepared to
develop an alternative theory of political obligation, and in so
exhaustive a fashion as to virtually sacrifice all his hopes of
attracting a wide number of readers as a philosopher. All this suggests
that he was hopelessly out of step with English opinion.
1 3 * ' ^  .......For the premises of this line of reasoning see ibid,, chaps, xxi, 
xxix (pp. 144-145, 218); for its practical implications see ibid.,
^  'A Review, and Conclusion' (pp. 461-463).
For an example of how this divergence of rhetoric and practice operated 
in the actual conduct of politics see John Cannon, The Fox-North 
Coalition, Cambridge, 1969, p. 233.
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But we need to remember here that Hume was not in fact 
English; he was a Scotsman, and this meant a world of difference.
In the England of George II the political nation accepted the funda­
mental correctness of the existing constitution to the extent that it was 
able to conduct its political disputes within an overall context of 
civil peace; this meant that, for all its potentially subversive and 
unsettling influence, Locke's theory of political obligation did not 
have to be repudiated in the name of political stability. However, as 
a Scotsman, as an inhabitant of a country which twice during his 
lifetime was the scene of armed conflict, Hume saw matters in a 
completely different light; the persistence of the Jacobite problem 
throughout the first half of the eighteenth century deeply affected 
his political consciousness in that it focused his attention in 
a particularly sharp way upon the problems involved in justifying 
obedience to a form of government which was unable to command 
the loyalty of a sizable number of the inhabitants of the polity.
Hume was not yet thirty when he came to publish Of Morals 
in 1740, but already in his lifetime the Jacobites had launch«d one 
major uprising (in 1715) in addition to hatching several plots and 
conspiracies, while within less than five years yet another Jacobite 
army was to sweep through the country.^ Government in Scotland 
throughout this period patently rested upon the power of the sword, 
not upon consent, a state of affairs which, so far as Hume was concerned, 
dramatically highlighted the problems involved in seeking to justify 
England's post-revolutionary system by means of Lockean rhetoric.
As we shall see, Hume believed as much as Locke did that civil society
^  For straightforward accounts of Jacobite activity throughout this 
period see George Hilton Jones, The Main Stream of Jacobitism, 
Cambridge, Mass,, 1954 and Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite 
Movement, 2 vols.,London, 1948-50.
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sprang from the consent of individuals and that therefore political
obedience was necessarily conditional. But he also felt that active
opponents of subversive groups like the Jacobites had no choice but
to look beyond these facts when they came to formulate a theory of
political obligation; if they did not do so, they would get bogged
down in insuperable dialectical difficulties:
Has a government ... no authority over (subjects like the 
Jacobites), because they never consented to it, and wou'd 
esteem the very attempt of such a free choice a piece of 
arrogance and impiety? We find by experience, that it 
punishes them very freely for what it calls treason and 
rebellion,^hich, it seems, ... reduces itself to common 
injustice.
In short, the persistence of the Jacobite problem influenced Hume to 
the extent that he never regarded the question of the respective weight 
which ought to be given to the demands of peace as opposed to those of 
revolution in a theory of political obligation as being of merely 
academic interest; his preparedness to canvass a neo-Hobbesian theory 
of political obligation reflected a desire on his part to prove that 
the defenders of an embattled status quo could employ coercion and 
violence without necessarily falling into 'common injustice'.
When viewed in relation to the precarious state of 
political stability in the Scotland of his day, Hume's attitude towards 
de facto power is seen to be explicable not so much in terms of any 
'influence' which Hobbes may have wielded over him but rather in terms 
of the recurrence of a special set of circumstances giving rise to yet 
another manifestation of a particular mode of political thought. We 
have to bear in mind here that in mid and late seventeenth-century 
England periods of chronic political instability invariably threw up a 
crop of political writers who looked upon commitment to government as
^ Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, viii (p. 548).
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such as an excellent means of ensuring peace, if not in the polity ar.
large, then at least in their own minds. In the early 1690's,for
example, some strict Tories were able to submit to the new regime with
a clear conscience as a result of persuading themselves that their
fundamental political duty was to obey whatever happened to be the
government of the day; indeed, in these years when the eighteenth-century
constitution had yet to assume massive stability even a few Whigs were
not above stressing the advantages of paying obedience to de facto 
17rulers. But the real heyday of the de facto theory of political 
obligation was in the 1650's, following the effective assumption of 
power by the Commonwealth after the execution of Charles I. Although 
he was to become the most famous - or infamous - of its proponents,
Hobbes was in fact merely one of a number of political writers of this 
period who insisted that self-preservation dictated that subjects should 
direct their loyalty towards government as such rather than towards a 
particular set of magistrates or form of government. Working independ­
ently of him but equally troubled by the problem of chronic political 
instability, writers such as Marchamont Nedham and Anthony Ascham came 
to a basically similar conclusion - rational self-interest dictated that
subjects should obey whatever happened to be the government of the day,
18irrespective of how it had originated.
(ii)
As Hume saw the matter, the existence of civil society was an 
aspect of man's inability to rigidly follow enlarged as opposed to narrow 
self-interest. If he were to consistently follow enlarged self-interest,the
17 Skinner, 'Hobbes's Ideological Context', pp. 301-303 and 'History and 
Ideology in the English Revolution', pp. 171-176.
1 8 Skinner, 'Hobbes's Ideological Context', pp. 303-312.
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three basic social conventions would not have to be buttressed by a 
further set of constraints, for it was through their strict observance 
that the acquisitive urge was best satisfied. However, this state of 
affairs did not in fact prevail; man's selfishness was such that he 
had a strong propensity for preferring his short-term to his long-term 
interests:
This is the reason why men so often act in contradiction 
to their known interest;and in particular why they prefer 
any trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance 
of order in society, which so much depends on the observance 
of justice. The consequences of every breach of equity 
seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counterbalance 
any immediate advantage, that may be reap'd from it.
They are, however, never the less real for being remote; 
and as all men are, in some degree, subject to the same 
weakness, it necessarily happens, that the violations of 
equity must become very frequent in society, and the 
commerce of me^ by that means, be render'd very dangerous 
and uncertain.
But as we have already seen, Hume considered that human
selfishness was capable of disrupting society only in so far as it
manifested itself in quarrels over the possession of material goods.
This meant, he believed, that not every large human social grouping
had of necessity to take the form of a civil society; not every society
was compelled to buttress the basic social conventions by means of the
power of the state. Being socially disruptive only in so far as it
resulted in disputes over material possessions, human selfishness was
incapable of causing grave social upheval 'where the possessions, and
the pleasures of life are few, and of little value, as they always are
in the infancy of society'. All mankind being originally 'barbarous
and uninstructed', many years elapsed before any society's possessions
increased to such a degree as to put social peace in jeopardy and
thereby make the setting up of civil society necessary. Society with-
20out government was thus 'one of the most natural states of men'.
ToTreatise, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, vii (pp. 534-537).
^ibido, Bk, iii, pt. ii, sect, viii (pp. 539-541).
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But the fact remained that in 'large and pdish'd' societies
the three great laws of nature, although in themselves sufficient to
maintain any society, had to be supported by a further set of constraints
in order to ensure the continued existence of social peace. In such
societies the human propensity to follow narrow as opposed to enlarged
self-interest was capable of causing a complete breakdown of social
order, so that their inhabitants were compelled to devise some means by
which to completely overcome their natural tendency to prefer the
contiguous to the remote. The path they had to follow here was clear:
'Tis evident such a remedy can never be effectual without 
correcting this propensity; and as 'tis impossible to 
change or correct any thing material in our nature, the 
utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and 
situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice 
our nearest interest, and their violation our most remote. 
But this being impracticable with respect to all mankind, 
it can only take place with respect to a few, whom we thus 
immediately interest in the execution of justice. These 
are the persons, whom we call civil magistrates, kings and 
their ministers, our governors and rulers, who being 
indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state, have 
no interest, or but a remote one, in any act of injustice; 
and being satisfied with their present condition, and with 
their part in society, have an immediate interest in every 
execution of justice, which is so necessary to the upholding 
of society. 2^ere then is the origin of civil government 
and society.
But although he felt that it was possible for 'a small 
uncultivated society' to exist without government, Hume still considered 
that no society could exist unless it were based upon the three great 
rules of justice; this meant that justice was necessarily antecedent to 
government and therefore imposed an obligation before the various 
political duties had ever taken shape. Indeed, Hume was prepared to go 
a step further; having depicted government as very largely an offspring 
of self-interested commerce, he went on to claim that its creation would 
be accompanied by the making of a contract, by the making of a promise,
21 ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sects, vii-viii (pp. 536-537, 540-541, 543).
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the characteristic sanction of all forms of this commerce:
...government, upon its first establishment, wou'd naturally 
be suppos’d to derive its obligation from those laws of 
nature, and, in particular, from that concerning the performance 
of promises. When men have once perceiv'd the necessity 
of government to maintain peace, and execute justice, they 
wou'd naturally assemble together, wou'd chuse magistrates, 
determine their power, and promise them obedience. As a 
promise is suppos’d to be a bond of security already in use, 
and attended with a moral obligation, 'tis to be consider'd 
as the original sanction of government, and as the source 
of the first obligation to obedience.22
Far from seeing this view of the origin of political
obligation as in any way unique, Hume in fact believed that it was
perfectly compatible with 'the foundation of our fashionable system of
politics' - the Lockean theory of political obligation - and with 'the
creed of a party amongst us, who pride themselves, with reason, on the
soundness of their philosophy, and their liberty of thought' - the Whigs:
All men, say they, are born free and equal: Government and
superiority can only be establish'd by consent: The consent
of men, in establishing government, imposes on them a new 
obligation, unknown to the laws of nature. Men, therefore, 
are bound to obey their magistrates, only because they 
promise it; and if they had not given their word, either 
expressly or tacitly, to preserve allegiance, it would 
never have become a part of their moral duty.
As far as Hume was concerned, the premise of this whole line of
reasoning was unexceptionable - he never sought to deny that political
power as such was created by consent - but he was convinced that its
conclusion - that political obligation represented the obligation created
when an original contract was entered into - was entirely erroneous if
'carried so far as to comprehend government in all its ages and situations'.
In opposition to this notion he sought to show
that tho' the duty of allegiance be at first grafted on the 
obligation of promises, and be for some time supported by 
that obligation, yet it quickly takes root of itself, and 
has an original obligation and authority, independent of 
all contracts.
22 ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, viii (p. 541).
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For Hume this thesis was extremely important; it was, indeed, the
basic premise of his critique of Locke's theory of political obligation,
so that it was with care and attention that he sought to unfold its 
23implications.
In Hume's opinion, the fundamental flaw of the Lockean 
theory of political obligation was its failure to recognize that the 
essential principles of human sociability were wholly artificial in 
form. Taking advantage of its antiquity and obscure origins, Locke had 
depicted justice as a natural virtue, as something other than a mere 
social convention. He had then set out to engraft upon this concept of 
a natural moral order the even more plainly artificial duties which 
appertained to membership of civil society by seeking to resolve the 
obligation to obey magistrates into the obligation to keep contracts, 
to keep promises. It was, however, Hume was convinced,fruitless to 
search amongst the laws of nature for a stronger foundation for the 
various civil duties than interest and convention; both sets of duties - 
the laws of nature and the various political duties - were, after all, 
on exactly the same footing. Both were mere sets of conventions which
ibid., Bk. lii, pt. li, sect, viii (pp. 541-542). It is necessary 
to point out here that throughout the Treatise Hume rarely mentions 
by name the proponents of the various rival ideas and concepts with 
which he takes issue and that his approach in Of Morals is no 
exception; his theory of political obligation is worked out in 
the form of a critique of the views of unnamed 'philosophers' 
and 'political writers'. However, he was not always to be so coy; 
in 1748 he was to specifically name Locke as 'the most noted of 
(the) partizans' of ' (the) doctrine, which founds all lawful 
government on an original contract', while in a private letter 
written in the same year we find him referring to 'the original 
Contract, the System of the Whigs'. See 'Of the Original Contract', 
Phil. Works, iii, p, 460 and HL, i, p. 112.
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men had devised in order to overcome the difficulties which their
natural selfishness caused and both acquired what moral obligation
24they had only in so far as they were able to serve this purpose.
Men had to live in society if they wished to live in any
degree of comfort and they had to put their passions under restraint
if they wished to live as social beings. The laws of nature represented
that restraint. In order to ensure the satisfaction of their needs
through the strict observance of these laws, the inhabitants of
economically sophisticated societies were compelled to live in civil
societies. Civil duties, then, were devised for the sake of the laws
of nature; but they both shared a common foundation: self-interest.
Furthermore, the interest men had in obeying their magistrates differed
from the interest they had in performing their contracts;government
preserved social peace, whereas contracts facilitated self-interested
commerce. Moreover, the interest they had in observing their contracts
not being more fundamental than the interest they had in obeying their
magistrates, the inhabitants of civil society soon came to place a
similar amount of importance upon each of these duties; the promise
involved in the making of an original contract then ceased to be the
reason why they felt compelled to obey government:
... without (strict obedience to magistrates) no 
government cou'd subsist, nor any peace or order be 
maintain'd in large societies, where there are so many 
possessions on the one hand, and so many wants, real or 
imaginary, on the other. Our civil duties, therefore, 
must soon detach themselves from our promises, and acquire 
a separate force and influence. The interest in both is 
of the very same kind: 'Tis general, avow'd, and prevails
in all times and places. There is, then, no pretext of 
reason for founding the one upon the other* while each of 
them has a foundation peculiar to itself. 5
24 Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, viii (pp. 542-543).
25 ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, viii (pp. 543-545).
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Hume similarly believed that the moral obligation
accompanying obedience to magistrates could not be seen as an aspect
of the moral obligation which accompanied the making of promises. The
inhabitants of civil society almost always had an interest in obeying
their magistrates; the mere thought of rebellion was enough to make
them feel uneasy, and so they came to consider sedition immoral. The
keeping of promises likewise was so much in their interest that the
very thought of faithlessness was enough to make them feel uneasy;
the breaking of promises was thus also invariably censured. But
seeing that they served totally different ends, each of these moral
obligations had to be regarded as perfectly self-sufficient:
We blame all treachery and breach of faith; because we 
consider, that the freedom and extent of human commerce 
depend entirely on a fidelity with regard to promises.
We blame all disloyalty to magistrates; because we perceive, 
that the execution of justice, in the stability of 
possession, its translation by consent, and the performance 
of promises, is impossible, without submission to government. 
As there are here two interests entirely distinct from 
each other, they must give rise to two moral obligations, 
equally separate and independant.^6
Hume's attempt to refute the notion that government
ultimately drew its authority from the promise of obedience involved
in the making of an original contract has above all else to be seen as
an attempt on his part to develop a philosophically coherent rejection
of what he saw as the central notion of Lockean political philosophy,
namely, that government drew its moral authority soley from the consent
of the governed and that therefore absolute monarchy was incompatible
with the ends of civil society. Such a doctrine clearly entailed
whole-hearted commitment to the concept of a right of revolution and
as such it ran foul of Hume's neo-Hobbesian principles. For Hume, it
was not consent - a concept which, as we have seen, he defined as a
26 ibid,, Bk. iii, pt. li, sect, viii (pp. 545-546).
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v o l u n t a r y  accep tance  o f  th e  o b l i g a t i o n s  in v o lv ed  in  th e  making o f  an 
o r i g i n a l  c o n t r a c t  - which gave government i t s  u l t i m a t e  moral  a u t h o r i t y ;  
government was in  f a c t  d e s e rv in g  o f  s u p p o r t  c h i e f l y  in  i t s  c a p a c i t y  
as th e  upho lde r  o f  s o c i a l  p e ac e ,  and given  t h e  grim consequences which 
would accompany a breakdown o f  s o c i a l  o r d e r ,  i t  fo l lowed  t h a t  s u b j e c t s  
ought no t  t o  e x h i b i t  an undue concern  about  th e  observance  o f  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  forms and n i c e t i e s .  Government was b ased  upon man's  need f o r  
s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  r a t h e r  than  upon c o n s e n t ,  and i f  an a b s o lu t e  
monarch proved  capab le  o f  uphold ing  s o c i a l  peace - which Hume d id  no t  
c o n s id e r  to  be a p r i o r i  imposs ib le^“ - he dese rved  th e  f u l l  suppor t  o f  
h i s  s u b j e c t s .
( i i i )
Once he had proved t o  h i s  own s a t i s f a c t i o n  t h a t  th e  
u l t i m a t e  r ea son  why s u b j e c t s  f e l t  o b l i g e d  t o  obey t h e i r  m a g i s t r a t e s  
had to  be e x p l a in e d  in  terms o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  th e y  had in  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  
o f  s o c i a l  peace r a t h e r  than  in  terms o f  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an o r i g i n a l  
c o n t r a c t ,  Hume c o n s id e re d  t h a t  h i s  r e f u t a t i o n  o f  Locke 's  t h e o ry  of  
p o l i t i c a l  o b l i g a t i o n  was complete .  But when we examine t h e  m a t t e r  
c l o s e l y ,  we f i n d  t h a t  h i s  con f ide nce  may have been m isp laced .  The b a s i c  
approach he took  - i n t e r p r e t i n g  Locke 's  id e a s  in  such a way as to  make 
t h e i r  r e f u t a t i o n  an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  th e  development o f  h i s  argument - 
i n e v i t a b l y  l e d  him to  d i s t o r t  t h e  argument o f  t h e  Second T r e a t i s e , 
and so i t  i s  by no means c e r t a i n  t h a t  he was a c t u a l l y  ab le  t o  develop 
as e f f e c t i v e  a c r i t i q u e  o f  Locke 's  th e o ry  o f  p o l i t i c a l  o b l i g a t i o n  as
For Hume a b s o lu t e  monarchy was ' a s  n a t u r a l  and common a government 
as a n y ' .  See i b i d . ,  B k . i i i ,  p t .  i i ,  s e c t ,  v i i i  (p. 549) .  He had,  
a f t e r  a l l ,  w r i t t e n  th e  T r e a t i s e  in  t h e  France o f  Louis XV.
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he would have liked. Taking Locke to mean that subjects felt obliged 
to obey their magistrates only because they had promised to do so 
in an original contract, and finding that such a point of view could 
not be intelligibly expressed in the particular language he had adopted 
for his analysis of the framework of civil society, that it could not 
be squared with the assumptions he had made about human nature and the 
meaning he had given to the concept of justice, Hume naturally regarded 
Locke's theory of political obligation as philosophically incoherent.
His assumption that Locke believed that subjects felt obliged to obey 
their magistrates only because they felt obliged to keep their contracts 
cannot, however, be sustained; Locke did not in fact believe that the 
authority of magistrates was contractual in form.
In Locke's opinion, it was society, not government, which
was held together by a contract; he saw the authority of the civil
2 8magistracy as fiducial rather than contractual in character. The 
people were not contractually obliged to obey their magistrates; governors 
were merely the trustees of the governed, mere deputies who could be 
peremptorily dismissed if they abused the power entrusted to them. Locke 
did not consider that men accepted an obligation previously unknown to 
the laws of nature whenever they established a civil magistracy; govern­
ment was simply a means of better enforcing the law of nature, and all 
men, in both civil society and the state of nature, lived under an 
obligation to obey the law of nature. Men did not have to enter into a 
contract with their magistrates by which they promised obedience in exchange 
for security, for they were of necessity obliged to obey the commands of 
the state whenever they were designed to execute the laws which the community 
had devised with respect to the preservation of property, with respect to
28 For a succint introduction to Locke's concept of trust see Laslett's 
introduction to Two Treatises, pp. 106-116.
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the enforcement of the law of nature. Ultimately, therefore, Locke's
belief that the relationship between the people and their magistrates
was fiducial rather than contractual in form was an aspect of his
concept of natural sociability: 'we can and must trust each other if
29natural political virtue is a reality'.
But for Hume there was no such thing as natural sociability 
or natural political virtue. Man, in his opinion, was inherently selfish 
and so could only become a social being by putting his passions under 
artificial constraints. There was no great law of nature discoverable 
by reason to show him how he ought to act. There were only specific 
laws of nature which hard experience taught him he would have to obey 
if he were to avoid the difficulties his selfishness could lead him 
into. When men came together to form organized government, they simply 
could not afford to act upon the assumption that they were all naturally 
virtuous. By creating a civil magistracy they ensured that in their 
community there would be a group of men having a pressing interest in 
the preservation of social peace and the power to uphold it; but they 
could only assure each other that they would all submit to this further 
constraint by promising to do so - the formation of government was, 
after all, an aspect of self-interested commerce, Once he had established 
this point, Hume felt that he had laid the foundations of his critique 
of Locke's theory of political obligation; he felt that to refute Locke
Sc
all he had toAwas to show that the interest which the inhabitants of 
civil society had in the preservation of social peace gradually came 
to replace the interest they had in the keeping of contracts as the 
ultimate reason why they felt obliged to obey their magistrates. But 
it is hard to see just what this line of reasoning achieved in terms
29 ibid., p . 112.
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of the development of an effective critique of the Second Treatise, 
given that Locke saw the relationship between the people and their 
magistrates as fiducial rather than contractual in form.
But if its effectiveness as a critique of Locke's theory 
of political obligation has to be questioned, Hume's attempt to prove 
that the reason why subjects felt obliged to obey their magistrates 
had to be explained in terms other than the existence of an original 
contract did undoubtedly represent a serious challenge to a political 
belief widely held at the time. We have to recognize here that whenever
we talk about the contractarian tradition in political thought, we must
*
be careful to distinguish between the concept of a social contract and
the concept of a contract of government, the former being an agreement
men make amongst themselves whereby they emerge from a state of nature
and start to lead a fully-developed social existence and the latter
being an agreement regulating the relationship between an already
existing society and its governors. These two concepts are logically
distinct, it being possible to subscribe to one of them without having
30to subscribe to the other. Thus, Locke believed that men in civil 
society were contractually related to each other, but he did not consider 
that they were contractually related to their magistrates. In taking 
such a stance, however, he seems to have represented a minority opinion 
within the broad stream of the constitutionalist thought of his day.
When in 1683 the University of Oxford came to denounce such of the 
current political beliefs as were 'destructive of the kingly government', 
it gave special prominence to the notion that ' (there) is a mutual 
compact, tacit or express, between a prince and his subjects, and that
30 J. W. Gough, The Social Contract, Oxford, 1936, pp, 2-3.
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31if he perform not his duty, they are discharged from theirs'.
Locke himself may not have adhered to such a point of view, but we can
find it expressed by one of his closest friends, the Whig antiquarian 
32James Tyrrell, and at the time of the Revolution few Englishmen
33doubted that James II had broken an original contract. Converted
into political orthodoxy following the events of 1688-89, the concept
of an original contract was still in vogue in the latter decades of
the eighteenth century; in the early 1760's, for example, the young
Jeremy Bentham found that the common lawyers regarded it 'as a recipe
of sovereign efficacy for reconciling the accidental necessity of
34resistance with the general duty of submission'. It has been 
suggested earlier on that Hume's misinterpretation of Locke's ideas 
concerning the nature of political authority can be adequately 
explained purely in terms of the logic of the argument in Of Morals; 
but when we take into account the fact that throughout Hume's life­
time Locke was widely if uncritically acclaimed as a leading ideologue 
of the existing structure of political power, a structure many of whose 
supporters subscribed to the notion of an original contract, we can at 
least say that the general ideological background of the day did not 
provide him with any great incentive to view Locke's theory of 
political obligation as anything other than a purely contractarian
The Somers Collection of Tracts, ed. Walter Scott, second ed.,
13 vols, London, 1809-15, viii, p. 421.
James Tyrrell, Bibliotheca Politica, London, 1718, pp. 498-514, 
587-589.
Gough, The Social Contract, pp. 123-127.
See Wilfrid Harrison's edition of Bentham's Fragment on Government, 
published along with his Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, Oxford, 1948, p,51.
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a rgum ent ,
But g iven  t h e  c l o s e  connec t ion  between th e  id e a  o f  an 
o r i g i n a l  c o n t r a c t  and t h e  id e a  o f  a r i g h t  o f  r e s i s t a n c e ,  Hume had to  
be ab le  to  show t h a t  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  former d id  no t  e n t a i l  r e j e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  l a t t e r  i f  he wished to  avo id  p a i n t i n g  h i m s e l f  i n t o  an 
o b s c u r a n t i s t  c o rn e r .  He d id  no t  s h r in k  from t h i s  t a s k ;  in d e e d ,  he 
was convinced t h a t  he cou ld  produce  a l i n e  o f  r e a s o n in g  on b e h a l f  o f  
t h e  concep t  o f  a r i g h t  o f  r e b e l l i o n  which would be f a r  more cogent  
than  th e  one Locke h i m s e l f  had o u t l i n e d -  h i s  o p in i o n ,  t h e  r e a l  
t r o u b l e  w i th  Locke was t h a t  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  h i s  arguments had f a i l e d  
t o  match th e  e x c e l l e n c e  o f  h i s  i n t e n t i o n s .  Locke 's  pu rpose  in  
r e s o r t i n g  to  th e  concept  o f  an o r i g i n a l  c o n t r a c t  had been t o  demon­
s t r a t e  t h a t  obed ience  t o  m a g i s t r a t e s  cou ld  n e v e r  be u n c o n d i t i o n a l ,  
t h a t  eg reg ious  ty ra n n y  f r e e d  t h e  s u b j e c t  from a l l  t i e s  o f  a l l e g i a n c e .
But so f a r  as Hume was conce rned ,  such a ' p e r f e c t l y  j u s t  and r e a s o n a b l e '  
p r i n c i p l e  d id  no t  have t o  r e s t  upon so ' f a l l a c i o u s '  a p re m is e .  A 
promise  or  c o n t r a c t  was merely a conven t ion  which men had d ev i se d  
because  the y  had an i n t e r e s t  in  exchanging  s e r v i c e s ;  t h e  r ea s o n  why 
government was s e t  up and obeyed had t o  be e x p l a in e d  i n  te rms o f  a 
d i f f e r e n t  s o r t  o f  i n t e r e s t  a l t o g e t h e r :
This  i n t e r e s t  ( c o n s i s t s )  i n  t h e  s e c u r i t y  and p r o t e c t i o n ,  
which we en joy  in  p o l i t i c a l  s o c i e t y ,  and which we can 
neve r  a t t a i n ,  when p e r f e c t l y  f r e e  and in d e p en d en t .  As 
i n t e r e s t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  the  immediate s a n c t i o n  o f  government,  
th e  one can have no lo n g e r  be in g  tha n  t h e  o t h e r ;  and 
whenever t h e  c i v i l  m a g i s t r a t e  c a r r i e s  h i s  o p p re s s io n  so 
f a r  as to  r e n d e r  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  p e r f e c t l y  i n t o l e r a b l e ,  we 
a re  no longe r  bound t o  submit  t o  i t .
The whole purpose  o f  a c i v i l  m a g i s t r a c y  be ing  to  ho ld  s o c i e t y  t o g e t h e r ,
s u b j e c t s  were f r e e  to  r e s i s t  m a g i s t r a t e s  who t h r e a t e n e d  s o c i a l  peace
by g r o s s l y  abus ing  t h e i r  power.  The Tory d o c t r i n e  o f  a b s o l u t e  non-
35r e s i s t a n c e  was a complete a b s u r d i t y .
35 T r e a t i s e , Bk. i i i ,  p t .  i i ,  s e c t ,  i x  (pp . 549-553) .
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For Hume, then, the fact that political power was essentially
artificial in form, the fact that government was not a part of the natural
order of things but was rather an aspect of man's effort to satisfy
his needs, meant that political obedience was inherently conditional.
However, believing as he did in the essential bleakness of the state
of nature, his attitude towards the role which revolution could play
in maintaining the health of civil society was one of deep scepticism.
When he came to express an opinion concerning the respective merits of
obedience and resistance, he came down firmly on the side of the former.
On some occasions a resort to armed resistance could no doubt be justified,
but in the ordinary course of events nothing could be more pernicious
and criminal. No civilized society could exist without government and
no government could exist without strict obedience on the part of
subjects. The inhabitants of civil society should be extremely scrupulous
in putting the doctrine of resistance into practice. Only in cases of
grievous tyranny and oppression could rebellion be justified; if political
obedience ceased to be strictly observed in the ordinary course of events,
36the inevitable result would be anarchy and social chaos.
Having come to the conclusion that'a blind submission is 
commonly due to magistracy', Hume then turned to the next logical question: 
'to whom it is due, and whom we are to regard as our lawful magistrates?'
At the first establishment of civil society, he contended, such a 
question would pose few problems; a society which turned itself into a 
civil society became bound by a promise to obey the persons to whom it 
entrusted political power in the original contract. But once men settled 
down in civil society, their interest in the preservation of civil and 
social peace gradually replaced their obligation to perform contracts 
as the grounds of their obedience. When this happened, they immediately
36 ibid., Bk. lii, pt. ii, sect, x (pp. 553-554).
61
l o s t  th e  power t o  appo in t  i n d i v i d u a l  c i v i l  m a g i s t r a t e s ;  were men to  
seek t o  promote e i t h e r  p u b l i c  o r  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t  th rough  th e  a p p o i n t ­
ment o f  i n d i v i d u a l  c i v i l  m a g i s t r a t e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  would be anarchy and 
th e  breakdown o f  s o c i a l  peac e ,  which th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  government was 
supposed t o  s t r e n g t h e n :
The p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t  o f  every  one i s  d i f f e r e n t ;  and t h o '  
t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  in  i t s e l f  be always one and th e  same, 
y e t  i t  becomes th e  source  o f  as g r e a t  d i s s e n t i o n s ,  by 
r ea s o n  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  o p in ions  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  p e rsons  
conce rn ing  i t .  The same i n t e r e s t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  which causes  
us t o  submit t o  m a g i s t r a c y ,  makes us renounce i t s e l f  in  
t h e  cho ice  o f  our  m a g i s t r a t e s ,  and b inds  us down to  a 
c e r t a i n  form o f  government,  and t o  p a r t i c u l a r  p e r s o n s ,  
w i th o u t  a l low ing  us to  a s p i r e  to  th e  utmost  p e r f e c t i o n  
i n  e i t h e r . 37
P o l i t i c a l  power as such i s  c r e a t e d  by c o n s e n t ,  bu t  once i t
i s  c r e a t e d ,  men l a r g e l y  lo s e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  de te rm ine  who i s  t o  w ie ld  i t :
such a l i n e  o f  r e a s o n in g  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  s t r o n g l y  Hobbes ian ,  and i t  was
in  t h e  cou rse  o f  u n f o ld i n g  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  Hume f i n a l l y  emerged
as a f u l l y - f l e d g e d  de f a c t o  t h e o r i s t ;  i f  what m a t t e re d  above a l l  e l s e
was t h a t  government should  e x i s t ,  t h e n  th e  l o y a l t y  o f  s u b j e c t s  was b e s t
d i r e c t e d  no t  so much towards  any p a r t i c u l a r  form o f  government o r  s e t  of
m a g i s t r a t e s  bu t  r a t h e r  towards  any government capab le  o f  govern ing .  In
Hume's o p in i o n ,  t h e r e  was no maxim 'more conformable ,  bo th  t o  prudence
and m o ra l s ,  t h a n  t o  submit  q u i e t l y  t o  th e  government,  which we f i n d
e s t a b l i s h ' d  in  th e  co u n t ry  where we happen t o  l i v e ,  w i th o u t  en q u i r in g
38too  c u r i o u s l y  i n t o  i t s  o r i g i n  and f i r s t  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ' .  As th e  de 
f a c t o  t h e o r i s t s  o f  t h e  In te r regnum  had done b e f o r e  him, he took p a in s  
t o  p o i n t  out  t h a t  h i s t o r y  - and he re  he s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e f e r r e d  to  the  
case  o f  t h e  Roman empire - was v e ry  l a r g e l y  a saga o f  f o r c e  and v i o l e n c e ,
37 i b i d . , Bk. i i i , p t . l i ,  s e c t . x (pp.. 554-555)
38 i b i d . , Bk. i i i , P t . i i ,  sec t„ x (p. 558) .
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of usurpation and rebellion, in an effort to show the futility of getting
worked up about questions of 'right’ and 'legality' when confronted with
usurped power, in an effort to show that de facto control of power was
the decisive argument when questions of political obedience came to be 
39settled. Rational self-interest dictated that subjects should obey
whoever happened to be the present possessor of power, even if he were
a usurper or a conqueror, for self-interest consisted above all else
'in the preservation of peace, and the avoiding of all changes, which,
however they may be easily produc'd in private affairs, are unavoidably
attended with bloodshed and confusion, where the public is interested'.
Being a Scotsman, Hume inevitably had the Jacobites uppermost in his
mind when he came to expatiate upon the imprudence of not falling in
with the status quo in politics:
Whoever considers the history of the several nations of 
the world; their revolutions, conquests, increase 
and diminution; the manner in which their particular 
governments are establish'd, and the successive right 
transmitted from one person to another, will soon learn 
to treat very lightly all disputes concerning the rights 
of princes, and will be convinc'd, that a strict adherence 
to any general rules, and the rigid loyalty to particular 
persons and families, on which some people set so high a 
value, are virtues that hold less of reason, than of bigotry 
and superstition. In this particular, the study of history 
confirms the reasonings of true philosophy; which ... 
teaches us to regard the controversies in politics as 
incapable of any decision in most cases, and as entirely 
subordinate to the interests of peace and liberty.40
It is to be noted that in this attack on the Jacobites Hume
invokes the name of liberty as well as that of peace. Now it is quite
For an indication of how the de facto theorists of the Interregnum 
exploited history on behalf of usurped power see Skinner, 'History 
and Ideology in the English Revolution', pp. 163-164, 166-168; for 
Hume's emulation of them in this respect see Treatise, Bk. iii, 
pt. ii, sect, x (pp. 556, 558).
40 ibid., Bk„ iii, pt. ii, sect, x (pp. 557, 562).
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understandable why he should have referred to peace, for his whole theory 
of political obligation was based upon a commitment to order and 
acquiescence. We have already seen that he in effect believed that if 
man were to remain a truly human being, he had no choice but to keep 
on accepting all the duties entailed by membership of civil society, 
amongst which strict obedience to magistrates was paramount. His 
overriding concern being to stress that subjects had duties as well as 
rights, Hume was under no obligation in Of Morals to discuss what 
privileges they could claim, and he had every incentive to eschew doing 
so in an argument which amounted to a critique of the Lockean theory 
of political obligation, the central weakness of which he considered 
to be an undue stress upon rights. It is tempting to dismiss Hume's 
reference to liberty in the course of his attack upon the Jacobites as 
merely an outburst of exasperated rhetoric on the part of a writer who 
was at one with the Whigs in their opposition to any changes in the 
succession. But such a judgement has to be modified when we recall that 
during the course of his discussion of the notion of a right of 
revolution we find Hume contending that civil society exists primarily 
because men would never enjoy 'security and protection' were they to 
attempt to live'perfectly free and independent'. In expressing such 
an opinion Hume might seem to be committing himself to the notion that 
men sacrifice a natural freedom by living in civil society. However, 
if we recall his overall attitude towards civil society, we have to 
reject this line of reasoning. If man enjoyed 'force, ability, and 
security' only when he led a social existence and if civil society was 
the outcome of the good use of these three gifts, it followed that they 
could be enjoyed to the full only within its confines. Now if force, 
ability and security do not constitute freedom, what possibly can? 
Certainly, given his belief in the essential bleakness of the state of
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nature, natural freedom for Hume could scarcely be a desirable asset.
But if we assume that he did believe that liberty in the sense of personal 
freedom and security could exist only within civil society and was thus 
the offspring of order and restraint, his reason for attacking the 
Jacobites in the name of liberty becomes explicable,, If personal 
freedom and political order were inseparable, the Jacobites and all 
other subversive groups were truly the enemies of liberty.
But if Hume saw personal liberty as an aspect of order,
many eighteenth-century Englishmen saw order itself as an aspect of
political liberty; in their opinion, the particular virtue of the
British constitution was that it distributed power amongst several
branches of government each of which checked and balanced the others
thus making arbitrary exertions of power impossible.^ Obviously
recognizing its importance, Hume sought to come to grips with this
point of view by rounding off his argument concerning the nature of
political obligation with a brief assessment of how he considered his
ideas stood in relation to 'that famous revolution, which has had such
a happy influence on our constitution, and has been attended with such
42mighty consequences'. Specifically, he was concerned with the 
question of how justified the English had been in overthrowing James II 
in 1688. That they were not automatically debarred from resorting to 
armed rebellion Hume did not doubt; self-preservation and social order 
dictated that in any civil society subjects were free to resist acts 
of enormous tyranny and oppression. The real problem was to establish 
whether the circumstances of 1688 had been such as to justify the English
41 For the authoritative eighteenth-century expression of this attitude 
see Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
fifth ed., 4 vols., Oxford, 1773, i, pp. 154-155.
42 Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, x (pp. 563-567).
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acting in the way they had. It was clear, Hume felt, that nobody could
draw up a set of general criteria by which men could judge whether or
not a specific rebellion was justifiable. Furthermore, the mixed
constitution of England made provision for a powerful chief magistrate;
this meant that the laws of the land were necessarily silent concerning
a right of resistance: 'an exercise of power, in so great a magistrate,
may at one time be beneficial to the public, which at another time wou'd
be pernicious and tyrannical'. But against this could be set the fact
that under a mixed constitution the chief magistrate could rightfully
be desposed not only when he pursued measures which were in themselves
pernicious but also when he sought to deprive the other branches of the
constitution of their share of power. No mixed constitution could
survive unless each of its various branches had the power to maintain
its share of authority; it was absurd to suppose 'a right without a
remedy, or allow, that the supreme power is shar'd with the people,
without allowing, that 'tis lawful for them to defend their share
43against every invader'.
Ultimately, however, Hume was not prepared to say whether
or not he saw the Revolution as a vindication of imperilled rights and 
44liberties; when he came to express an opinion on the matter, he took 
care to base his judgement upon the only criterion which he as a de 
facto theorist of political obligation could recognize: it was success
alone which made the events of 1688-89 appear right and proper in the 
eyes of the eighteenth century. Although considering that most royal 
dynasties and commonwealths arose out of force and violence, Hume did 
not believe that their power forever rested upon such a foundation:
43 ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect. x (pp. 563-564)
44 ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect. x (pp. 564-565)
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Time ... gives solidity to their right; and operating grad­
ually on the minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, 
and makes it seem just and reasonable. Nothing causes any 
sentiment to have a greater influence upon us than custom, 
or turns our imagination more strongly to any object. When 
we have been long accustom'd to obey any set of men, that 
general instinct or tendency, which we have to suppose a 
moral obligation attending loyalty, taken easily this direction, 
and chuses that set of men for its objects.
Rational self-interest was too hard-headed an attitude for the vast bulk 
of people who were averse to the clinical detachment of the political 
scientist. Their loyalty was strongest when it arose from custom or 
habit; 'that which gives authority to all the most establish'd govern­
ments of the world without exception (is) long possession in any one
45form of government, or succession of princes'.
Applying this reasoning to the case of the Revolution, Hume 
found that, for all the controversy it had provoked at the time, the 
accession of William of Orange 'must have acquir'd a sufficient authority 
from those three princes, who have succeeded him upon the same title'. 
Princes acquired legitimacy from their successors as well as from their 
ancestors; provided that he could settle his family upon the throne, a 
usurper attained, in the eyes of posterity, the status of a lawful prince. 
Julius Caesar and Hugh Capet were regarded as lawful princes, whereas 
Cromwell and Sulla were doomed never to rise above the status of a 
usurper. Any royal dynasty which had attained a patina of respectability 
as a result of the passage of time was automatically deemed by its 
subjects to have always enjoyed an undisputed title, irrespective of 
how far historical fact indicated the contrary. Hume saw a similar 
state of affairs prevailing with respect to rebels; success turned them 
into revered patriots - 'the establish'd liberty of the Dutch is no 
inconsiderable apology for their obstinate resistance to Philip the
45 ibid., Bkt iii, pt. ii, sect, x (p. 556).
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second'. That Hume meant this line of reasoning to be applied to the 
case of the men of the Glorious Revolution goes without saying. The 
whole argument he advanced in Of Morals culminated in a commitment to 
established power, and in his discussion of the Revolution, with his 
willingness to fall in with such of the prejudices of the vulgar as 
were conducive to the maintenance of the status quo and to accept 
success as the decisive argument in political debate, he indicated that 
he had every intention of applying the ideas he held as a supporter of 
de facto power to the case of the political system which had taken shape 
following the events of 1688-89. The task that now confronts us is to 
examine just how he set out to do this. Such an examination necessitates 
a survey of his activity as an essayist and historian, for it was 
mainly in these capacities that he outlined in precise form the attitude 
he held concerning the mixed constitution of eighteenth-century England.
46
46 ibid., Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, x (pp. 566-567).
P A R T  I I
T H E  E S S A Y I S T
CHAPTER III
THE MIXED GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND
(i)
The inability of the Treatise of Human Nature to attract
sympathetic attention in no way weakened Hume’s fundamental commitment
to the life of letters. The most he was ever prepared to concede was
that his manner - not his matter - had been at f a u l t t h e  main lesson
he drew from the whole affair was that it was his fate to live ’in an
age, wherein the greatest part of men seen agreed to convert reading
into an amusement, and to reject every thing that requires any consid-
2erable degree of attention to be comprehended’. He believed, in short,
that he was under no obligation to reassess the basic goals and
methods of his moral philosophy; the only thing he had to do was to
discover a literary genre which did not demand ’any tiresome stretch
3of Attention or Application’. After 1740 he published no more long
and involved philosophical treatises. But he did not abandon his
overall attempt to develop a comprehensive science of man, quite
obviously believing that he could pursue such a goal without having
to resort to abstruse reasoning.
It did not take Hume long to discover a way he could set
about to broaden his appeal to the reading public - he would become
an essayist. In the spring of 1739, when it had already become clear
that the success of the Treatise would be modest at best, he decided to
4turn his hand towards producing a number of essays, a task which he
 ^My Own Life, HL, i, p. 3.
2 Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. i, sect, i (p. 456).
 ^Phil. Works, iii, p. 42.
4 NHL, p. 5.
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took up in a systematic fashion once it became certain that he had 
scant hope of producing a philosophical treatise possessing popular 
appeal.^ He was quite certain in his own mind as to what he wanted 
to achieve as an essayist; through his essays he intended to supply 
the world of 'Company and Conversation' with 'Topics of Conversation 
fit for the Entertainment of rational Creatures', in particular history, 
poetry, politics and philosophy. By doing so, by expressing the 
opinions he held as a political scientist and critic not in a 
further two volumes of the Treatise but by means of a series of 
essays, he hoped to bring about a kind of union between the worlds 
of company and learning.^ Coming from someone who but a short time
7before had been yearning to effect 'a total Alteration in Philosophy' 
such an ambition undoubtedly represented a considerable comedown. 
Nevertheless, it was a change of direction which Hume felt he simply 
had to take. If he were to become a professional man of letters, he 
would have to be able to express his ideas in a popular and attractive 
form, and following the failure of the Treatise he had become convinced 
that if he were to persevere with a 'moaping recluse Method of Study', 
he would remain unintellible and perhaps might even become downright 
chimerical. He felt that he could avoid both of these evils only by 
turning to the essay; he would have to develop clarity of expression 
or go under, and by writing with the needs of everyday life uppermost 
in his mind, he would have to regularly consult common experience, g
which in his opinion was the only proper standard in moral philosophy.
Hume at first intended to publish his essays in a series 
of weekly instalments, but towards the end of 1741 he abandoned this 
plan and decided instead to put them out in book form. In December 
 ^My Own Life, HL, i, p. 2.
 ^ 'Of Essay Writing' (1742), Phil. Works, iv, pp. 367-369.
7 m L > P- 3-
 ^ 'Of Essay Writing', Phil. Works, iv} p. 368.
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he had fifteen essays published in Edinburgh under the title of Essays
Moral and Political, and in the following January he put out a second
9volume, this time containing twelve essays. As Hume himself admitted
at the time, some of the items he included in these two volumes were
mere trifles,^ and in later life he was to suppress some of them on
the grounds that they were frivolous.^ However, from the point of
view of the development of his political science, Essays Moral and
Political still represented a marked advance, roughly half of its
twenty-seven items reflecting in various ways Hume’s interest in
men 'united in society, and dependent on each other'. In terms of
the reading public's response, Hume's literary judgement was largely
vindicated, Essays Moral and Political being favourably received
12in Edinburgh and London. In the middle of 1742 he brought out a
second edition of the first volume, and six years later he published
13a new edition of the whole work.
In 1752 Hume published Political Discourses, a collection
of a further twelve essays, all of which were devoted to political,
14sociological and economic topics. Characterized by an extreme 
lucidity of style and suffused with a mood of elegant urbanity, this 
work undoubtedly represents the height of his achievement as an 
essayist; 'well received abroad and at home', it was the first of 
his writings which aroused widespread interest on the continent.^
But with its publication Hume's activity as an essayist largely came
11
12
13
15
ibid., iii,pp. 41-42; Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 138-140.
Phil. Works, iii, p . 41.
Mossner, Life of Hume, p. 140.
My Own Life, HL, i, p . 2; NHL, p . 10.
Jessop, Bibliography of Hume, pp. 16-17.
For the genesis of this work see Mossner, Life of Hume, chap. 20. 
My Own Life, HL., i, pp. 3-4; Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 225-229.
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to an end; it was in 1752 that he began work upon his History of
England, a task which was to occupy much of his time for the next
ten years. After the publication of Political Discourses Hume in fact
published only three new essays. One - Of the Jealousy of Trade
(1759) - is of no particular interest so far as the student of his
political science is concerned. Another - Of the Coalition of Parties
(also 1759) - is very largely a by-product of his activity as a
historian and will be examined in that context. The third - Of the
Origin of Government - is a very late work - it was probably written
in the winter of 1773-74 and was not published until 1777 - and
is essentially a brief summation by Hume of his basic political 
16creed. But the most important thing to be remembered here is that,
apart from these three exceptions, all of Hume's essays were first
published between 1741 and 1752, that is to say, between the time
when Of Morals was published and the time when the first volumes of
his History made their appearance, and so they can quite accurately
17be said to represent a distinct phase in his study of politics.
For the-history of these three late essays see HL, i, pp. 272, 317; 
ii, 287-288, 324.
Unless otherwise indicated, the argument of this and the next two 
chapters will be based upon an examination of Hume's essays in the 
form in which they appeared upon their initial publication. Hume, 
it should be noted, subjected his essays to a constant process of 
revision, altering sometimes merely stylistic points, but sometimes 
altering aspects of his argument as well. Significant alterations 
effected during the period 1742 to 1758 will be taken into 
account in the argument of these three chapters; significant 
alterations effected after 1760 will be discussed in the 
final chapter. When not otherwise identifiable, the volume 
in which an essay made its first appearance (whether the first 
or second volume of Essays Moral and Political, the first 
revised edition of both of these volumes or Political Discourses) 
will be indicated by the date of original publication (1741,
1742, 1748 and 1752 respectively) being given in parentheses 
when the essay is first referred to. For a synoptic survey 
of Hume's activity as an essayist see Phil. Works, iii, pp. 85-86. 
See also Stewart, Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy, pp. 
405-408.
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(ü)
The various essays which Hume devoted to the topic of man 
as an inhabitant of civil society are best seen as an attempt on his 
part to grapple with the question of the relationship between mixed 
government and political stability, between political liberty and 
the preservation of order and authority. In Of Morals Hume had not 
had to examine this question with any degree of rigour, for in that 
work his basic intention had been to delineate what he took to be 
the essential framework of civil society, and in such an analysis 
the concept of political liberty necessarily occupied only a 
peripheral place in the argument, since for Hume the sine qua non of 
civil society was unquestionably authority, and not political liberty. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that in Of Morals Hume did defer to 
the prevailing state of political opinion to the extent of raising, 
albeit in a rather tangential way, this very question of the relation­
ship between mixed government and political order, and in his essays 
he did so again, and this time in a far more exhaustive fashion. After 
all, he had become an essayist in order to be able to canvass 
questions of interest to the common reader, and in the England of his 
day one such question was undoubtedly the worth of a mixed constit­
ution as a form of government, it being a commonplace at the time that 
the British constitution owed its undoubted excellence to the fact 
that it was an ingeniously arranged system of checks and balances.
We have already contended that when they sought to explain 
the precise nature of this excellence, eighteenth-century Englishmen 
invariably did so in terms of the prevention of unchecked arbitrary 
exertions of power. But we have also noted that in Of Morals Hume 
did not go along with this approach; he did not seek to define 
personal freedom and security in terms of the existence of a particular 
set of political institutions. He instead depicted it as an aspect of
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order and stability, and he in turn depicted the continued existence of 
stability as being best ensured whenever subjects faithfully obeyed 
whatever happened to be the government of the day, irrespective of how 
it had arisen or of the form it took. In other words, Hume did not 
believe that personal freedom was inextricably bound up with political 
liberty, with mixed government. However, for all the heterodoxy of 
his political principles, the fact remained that as a supporter of 
de facto power he had in all consistency to support the current 
status quo in politics, which for him was the mixed government 
of England; he had, in other words, to come to terms with the 
dominant stream of political thought, with its stress upon the value 
of political liberty. The unifying theme of the essays Hume wrote 
as a political scientist takes the form, then, of an attempt on his 
part to square the frequently articulated belief of his contemporaries 
in the virtues of mixed government with his own far more personal 
notion that any form of government or set of magistrates was deserving 
of obedience so long as it was capable of ensuring the secure 
enjoyment of social peace and political stability.
The importance of the unifying theme of Hume's political 
essays in his political science as a whole, the depth of his interest 
in the relationship between liberty and authority in civil society, 
becomes apparent when we realize just how strongly this concern comes 
through in Of the Origin of Government, which, as we have stated, must 
be viewed as not only Hume's last essay but as also a kind of basic 
statement in which he set out the fundamentals of his political 
creed; writing it near the end of his life, he inevitably had his 
attention focused upon his ultimate values. In this essay the 
foundations of the political philosophy first outlined almost forty 
years before in Of Morals are still intact. Government is still
depicted as an attempt on man's part to prevent the social chaos
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which the element of blind selfishness in his nature would bring
18about if left unchecked. But Hume also takes pains to argue
that this does not mean that political authority is necessarily
absolute. There has to be a great sacrifice of liberty in civil
society, but this sacrifice is never total, for in every civil
society, the power of the civil magistrate is subject to the
influence of a certain irreducible number of informal checks and
restraints; the power of any civil magistracy is inevitably
circumscribed in that political reality forces it to pay consideration
to the values and customs of the people it governs. Even under
a supposedly despotic form of government the enjoyment of personal
freedom is never wholly in jeopardy; the sultan cannot impose new
taxes at will, while a French monarch cannot arbitrarily take away
the life or the livelihood of individual subjects. Political power
in every civil society exists within the context of a basic cultural
or ideological structure - Hume calls this 'opinion’ - which moulds
the way in which it is exercised, which means that 'there is a
perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, between AUTHORITY and
LIBERTY; and neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the 
19contest'.
But although he always believed that personal and political 
liberty were not inextricably bound together, Hume took care in Of 
the Origin of Government to point out that he felt that it was by no 
means completely wrong-headed to talk about the one in terms of the 
other. The checks and restraints upon the arbitrary exertion 
of power need not always be purely informal. Personal freedom was 
indeed most secure when it was buttressed by political liberty;
1 8 Phil. Works, iii, pp. 113-115.
^  ibid., iii, p. 116.
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by stating without pejorative comment the orthodox view of the value 
of constitutional government and the rule of law> Hume in effect gave 
it his tacit approval:
The government, which, in common appellation, receives 
the appellation of free, is that which admits of a 
partition of power among several members, whose united 
authority is no less, or is commonly greater than that of 
any monarch; but who, in the usual course of admin­
istration, must act by general and equal laws, that are 
previously known to all the members and to all their 
subjects.20
But since he saw opinion operating as an informal restraint upon the
power of any civil magistracy, Hume did not regard the difference
between constitutional government and absolute monarchy as a clear-
cut difference between freedom and slavery; he always considered that
their difference in this respect was essentially a matter of degree,
not of kind. As a good neo-Hobbesian, he believed that the difference
between one form of civil society and another was dwarfed by the
difference between any form of civil society and no form of civil
society at all; political liberty might expand and strengthen personal
security, but widespread personal security could only exist within
the confines of civil society, and it was authority, and not political
liberty, which held civil society together. Political liberty was
indeed the perfection of civil society; but it was authority alone
21which was essential to its very existence.
For Hume, then, there was no unbridgeable gap between free 
states and absolute monarchies so far as the enjoyment of personal 
security was concerned. But he never went so far as to assert that 
no difference existed at all, and the precise nature of this difference 
was always of great interest to him. In the present context it is 
important to bear in mind that whenever Hume talked about liberty in 
terms of laws and institutions, his whole approach was decisively
2  ^ibid., iii, p . 116.
21 ibid., iii, pp. 116-117.
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influenced by his belief that political virtue was artificial rather 
than natural in origin. We have already seen that in Of Morals Hume 
rejected any idea that civil magistrates upheld order and justice 
because of an innate love of virtue; he considered that the real 
reason why they did so was because their possession of political 
power meant that the preservation of order and peace in their society 
was very much in their interest. Now there was a corollary to this 
line of reasoning which Hume was at pains to develop in his essays.
It may be stated thus: When men are politically virtuous, when
they faithfully perform their civil duties, the best way we can 
explain why this is so is by assuming that the laws and institutions 
which they are living under are arranged in such a way as to compel 
them to act according to the public good; given man's inherent 
selfishness, any attempt to explain this state of affairs in terms 
of the inhabitants of the civil society concerned having a personal 
predilection for virtuous behaviour has to be rejected. Liberty, 
therefore, in so far as it is inseparable from civil peace, has 
ultimately to be seen as the offspring of well-ordered laws and 
institutions.
Such certainly are the assumptions which underlie the 
argument of That Politics may be reduced to a Science (1741), an 
essay in which we find Hume stating at some length his ideas concerning 
the relationship between institutions and liberty. He broaches its 
argument by contending that the essential difference between free states 
and absolute monarchies is that in an absolute monarchy an absence 
of the various political evils - 'Oppression, levity, artifice on the 
part of the rulers; faction, sedition, treachery, rebellion, disloyalty 
on the part of the subjects' - is very largely the outcome of 'the 
casual humours and characters' of the rulers and as such is a result 
of chance whereas in a free state it occurs practically as a matter
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of course, being the outcome of a system of laws and the form of 
government:
All absolute governments... must very much depend on 
the administration; and this is one of the great 
inconveniences attending that form of government. But 
a republican and free government would be an 
obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and 
controuls, provided by the constitution, had really 
no influence, and made it not the interest, even of 
bad men, to act for the public good. Such is the 
intention of these forms of government, and such is 
their real effect, where they are wisely constituted:
As on the other hand, they are the source of all 
disorder, and of the blackest crimes, where either 
skill or honesty has been wanting in their original 
frame and institution.
Strictly speaking, then, a civil society cannot be deemed to be
absolutely secure in the possession of liberty simply because it enjoys
political stability and social peace; its stability has to be a
consequence of well-ordered laws and institutions if it is to be
classed as a genuine free state. The England of Elizabeth and the
France of Henry IV prove that it is perfectly possible for the
subjects of an absolute monarch to enjoy the fruits of good
government. But their enjoyment of its blessings can never be
anything else but precarious, for its rests upon no more secure a
22foundation than the casual humours of the prince.
But we should not forget Hume's proviso in the statement 
we have just quoted, his insistence that the institutions of a
constitutional state must reflect either skill or honesty if it is to
be classed as a genuine free state; Hume took pains in That Politics 
may be reduced to a Science to point out that he felt that political 
stability and social order could be just as vulnerable in a republic 
where this was not the case as in the most absolute of monarchies.
In his opinion, the history of the Roman republic revealed this
truth in dramatic fashion. In the Roman republic the sole legislative
22 ibid., iii, pp. 98-99.
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assembly was the whole body of the people. Being unrestrained by
other legislative assemblies or by representative institutions,
Rome's 'rascally citizens' became daily more licentious and Roman
politics eventually degenerated into a scene of perpetual tumult
and sedition; 'the whole government fell into anarchy, and the
greatest happiness, which the ROMANS could look for, was the
despotic power of the CAESARS'. All this showed just how dependent
23upon order liberty was.
A similar faith in the ability of skilfully arranged
laws and institutions to bring about the secure enjoyment of good
government can be found expressed in Of the Independency of Parliament
(1741). At the start of this essay we find Hume examining in a
general way the implications of the 'just political maxim' that
'every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end,
in all his actions, than private interest'. No matter how honest
they may be in private life, men are governed by insatiable
avarice and ambition alone when they take part in public affairs,
especially when party politics is involved. In private life men
restrain their more unruly passions out of a sense of honour.
But this check is removed when they participate in party politics,
for a partisan can be certain that his party will approve anything
he does to advance its cause. In determining the worth of a
particular political system, then, the only proper method to follow
is to discover how efficacious its institutional arrangements are
in channelling the various base motives which influence political man
into the service of the public good; if these arrangements are
unable to achieve this end, an outbreak of faction, disorder and
24tyranny is more or less inevitable.
23 ibid., iii, p. 99-100.
24 ibid., iii, pp. 117-119.
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Now if well-modelled institutions can largely stifle
faction, disorder and tyranny, why should not perfect laws and
institutions be able to compel the inhabitants of civil society to
act the part of perfect political beings? Hume's belief that well-
ordered institutions could suppress the natural depravity of political
man and then compel him to act according to the public good had
obvious utopian tendencies, and in the essay Idea of a Perfect
Commonwealth (1752) we find him developing these tendencies to the
full. Forms of government do not depend for their merit upon 'the
manners and humours of particular men'. It is possible, therefore,
to draw up a perfect form of government, a form of government whose
laws and institutions will bring about good government in any civil
society upon which it is imposed, no matter how little disposed
towards politically virtuous behaviour the individual members of
that society would have been in the natural course of events. Hume's
perfect commonwealth is a civil society whose perfection lies in its
institutions, not in its inhabitants; its institutions, Hume tells
us, are arranged in such a way as to make the outbreak of such
evils as mob rule, demagoguery, oligarchy, faction and intrigue 
25impossible. This faith in the beneficial effects of well-modelled
institutions strongly influenced the attitude Hume took to other
perfect commonwealths. Plato's Republic and More's Utopia were
'plainly imaginary', for they both presupposed 'great reformation in
the manners of mankind'; Harrington's Oceana, with its concern
with laws and institutions, was 'the only valuable model of a
26commonwealth, that has yet been offered to the public'.
25 For the theoretical premises of this essay see ibid., iii, pp. 480- 
481, 487-490, 492-493; for the actual form of government outlined 
see ibid., iii, pp. 482-487.
ibid., iii, p. 481.26
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But what really needs to be said about the form of government 
delineated in Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth is that it is not a mixed 
constitution. In Of Morals Hume had already defined such a constitution 
it was a system of checks and restraints in which the political 
balance of power took the form of countervailing monarchical and 
republican elements, with an individual chief magistrate whose power 
was great but not unlimited, being balanced by the power of the 
representatives of the people, the republican element of the constit­
ution. Such a description cannot be applied to Hume's perfect form 
of government. It is certainly a balanced constitution; it comprises 
a whole host of checks and restraints. But it is not a mixed 
constitution; it makes no provision for a single powerful chief 
magistrate. It is wholly republican in form; in Hume's opinion,
the actual form of government it bore most resemblance to was that
27of the United Provinces. It bore little resemblance to the
eighteenth-century British constitution, which is depicted as a
mixed constitution par excellence in Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth;
although the King of England was a limited monarch, his personal
character still had a tremendously important influence upon the
conduct of political affairs, given that a mixed constitution
28necessarily possessed marked monarchical features. In effect, then, 
what Hume was saying in this essay was that the British constitution 
was far from ideal or perfect as a form of government. Such an 
attitude seems straightforward enough, given his frequent espousal of 
the opinion that a consititution was only as good as the degree to 
which it subordinated the will of individuals to the power of laws and 
institutions.
ibid., iii, p. 490. 
28 ibid., iii, p. 491.
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But there is another and far more important sense in which 
we can say that Hume believed that mixed government had pernicious 
effects so far as the preservation of order was concerned. We can 
say indeed that what he really feared was not so much that mixed 
government might perhaps lessen the importance of laws and institutions 
but rather that the very opposite might be the case, that mixed 
government might in fact give too much consideration to legal and 
constitutional niceties at the expense of the effective exercise of 
authority. As a good neo-Hobbesian, Hume's most elemental fear was 
always that government might be too weak, not that it might be 
too strong; the ultimate reason why he considered England's mixed 
government to be imperfect was because he felt that under it the 
authority of the chief magistrate tended to become unduly circumscribed. 
This attitude comes through strongly in his essay Of the Liberty of 
the Press (1741). Hume's attention in this essay is centred around 
the problems involved in determining the sort of polity most likely 
to look favourably upon complete freedom of expression. At the 
outset of its argument we find him rejecting any suggestion that 
such a question can be tackled in terms of a clear-cut difference 
between republican and monarchical states. In a French-style 
absolute monarchy law, custom and religion concur to make the 
people fully satisfied with their lot; the prince need not entertain 
any jealousy of his subjects, and thus he can afford to tolerate much 
freedom of expression. In contrast, in a Dutch-style pure republic 
there is no single powerful chief magistrate and as a result the
people consider that there is no danger involved in entrusting the
29state with wide discretionary powers.
In terms of the amount of personal freedom they tolerated,
29 ibid. , n i , p. 95 .
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then, there was no clear-cut difference between pure republics and 
absolute monarchies; Hume in fact sought to show that the most 
drastic contrast in this respect was between the two basic variants 
of mixed government. A mixed constitution in which the republican 
element predominates over the monarchical tends to be characterized 
by extreme freedom; a mixed government in which the monarchical 
element predominates over the republican tends to be characterized 
by oppression and slavery. This is all a result of the spirit of 
mutual watchfulness and jealousy which springs up in mixed 
governments. The history of imperial Rome indicates that whenever 
the monarchical element prevails in a mixed government, the chief 
magistrate invariably becomes a frightful tyrant; the restless s p m t  
of liberty prevailing amongst his subjects continually provokes 
him into using his power with extreme rigour. A completely different 
state of affairs is found in a British-style mixed government; 
here the republican element predominates, and so it is amongst the 
people that the spirit of watchful jealousy is found. They seek to 
preserve their hegemony by stripping the chief magistrate of all 
discretionary power; general and inflexible laws keep prerogative 
within very narrow bounds. All this means 'that there is as much 
liberty, and, even, perhaps, licentiousness in GREAT BRITAIN, as there 
were formerly slavery and tyranny in ROME'. In Hume's opinion, 
the most spectacular manifestation in England of this pugnaciously 
libertarian climate of opinion was the unfettered freedom which the 
press enjoyed; England was the only polity existing in the world 
in which subjects were free to openly attack every measure entered 
into by the government.^
30 ibid., iii, pp. 94-97.
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It is now clear why Hume should have considered that Holland 
was superior to England so far as its form of government was concerned; 
given his commitment to political peace, it was natural that he 
should prefer a form of government under which the state possessed 
wide discretionary powers to one which allowed the people to indulge 
in licentiousness. Moreover, besides believing that the British 
constitution was not particularly well-equipped to deal with problems 
associated with the maintenance of political stability and law and 
order, Hume also felt that precisely because it had a mixed constitution, 
England was especially prone to experiencing these very same problems.
In Of the Parties of Great Britain (1741) we find him explaining 
why he considered this to be the case, why he considered that England's 
mixed government had to be classed as a veritable breeding-ground of 
political conflict. E-ven when it is merely considered as a subject 
of speculation, he argues, the British constitution is found to be an 
inevitable source of party divisions. Under England's mixed constitution 
it is inevitable that politics should be characterized by outbursts 
of party conflict between court and country, between the partisans 
of royal authority and the champions of parliamentary privilege, given 
the sort of relationship which exists between the monarchical and 
republican elements of the constitution, the King and the House of 
Commons:
(iii)
The just balance between the republican and 
monarchical part of our constitution is really, in 
itself, so extremely delicate and uncertain, that, 
when joined to men's passions and prejudices, it is 
impossible but different opinions must arise 
concerning it, even among persons of the best 
understanding. Those of mild tempers, who love peace 
and order, and detest sedition and civil wars, 
will always entertain more favourable 
sentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous 
spirits, who are passionate lovers of liberty, and 
think no evil comparable to subjection and slavery.
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And though all reasonable men agree in general to preserve 
our mixed government; yet, when they come to particulars, 
some will incline to trust greater powers to the crown, 
to bestow on it more influence, and to guard against its 
encroachments with less caution, than others who are 
terrified at th^most distant approaches of tyranny and 
despotic power.
But although he considered that this clash between court
and country was ultimately grounded upon rivalry between two bodies of
political opinion, Hume also felt that it was 'very much fomented by
a difference of INTEREST, without which (it) could scarcely ever be
dangerous or violent'. As depicted in Of the Parties of Great
Britain, this difference of interest very much centres around the
struggle for place. The crown as a matter of course bestows power
and place upon only those politicians 'whose principles, real or
pretended, are most favourable to monarchical government'; the
court-party is thus driven by material self-interest into going to
greater lengths in defence of prerogative than its principles would
otherwise carry it. On the other hand, politicians who miss out in
the scramble for place ally themselves with the country-party, and
being disappointed in their ambitions, they spitefully strive to get
their allies to carry their jealousy of royal power to a greater
32height than sound politics will justify.
To understand the full import of this aspect of Hume's 
argument, we have to place it in its precise historical context; we 
have to bear in mind that throughout the eighteenth century one of 
the great myths which dominated country-party thinking was its belief
Jthat the presence in the House of Commons of men holding offices of 
profit under the crown posed a serious threat to the power of 
parliament in relation to that of the crown and therefore endangered
ibid., iii, pp. 133-134. 
ibid., iii, p. 134.
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the continued existence of England's mixed constitution, Opposition
politicians ceaselessly played upon this fear, and in times of
political crisis or unrest they invariably sought to compound the
ministry's difficulties by calling for the exclusion of placemen from 
33the Commons, By the time he came to publish Of the Parties of 
Great Britain in 1741 Hume must already have been well aware of the 
precise form the agitation against placemen took. In 1734, on the eve 
of a general election, and again in 1740, after Sir Robert Walpole had 
failed to prevent England going to war with Spain, the parliamentary 
opposition sought to compound confusion by attempting to secure the 
passage of a Place Bill, and during the course of their efforts to
34do so, they were able to make use of stock country-party rhetoric.
This period also say the apprearance of one of the most glittering
expressions of the country-party's hatred of placemen ever to be
published in the eighteenth century - the Dissertation on Parties
(1733-34) of Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, who at the time was
the leading extra-parliamentary spokesman for Walpole's political 
35opponents.
For all its clamour and insistence, country-party condemn­
ation of placemen made scant impression upon Hume. It was in Of Morals 
that he chose to state his basic attitude to the question, an attitude
For a general discussion of the significance of the demand for 
Place Bills in eighteenth-century politics see Betty Kemp, King 
and Commons 1660-1832, London, 1957, pp. 23, 52-64, 104; a sample 
oY the legislative enactments brought about by this agitation 
may be found in E, Neville Williams (ed,), The Eighteenth-Century 
Constitution 1688-1815, Cambridge, 1965, pp, 188-208,'
For the debates in parliament which followed upon these opposition 
moves see The Parliamentary History of England, ed. William Cobbett, 
36 vols., London, 1806-20, ix, cols, 366-392; xi, cols, 328-380.
For the gist of Bolingbroke's case see Dissertation on Parties, 
letters xviii-xix, Works, ed, David Mallet, 5 vols., London,
1754, ii, pp, 229-256*;
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which he never fundamentally altered: order and authority cannot but
be strengthened whenever civil magistrates have the power to interest
others more immediately in the execution of justice by being able to
36create a number of civil and military officers to help them govern.
Given this attitude, Hume was naturally opposed to Place Bills,
designed as they were to weaken the power of the crown by lessening
the value of its appointments. It was as an essayist that he set
out his opposition in an explicit form, by means of a brief yet telling
critique of Bolingbroke's Dissertation on Parties which appropriately
enough forms the core of the argument advanced in Of the Independency
of Parliament. Had Bolingbroke examined the constitution with a little
more care, he argued, he would have realized that the chief threat
to its equipoise is posed not by the crown but by the parliament.
The British constitution is widely touted as the model of a mixed
constitution; but the fact of the matter is that it assigns so much
power to the Commons that its members could, if they so wished, easily
secure absolute power. The sole legislative power possessed by the
monarch - the veto - has long since fallen into desuetude. The
crown is only of consequence because of its control of executive
power. But it is the Commons alone which has the power to provide
the money needed to run the executive, and if it should choose to make
all its grants conditional, it would soon reduce the crown to utter
subservience. Given that it has the power to do so and given that
an insatiable lust for power is a strong human trait, there is an
obvious- question to be asked: Why has not the Commons made itself
37the sole member of the constitution?
36 Treatise, Bk. iii, pt. ii, sect, vii (p. 537).
37 Phil, Works, iii, pp. 119-120.
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Hume’s answer to this question amounted to a restatement
38of the standard court-party line of the time concerning Place Bills.
England's mixed constitution had been kept intact by 'influence':
...the house of commons stretches not its power, 
because such an usurpation would be contrary to the 
interest of the majority of its members. The crown 
has so many offices at its disposal, that, when 
assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the 
house, it will always command the resolutions of the 
whole so far, at least, as to preserve the antient 
constitution from danger. We may, therefore, give 
to this influence what name we please; we may call 
it by the invidious appellations of corruption and 
dependence; but some degree and some kind of it 
are inseparable from the very nature of the 
constitution, and necessary to the preservation 
of our mixed government.
All this being so, it necessarily followed that, far from strengthening
the constitution, Place Bills could only undermine it. Hume felt that
instead of wildly asserting that the slighest dependence of the Commons
on the crown necessarily jeopardized the country's freedom, country-
party spokesmen ought to accept the court-party's contention that in
itself influence was not pernicious and ought instead to restrict
themselves to calling for a determination of the boundary beyond which
influence became excessive and thus dangerous to liberty. Such an
examination would have to be carried on with great caution and
prudence, for legitimate influence was not a fixed quantity, being
instead something which fluctuated according to the varying capacities
of the particular individuals - whether the king or his ministers -
39who made use of the crown's fund of patronage.
That the country-party was not in fact prepared to tone down 
its condemnation of influence proved, Hume felt, that its self- 
proclaimed adoration of the constitution was in reality nothing 
more than a verbal smokescreen designed to conceal narrow and base
For the court-party line in the 1740 debate on Place Bills see 
Parliamentary History, xi, cols. j31-335, 339-342, 345-351, 361-369.
39 Phil. Works, iii, pp. 120-122.
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partisanship; the basic conclusion arrived at in Of the Independency
of Parliament was that a true patriot would never be a zealous
opponent of influence, for he would be well aware that too little
influence, as well as too much, would lead to the collapse of the 
40constitution. Hume felt the country-party would mount a far stronger
case were it to abandon its blanket opposition to influence and
instead limit itself to claiming that influence, although not in
itself pernicious, was in fact becoming excessive; he was convinced
that the fund of revenue and patronage at the disposal of the crown
was so great that its authority was bound to become absolute. This
prospect, however, did not unduly disturb him. Although believing that
the chance of absolute monarchy arising in England was the more
imminent, he was convinced that the prospect of a wholly popular form
of government was undoubtedly the more frightening. The inexorable
growth of influence would slowly and peacefully convert England into
an absolute monarchy; but should influence be destroyed, the Commons
would immediately become the sole member of the constitution, a
development which would culminate in either faction-ridden oligarchy
or popular licentiousness, both of which would in turn lead to the
establishment of a Cromwellian-type dictatorship. England would thus
at last 'find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have been
41happier for us to have established peacably from the beginning'.
In the tension and friction generated by the struggle 
between court and country over matters of political principle and 
material self-interest Hume saw tinder enough to produce an 
inherently explosive political situation. However, what really 
compounded this state of affairs so far as he was concerned was a
^  ibid.iii,-p. 121.
41 'Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, 
or to a Republic' (1741), ibid., iii, pp. 123-126.
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third factor - sectarianism; although not in itself an effect of mixed
government, this further exacerbated rivalry between court and country. In
Of the Parties of Great Britain Hume was content to outline this aspect of
English politics in a rather peremptory fashion. An established clergy
always opposes the cause of liberty, being well aware that its power
cannot but be endangered by freedom of thought and expression. There is
also a close connection between monarchy and episcopacy. The Anglican
clergy, therefore, 'while things are in their natural situation’, will
invariably be staunch adherents of the court-party. The Dissenters,
on the other hand, being of necessity committed to religious toleration,
42are the natural allies of the country-party, the party of liberty.
To discover in detail how Hume related sectarian conflict to the 
rivalry between court and country, we need to take into account the argument 
of another of his essays, Of Superstition and Enthusiasm (1741). In this 
essay Hume set out to delineate what he saw as the markedly different 
social and political consequences flowing from an evangelistic as opposed 
to a sacramentalist mode of religious behaviour (the enthusiasm and 
superstition of the title respectively). In Hume's opinion, the difference 
between these two forms of religious behaviour strongly resembled the 
difference court and country, being similarly grounded upon two divergent 
sets of passions and prejudices; like the clash between court and country, 
the struggle between superstition and enthusiasm was grounded upon differ­
ences between men of boldness and passion and men of a more passive bent. 
Superstition, we find Hume arguing, thrives best in a climate of fear, gloom 
and despair. Enthusiasm, on the other hand, is the religion of the 
hopeful, the proud, the passionate and the presumptuous. Springing 
from radically different states of mind, they have widely divergent 
effects on social and political behaviour. Being dominated by fear
42 ibid., iii, pp. 135-136.
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and sorrow, people who are prone to superstition tend to consider 
themselves unworthy of approaching God in a direct way; they seek 
instead to come into contact with Him in an indirect fashion, through 
the prayers and ceremonies of priests. Roman Catholics and Jews 
groan under the yoke of the two most degrading forms of superstition 
that have ever existed and so they suffer the worst excessess of 
priestly tyranny. Anglicanism, too, retaining as it does 'a strong 
Mixture of Popish Superstition', has ’a Propensity to Priestly Power 
and Dominion'. Only sects of enthusiasts are free from the yoke 
of priests. Being bold and passionate, they scorn all species of 
external ritual and seek instead to come into direct contact with 
God by means of contemplation and ecstasy; they have scant need for 
a priesthood. ^
This marked difference between superstition and enthusiasm
with respect to the power of priests has important political
consequences. Because their bold and passionate opposition to
servility in the church spills over into opposition to servility in the
state, enthusiasts are invariably committed to the cause of civil
liberty. Indeed, because of a common libertarian and iconoclastic
background, they are perfectly capable of forging firm political
alliances with the religiously heterodox:
We learn from ENGLISH history, that, during the civil 
wars, the independents and deists, though the most 
opposite in their religious principles; yet were 
united in their political ones, and were alike passionate 
for a commonwealth. And since the origin of whig and 
tory, the leaders of the whigs have either been deists 
or profest latitudinarians in their principles; that is, 
friends to toleration, and indifferent to any particular 
sect of Christians: While the sectaries, who have
all a strong tincture of enthusiasm, have always, 
without exception, concurred with that party, in 
defence of civil liberty.
43 ibid., iii, pp. 144-147..
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Superstition, in marked contrast, makes men tame and abject and so
prepares the way for the rise of absolute monarchy: ’(the)
resemblance in their superstitions long united the high-church
tories, and the Roman catholics, in support of prerogative and
kingly power’. Hume considered, in short, that throughout the
whole course of modern English party politics the clash between
court and country, the clash between the forces of authority and
liberty in politics, had been inextricably bound up with the
clash between the forces of authority and liberty in religion, with
44the clash between superstition and enthusiasm.
An examination of what Hume took to be the three main 
facets of the struggle between court and country does not fully 
cover all the aspects of the case he puts together in Of the Parties 
of Great Britain: an equally important element of the overall 
argument of the essay is the attempt he makes to discover just how 
adequate his account of the general framework of court-country 
rivalry is as an explanation of the course of modern English party 
politics. Hume initially directed his attention towards the events 
of the political crisis preceding the outbreak of civil war in 1642. 
He soon discovered that they were entirely ’conformable' to his 
thesis. When Charles I came to the throne, the English constitution 
was in ’a kind of confusion', Englishmen, nevertheless, had long 
enjoyed a considerable body of privileges. These privileges, 
however, were not accurately bounded and secured by law, and Charles, 
an 'ambitious, or rather a misguided' prince, regarded them as mere 
royal concessions and thus revocable at will. Acting in accordance 
with this principle, he openly violated the liberty of his subjects; 
but necessity eventually forced him to summon a parliament. When it
44 ibid., iii, pp. 149-150.
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met, its members set no bounds upon the constraints which they
45sought to impose upon their now defenceless monarch.
Faced with the dilemma of having to choose between an 
encroaching parliament and a prince with strong absolutist 
tendencies, Englishmen fell to the side which was most conformable 
to their usual principles; those whose bias lay towards monarchy 
joined the king, while those whose bias lay towards liberty 
supported parliament. Although 'enflamed into a civil war, by an 
unhappy concurrence of circumstances, and by the turbulent spirit 
of the age', both groups were true court and country-parties.
Few Cavaliers wanted to bring about the creation of an absolute 
monarchy, while few Roundheads wished to set up a pure republic; 
their differences concerned the precise positions which monarchy 
and parliament ought to occupy in a constitution of whose worth 
few had any doubts. This division between court and country was 
matched by a division between superstition and enthusiasm; an 
established clergy combatted presbyterian dissidents. Having 
shamelessly concurred with the king’s designs and having in turn 
been allowed to persecute the Puritans, the Anglican clergy were
royalists to a man; the Puritans supported parliament with equal
46unanimity.
But when he came to examine the history of party strife in 
England after 1660, Hume was forced to qualify his argument somewhat.
He had to take the struggle between Whigs and Tories into account, 
and when he did, he had to acknowledge that England's parties were 
in a confused state. Originally, however, he insisted, the division 
between Whigs and Tories represented a clear-cut division between court
^  ibid., iii, p . 136.
^  ibid., iii, pp. 136-137.
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and country; it arose in the course of conflicts between the supporters
and opponents of the policies pursued by Charles II. With its
shibboleths of passive obedience and indefeasible right the Tory
party began life as a rather violent court-party; its ideology
virtually amounted to an invitation to Charles II and then to James
II to set up an arbitrary government. But for all this, it soon forgot
its 'absurd principles' when James II 'openly threatened' to
overthrow 'the ancient government' of the country, and its
participation in the Revolution proved that, despite its rant, it
was not prepared to sacrifice liberty for the sake of ideological
purity. The only pre-Revolution Tories who took their party's
ideology seriously were the pulpit-declaimers and their deluded
followers amongst the vulgar; the membership of the early Tory
party consisted mainly of men who had a personal affection for the
Stuarts or who were out for self-aggrandizement. Because it had
not taken its ideology seriously, the early Tory party could
unhesistatingly be classed as a true court-party: such a party
47did not abandon liberty in its commitment to monarchy.
Once the Revolution had been carried out, however, 
confusion soon set in. Despite their participation in the Revolution, 
the Tories did not favour the tampering with the succession that 
occurred in 1689 and again in 1714. Although lovers of liberty, 
they were, being court-party men, greater lovers of monarchy and 
naturally felt that such tampering smacked too much of republicanism. 
But even after William of Orange and then the House of Hanover had 
become firmly entrenched upon the throne, the Tory party still did not 
rally around the monarchy. For Hume, this state of affairs indicated 
that since 1714 the ultra-royalist ideology of the Tories had really
47 ibid., iii, pp. 137-139, 142.
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been nothing more than an extravagant manifestation of their sole cohesive 
principle in opposition - personal affection for the Stuarts. He believed 
that because of this attachment the Tory party of the early 1740's was in 
fact a country-party; for all its self-professed commitment to monarchy, 
it regularly descended into hypocrisy by adopting a republican style of 
politics in order to spite the Hanoverians. By way of contrast, the 
Whig party, because of its association with the Protestant succession, 
had become a court-party. All this meant that England's party divisions 
were in a confused state. The crown, besides drawing political support 
from the adherents of authority, attracted the support of groups - for 
example, the Dissenters - who were the natural allies of the country- 
party but who instead supported government policy because of Whig senti­
ment. Similarly, the permanent political opposition did not consist 
solely of the adherents of liberty; it also consisted of groups - such 
as the Anglican clergy - who were the natural allies of the court-party 
but who instead supported the country-party because of Tory sentiment. 
Although much decayed in zeal, numbers and credit, considerable remnants 
of the old Tory party still existed in the England of the early 1740's; 
this meant that the succession was not moribund as a political issue,
and as a result English party politics was not solely a matter of
48rivalry between court and country,
ibid., iii, pp. 139-140, 141-143. Hume's assertion that the division 
between Whigs and Tories was not extinct was made in conscious 
opposition (see ibid., iii, pp. 139-140) to an assertion Bolingbroke 
had made in Dissertation on Parties (see letter i, Works, ii, pp. 
29-38) to the effect that this division had come to an end and that 
therefore English party politics was solely a matter of rivalry 
between court and country. Bolingbroke, it should be remembered, 
had a Jacobite past to live down and so it was natural that he should 
have set out to stress the unimportance of the division between Whigs 
and Tories; in contrast, Hume, as a Scotsman, could hardly help 
noticing the persistence of the succession issue and so it is under­
standable that he should have looked beyond the division between 
court and country in order to explain the course of modern political 
history. His analysis of the status of the post-1714 Tory party 
stands up well in the light of modern scholarship; in this respect 
see especially John B. Owen, The Rise of the Pelhams, London, 1957, 
pp. 66-75 and Romney Sedgwick, The House of Commons 1715-1754/
2 vols., London, 1970, i, pp, 62-78.
CHAPTER IV
THE SOCIOLOGY OF FREEDOM
(i)
If he wished to fully portray how the England of his day 
stood as a civil society, Hume had to do more than simply delineate 
the essential aspects of the tension between public authority 
and political liberty which he saw as the dominant theme of its 
party politics, given the fact that it had a mixed constitution.
To be more precise, if he wished to achieve this goal, he could 
not afford to simply take the existence of mixed government 
for granted. He had to be able to explain why it should be that 
there were any republican elements in the English constitution in 
the first place, why it should be that in England public authority, 
which by itself was perfectly capable of holding civil society 
together, had had to come to terms with the spirit of political 
liberty; he had to be able to show how it had come about that the 
people had arrived in a position whereby they possessed both the 
power and the will to circumscribe the authority of the civil 
magistrate by means of legal and constitutional forms. He had, 
in short, to think in sociological and cultural rather than in 
institutional terms if he wished to explain why England had a mixed 
government at all.
Because he believed that political authority was above 
all else the sine qua non of civil society, Hume was chiefly concerned 
to examine its origins as a political philosopher. The rise of 
civil society was essentially an outcome of man’s attempt to satisfy 
his basic needs, and the existence of civil society logically 
entailed the existence of political authority, so that the genesis of 
political obedience had to be accounted for in primarily abstract 
psychological, speculative, ahistorical terms; it is to Of Morals
96
that we must look if we wish to discover Hume's attitude concerning 
this question. But in Hume1s scheme of things the rise of political 
liberty was another matter altogether. Political liberty was not 
essential to the existence of civil society; in this respect it 
was, strictly speaking, accidental in status, and therefore in a real 
sense it was something which had to be approached from a wholly 
historical point of view. Hume believed that there was a certain 
irreducible amount of personal freedom and security which was 
ensured by the mere existence of civil society; but he also knew 
that certain civil societies had sought to expand and strengthen 
personal freedom by means of political liberty, by means of legal 
and constitutional restraints upon the exercise of political power. 
The mere existence of civil society could be explained by means 
of political philosophy, that is to say, in terms of certain basic 
assumptions about man's essential nature and condition; but being 
accidental, being only the perfection of an already existing entity, 
political liberty had to be studied in terms of the particular 
circumstances to be found in those individual civil societies which 
placed great store upon it, in terms, that is to say, of the 
historical experience and sociological and ideological structure of 
specific civil societies.
Whenever he sought to explain the rise and spread of 
political liberty in terms of history, sociology and ideology 
rather than in terms of institutions, Hume was forced to question the 
perspicacity of the opinion he frequently expressed to the effect 
that it was basically the degree to which a civil society's 
institutional arrangements reflected skill or wisdom which determined 
whether or not it could be assured of the secure enjoyment of good 
government. As we have already observed,this point of view is 
undeniably a marked feature of the way in which Hume thought about
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politics, forming as it does the basic assumption underlying the 
argument of such essays as That Politics may be reduced to a Science 
and Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth. But since it involved a 
concentration upon outward political forms, it was an inherently 
narrow, rather legalistic, and even mechanistic way of thinking, 
while having marked utopian tendencies, it stands revealed as having 
had a potentially blighting influence upon the development of 
Hume's political science; if political behaviour could be shaped 
and moulded at will by skilful legislators, it obviously followed 
that it could not be treated as an accurate reflection of the 
historical experience and social structure of actual civil societies. 
Indeed, had Hume's faith in the ability of institutions to decisively 
shape political behaviour been absolute, he would have found it 
impossible to account for any form of political change; after all, 
if political forms were the cause of everything else in civil society 
being as it was, how were the changes which political institutions 
themselves underwent to be accounted for? This was obviously a 
vicious circle.
The only possible way Hume could have avoided this 
dilemma, the only way he could have set about explaining political 
change without having to modify his faith in the ability of 
institutions to decisively shape political behaviour, was, of course, 
by consistently subscribing to the concept of the legislator, to 
the notion that an individual civil magistrate could impose good 
government upon the people he governed by making them submit to the 
yoke of well-ordered laws and institutions. Hume in many ways found 
the concept of a legislator quite appealing; we have already noted 
that in Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth it is presupposed that 
individual politicians can create perfect polities through the 
skilful arrangement of political forms, and elsewhere in his essays
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we find Hume expressing a similar faith in the ability of individual 
magistrates to work wonders in politics.'*' But ultimately Hume was 
too much of a sociologist to give any meaningful credence to the 
concept of a legislator; he felt that it was 'scarcely... consistent 
or rational' to suppose that a civil magistrate would attain an aware­
ness of the benefits which flowed from constitutional government and
the rule of law without there being some knowledge of these benefits
2already diffused amongst his subjects or neighbouring states.
By subscribing to this notion Hume in effect committed himself 
to the view that political forms were very largely the outcome, 
and not the cause, of broader changes within the structure of 
civil society; once this point was established, the whole concept 
of a semi-divine legislator immediately came crashing to the 
ground.
We have in fact already reviewed enough of Hume's
thinking about politics to realize that he was perfectly capable
of describing political behaviour in terms of the broad sociological
and ideological structure of civil society. As noted in the
previous chapter, in Of the Origin of Government we can find him
contending that the actual way in which political power is
exercised in specific civil societies need not be described in
terms of formal institutional arrangements at all, that it can
instead be adequately explained in terms of opinion, in terms of
the basic cultural factors which go to make up the view which
the inhabitants of a civil society hold concerning the nature and
extent of their rights and duties. That this concept of opinion allowed
Hume to relate political behaviour to broader movements within the
'*' See e.g. 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science', Phil. Works, 
iii, pp. 98-99 and 'Of Parties in General' (1741), ibid., iii, 
p. 127.
'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences' (1742), ibid., 
iii, p. 179.
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total life of the inhabitants of civil society has been already 
revealed in our discussion of the argument he put forward in Of 
Superstition and Enthusiasm, an argument which culminated in the 
contention that the clash between the forces of public authority 
and political liberty which took place in seventeenth-century 
England could not be adequately explained until it was seen in 
relation to the state of contemporary religious opinion, until it 
was seen in relation to the clash between superstition and 
enthusiasm.
(ii)
3It was in the essay first published as Of Luxury (1752)
that Hume chose to put forward the most considered statement of
opinion concerning this question of the broad context of politics
which he was ever to make as an essayist. In this essay he was
specifically concerned with the social and political effects of
luxury, defined here as 'great refinement in the gratification of 
4the senses'. In order to understand just why such a topic should 
have attracted his attention in the first place, we have to take into 
account the importance of a particular mode of thought in the 
English-speaking world of the eighteenth century, a mode of thought 
which took the form of an insistence upon the inseparability of 
luxury and 'corruption'. Espoused by the various wings of the country- 
party - opposition politicians, old-fashioned Whigs, unregenerate 
Tories, independent country gentlemen both in and out of parliament, 
radical pamphleteers and disgruntled men of letters - this point of 
view - when it was not merely cynical party rhetoric - was rooted in
In 1760 this essay was retitled Of Refinement in the Arts. 
 ^Phil. Works, iii, p. 299.
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the fear that the feverish activity so characteristic of the 
financial sector of the economy of post-Revolution England was 
leading to the corruption and decay of the country’s traditional 
love of freedom and independence in that it reflected an increasing 
willingness on the part of Englishmen to concentrate upon the 
pursuit of luxury, upon the satisfaction of their private economic 
needs, at the expense of their duty as political beings to give 
paramount attention to the public good, to the well-being of the 
community as a whole, a development which was culminating in a 
growing propensity on their part to seek economic gain through political 
dependence, by succumbing to the encroachments of executive power, 
a form of corruption which had already brought about the creation 
of groups dependent upon the existence of public credit - stock­
jobbers - a bureaucracy - placemen - and a standing army - professional 
soldiers,^
The influence of this mode of thought was quite pervasive.
It coloured, for example, much of the thinking of the American
Revolution.^ Similarly, its influence in the guise of a 'politics
of nostalgia’ has been detected at work in the propaganda campaign
which Bolingbroke directed against Walpole in the 1720’s and 1730's.
Bolingbroke sought to discredit Walpole's ministry by depicting it as
the most blatant manifestation of the overall corruption of England's
ancient virtues; he sought to convince the public at large that the
way in which Walpole used influence to hold his court-party
supporters together - his distribution of lucrative yet dependence -
creating jobs and places - was profoundly subversive of the freedom
 ^ For the underlying ideological premises of this mode of thought see 
J.G.A, Pocock, 'Civic Humanism and its Role in Anglo-American 
Thought', Politics, Language and Time, London, 1972, pp. 80-103.
 ^See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, chap. ii.
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of the Commons and that it therefore had to be regarded as the most
insidious and dangerous aspect of the overall assault on the liberties
7of England by the forces of luxury and corruption. Between the 
1670’s, the era of Marvell and Shaftesbury, and the 1780's, the 
era of Christopher Wyvill and his colleagues in the Yorkshire 
Association, the rhetoric of critics of executive power largely
g
revolved around these concepts of luxury and corruption. In 
order to strengthen parliament's willingness to forgo becoming 
involved in highly profitable yet ultimately degrading dependence 
upon the crown, such archetypal representatives of eighteenth-century 
country-party opinion as Robert Molesworth, Major John Cartwright 
and James Burgh ceaselessly canvassed the cause of parliamentary 
reform. We have already discussed the significance of one of the 
country-party's stock demands - the call for the exclusion of place­
men from parliament; other reforms it advocated in the name of 
parliamentary independence included the introduction of annual 
parliaments, the abolition of rotten boroughs and the extension of the
franchise and the binding of members to their constituents by means
g
of instructions. In short, it seems that throughout most of the
See Isaac Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his Circle: The Politics of
Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole, Cambridge, Mass./ 1968, chaps, 
i, iii, vi.
The best introduction to the formation of the ideology of the eight­
eenth-century country-party is J.G.A, Pocock, 'Machiavelli,
Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth 
Century', Politics, Language and Time, pp. 104-147; the importance 
of this way of thinking in shaping political debate in the first half 
of the reign of George III is revealed by H. Butterfield, George III, 
Lord North, and the People 1779-80, London, 1949 and Ian R. Christie, 
Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, London, 1962.
For the reform ideas of one wing of the eighteenth-century country- 
party - the old-tashioned Whigs - see Caroline Robbins, The 
Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, chaps, 
i, iv, viii, ix, x. See also Williams, Eighteenth-Century 
Constitution, pp. 208-221.
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eighteenth century it was the country-party's fear of corruption 
which formed the most important stream of radical - albeit radical in 
the sense of radical-reactionary - and subversive political thought 
in England.
So far as Hume was concerned, the country-party's fear of 
corruption was by no means completely wrong-headed. We have already 
seen that he believed that the growth of influence, if allowed to 
go unchecked, would eventually overwhelm the power of the Commons. 
Similarly, Hume was always particularly concerned about the country's 
growing public debt.^ However, as our discussion of his attitude 
towards influence has also revealed, Hume never sought to align 
himself with the concrete counter-measures against corruption 
canvassed by the country-party; given the connection between the 
fear of corruption and political radicalism and given Hume's commitment 
to de facto power, there eventually was a parting of the ways. If 
he were to succeed in inculcating a mood of acquiescence in the status 
quo in politics, Hume obviously had to discredit the style of politics 
which flowed from the country-party's fear of corruption, the whole 
spirit of which was inimical to the development of a mood of 
quiescence and tranquillity; his de facto theory of political obliga­
tion, his preparedness to insist that the immediate present was the 
sole dimension relevant in debate concerning the grounds of political 
obligation, had as its corollary a denial that modern times were 
hopelessly corrupt and venal, a denial that men could find desirable 
alternatives to the current set of political arrangements if they 
cared to look back into the past. It is just such a line of 
reasoning which we find being unfolded Of Luxury; in this essay we 
find Hume striking at the root of country-party rhetoric. He did
10 In this context see especially 'Of Public Credit' (1752), 
Phil. Works, iii, pp. 360-374.
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so by denying that luxury could be seen as 'the source of all the 
corruptions, disorders, and factions, incidental to civil government', 
by asserting, indeed, that 'the ages o efinement are both the 
happiest and most virtuous'.^ Hume was not prepared to resort to 
a Mandevillean insistence upon the connection between private vices 
and public benefits - he found such a notion perverse - but in his 
stress upon the notion that the pursuit of luxury, when not taken 
to excess, did indeed produce 'a large stirring Nation' we have 
perhaps hit upon the reason why he considered the author of the Fable
12of the Bees to be one of the pioneers of scientific moral philosophy. 
Han, we find him arguing, develops his gifts of mind and body only 
through work, and it is luxury, with its ceaseless clamour for goods 
and services^which sustains a steady demand for labour. It is the 
rise and spread of luxury, the gradual flourishing of industry and 
the arts, which sets men free from the languor and lethargy inseparable 
from backwardness and poverty, thereby allowing them to experience 
the sense of fulfilment which accompanies purposeful action; absorbed 
in honest industry, they are unlikely to develop the unnatural
ibid., iii, p . 300.
For Hume's rejection of the notion that vicious luxury was benefic­
ial to society see ibid., iii, pp. 299-300, 307-309; for the 
reason why Mandeville should have puzzled Hume here see F.B.
Kaye's introduction to his edition of Fable of the Bees, 2 vols., 
Oxford, 1957, pp, xiv-xxi. Kaye's thesis is that, for polemical 
purposes, Mandeville adopted a 'rigorist' definition of virtue 
according to which all aspects of the pursuit of luxury were 
necessarily vicious. For Hume's acknowledgement of Mandeville 
as a pioneer of moral philosophy see his introduction to the 
Treatise, p. xxi; for Mandeville's insistence upon the 
importance of the pursuit of refinement in producing a great 
and prosperous hive see 'The Grumbling Hive' and Remarks K,L, 
M,Q,S,X,Y, Fable of the Bees, i, pp. 17-37, 103-134, 181-198, 
223-224, 245-251.
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appetites produced by ease and idleness. Once put into a fermentation,
they seek to improve all aspects of knowledge and the various arts,
13liberal as well as mechanical.
Upon becoming 'enriched with science, and possessed of a 
fund of conversation', men develop an insatiable thirst for social 
intercourse and therefore for urban living. The more sociable they 
become, the more well-disposed they begin to feel towards each other; 
industry, knowledge and humanity are thus inseparable and can only 
exist in ages of luxury. Industriousnes and knowledge being 
inseparable, good government similarly can only exist within an 
overall context of luxury; a well-modelled form of government is 
unlikely to exist amongst a people whose faculties have not been 
sharpened as a result of application to commerce and industry. Thus, 
as with the arts and sciences, political life only reaches its most 
highly-developed form amongst people who satisfy their needs with 
great refinement:
Knowledge in the arts of government naturally begets 
mildness and moderation, by instructing men in the 
advantages of humane maxims above rigour and severity, 
which drive subjects into rebellion, and makes the 
return to submission impracticable, by cutting of all 
hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men are softened 
as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity appears 
still more conspicious, and is the chief characteristic 
which distinguishes a civilized age from times of 
barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then less 
inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less 
severe, and seditions 1es^frequent. Even foreign wars 
abate of their cruelty...
Now for Hume liberty was inseparable from good government, 
so that in Of Luxury he could in all consistency claim that it was 
only the inhabitants of ages of luxury who enjoyed real freedom. The
14
Phil. Works, iii, pp. 300-301. 
ibid., iii, pp. 301-303.
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rise of luxury, he could argue, ’is rather favourable to liberty, 
and has a natural tendency to preserve, if not produce a free 
government', Nothing more effectively blights the spirit of liberty 
than grinding poverty:
In rude unpolished nations, where the arts are neglected, 
all labour is bestowed on the cultivation of the ground; 
and the whole society is divided into two classes, 
proprietors of land, and their vassals or tenants. The 
latter are necessarily dependent, and fitted for slavery 
and subjection; especially where they possess no riches, 
and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; 
as must always be the case where the arts are neglected.
The former naturally erect themselves into petty tyrants; 
and must either submit to an absolute master, for the 
sake of peace and order; or if they will preserve their 
independency, like the Gothic barons, they must fall 
into feuds and contests among themselves, and throw the 
whole society into such confusion, as is perhaps worse than 
the most despotic government.
But in a society where luxury has nourished commerce, agriculture and
industry, a totally different state of affairs is to be found:
.,.the peasants, by a proper cultivation of the land, 
become rich and independent; while the tradesmen and 
merchants acquire a share of the property, and draw 
authority and consideration to that middling rank of men, 
who are the best and firmest basis of political 
liberty. These submit not to slavery, like the 
peasants, from poverty and meanness of spirit; and 
having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the 
barons, they are not tempted, for the sake of that 
gratification, to submit to the tyranny of their sovereign. 
They covet equal laws, which may secure their property, 
and preserve them from ipgnarchical, as well as 
aristocratical tyranny.
English history bears all this out; the lower house of 
the legislature, the bulwark of the country's liberties, owes all 
its importance to the growth of commerce and the subsequent increase 
in the amount of property held by the commons: 'The liberties of
ENGLAND, so far from decaying since the improvements in the arts, 
have never flourished so much as during that period'. Hume was 
prepared to concede that there was venality in English politics;
ibid., iii, p , 306.IT
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but he took care to point out that this was an effect of the unprecedented
strength of liberty in England: ’though corruption may seem to increase
of late years; this is chiefly to be ascribed to our established
liberty, ...our princes (having) found the impossibility of governing
without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the phantom of
prerogative’. Moreover, venality was far more prevalent amongst the
electors than amongst the elected, whereas the exact opposite would
be the case if corruption were truly inseparable from luxury; 'How
inconsistent then is it to blame so violently a refinement in the
arts, and to represent it as the bane of liberty and public spirit!’
The luxury so characteristic of modern England had not subverted the
country's liberties; it had created them.^
That Hume was quite convinced in his own mind that it was
hopelessly naive to claim that the eighteenth century essentially
represented a declension from some past golden age of freedom and
happiness becomes crystal clear when we turn to another of the essays
he published in 1752, Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations. In
Of Luxury Hume attributed the ubiquity of the belief in the close
connection between increased luxury and the decay of political liberty
to an almost inherent human propensity to declaim against the present
17by magnifying the virtue of the past. In Of the Populousness of 
Ancient Nations we find him once again doing battle with this way 
of thinking, and on an equally broad front. His specific aim in 
writing this essay was to determine the comparative populousness of 
the classical world and the Europe of his own day. In the course of 
researching it he discovered that it was 'commonly supposed’ by the 
various writers who had previously grappled with this question - and 
in this respect he had in mind the writings of Montesquieu and a
16 ibid., iii, pp. 306-307.
17 ibid., iii, p, 307.
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manuscript treatise written by one of his Edinburgh associates,
the Rev. Robert Wallace - that Europe's population had reached its
peak sometime during the flourishing of ancient Greek and Roman
18civilization and had since greatly declined. Hume felt that it was 
by no means certain that this was the case; his suspicion of any 
form of glorification of the past made him lean towards the view that 
it was in fact modern Europe which was the more populous, But 
above all else, in Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations he sought to 
demonstrate that the state of the evidence was such that dogmatic 
assertions had to be avoided at all costs; he stressed that 
the prevailing ignorance concerning the populousness of the kingdoms 
and cities of the modern world, let alone the even greater lack of 
evidence concerning the populousness of the ancient world, meant 
that all comparisons between them in this respect were bound to be 
highly imperfect. This being so, Hume felt compelled to talk in 
terms of 'causes' as well as 'facts'; he felt compelled to adopt 
a conjectural approach. Given what we know about their respective 
social and political structures,he in effect asked, is it probable 
that the world of the ancient Greeks and Romans could have contained 
more people than Europe does at present? Human beings multiply 
rapidly only when their situation is easy and secure; 'wherever 
there (is) most happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions,
'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', ibid,, iii, pp. 56-59, 382- 
383; HL_, i, pp. 140, 177-178, The demographic opinions of Montesquieu 
which Hume had uppermost in his mind here were those expressed in 
Lettres Persanes, lettres cxii-cxxii; see Montesquieu, Lettres 
Persanes, ed. Paul Verniere, Paris, 1965, pp. 232-259. For Wallace's 
ideas see his Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in Ancient and 
Modern Times, second ed., Edinburgh, 1809, especially pp.11-14, 32-33, 
81-82, 84-85, 148-149; 161-163; for the course of the (extremely
amicable) controversy he conducted with Hume over matters demographical 
see HL, i, pp, 177-178 and NHL, pp. 28-35 as well as Mossner, Life 
of Hume, pp, 260-26B. For general assessments of Hume the demographer 
see James Bonar, Theories of Population from Raleigh to Arthur 
Young, London, 1931 and Ernest Campbell Mossner, 'Hume and the 
Ancient-Modern Controversy, 1725 to 1752: A Study in Creative
Scepticism', University of Texas Studies in English, XXVIII (1949), 
pp. 139-153.
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there will also be most people'. The rate at which men propagate the
species can thus be seen as an accurate reflection of the quality of
'their whole police, their manners, and the constitution of their 
+ . 19government'.
When Hume came to speculate as to how far the social and
political structure of the classical world was likely to have been
conducive to the happiness of its inhabitants, the first factor which
he took into account was the key role which slavery had played in
its economic life. At first glance, he contended, slavery, with all
its accompanying misery and degradation, would seem to be absolutely
inimical to human happiness and so ought unhesistatingly to be classed
20as one of the great impediments to the propagation of the species.
But Hume was also aware that in his treatment of this very same
question Montesquieu had implied that slaveowners had an economic
21interest in encouraging their slaves to breed. He obviously had
to discredit such a notion, and in fact he was able to mount a formidable
case against it. In terms of making a profit, he argued, the
slaveowners of ancient Greece and Rome could do no better than to
discourage or prevent the slaves they already owned from breeding and
to buy any new slaves they might need from the barbarians, Slavery
in the classical world was thus no exception to the rule that
22happiness and populousness were inseparable. Moreover, Hume was 
convinced that it became even more difficult to uphold the notion that 
the classical world had been extremely populous once its whole economic 
life was taken into account. The primitive state of their agriculture, 
trade and industry indicated that the ancient Greeks and Romans had
21
Phil, Works, iii, pp. 383-384, 
ibid,, iii, pp. 385-387.
ibid., iii, pp. 387-388; for Montesquieu's belief that the slaveowners 
of the classical world had every incentive to encourage their slaves 
to breed see Lettres Persanes, lettre cxv (pp. 242-243).
Phil. Works, iii, pp. 388-395.
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never enjoyed the easy subsistence so characteristic of populous 
23countries.
When he turned to the political structure of the classical
world, Hume found further reasons for doubting that it had ever been
thickly populated. His line of reasoning here is once again extremely
interesting. Men are most happy when they live in civil societies
enjoying widespread political liberty and social equality. It is
thus fair to assume that the ancient Greeks and Romans, renowned for
24their republican and egalitarian spirit, bred prolifically. But
this still does not necessarily mean that the classical world was
extremely populous. For one thing, the host of city-states into
which it was divided had a propensity for indulging in extremely
25fierce and destructive warfare amongst themselves. Again, political
life within these same city-states was dominated by excessive
violence and turmoil. Political instability was chronic. Ferocity
and brutality were never far from the surface of party strife;
successful factions invariably massacred or exiled their beaten
opponents. Clamorous in asserting their rights in a desperate bid to
differentiate themselves from the slaves, the common people were
extremely turbulent and licentious. For this reason, the possession
of property was very precarious; men of property had to govern with
26the utmost rigour if they wished to preserve their status. In the
classical world ’every man of rank was rendered a petty tyrant (as a
result of being) educated amidst the flattery, submission, and low
27debasement of... slaves1; this meant that little store was put upon
23
24
25
26 
27
ibid., iii, pp. 410-413. 
ibid., iii, pp. 397-400. 
ibid., iii, pp. 400-402. 
ibid., iii, pp. 402-410. 
ibid., iii, p . 385.
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self-restraint, the only true foundation of order and therefore of 
liberty, For Hume, indeed, the men of the classical world 'were 
extremely fond of liberty; but seem not to have understood it very 
well',28
Thus, when we find him arguing in Of the Populousness of
Ancient Nations that 'it seems impossible to assign any just reason,
why the world should have been more populous in ancient than in 
29modern times', we have good reason for assuming that, if called upon 
to expressly do so, Hume would have denied that the civil societies 
of the Europe of his day were in any way inferior to the city-states 
of the classical world in terms of social and political organization. 
Moreover, given his belief that true liberty was best seen as an
aspect of good government, such a denial would have virtually amounted
to the contention that not only the populousness but also the freedom
of the classical world had been greatly exaggerated by subsequent ages.
Indeed, we have already seen that, being of the opinion that order and 
liberty were inseparable, Hume was inclined to believe that the 
ancient Greeks and Romans, for all their passionate republicanism, had 
lacked the self-restraint so necessary for the enjoyment of real 
liberty. He certainly was convinced that the Europe of his day was 
a far freer place in which to live than the classical world had ever 
been. For one thing, he felt that the decline of slavery in Europe 
alone meant that this was so. Domestic slavery was far more cruel and 
oppressive than all forms of civil subjection: 'The more the master
is removed from us in place and rank, the greater liberty we enjoy; 
the less are our actions inspected and controlled; and the fainter 
that cruel comparison becomes between our own subjection, and the
? R ibid., iii, p. 403. 
29 ibid., iii, p. 413.
Ill
freedom, and even dominion of another'.
A further reason for believing that the ancient Greeks and
Romans had never enjoyed true freedom was the primitive state of their
economic life. Because they had been unacquainted with luxury,
because their trade and industry had always been 'more feeble and
31languishing' than was the case in modern Europe, the social structure
of their republics had lacked that middling rank of prosperous
peasants, tradesmen and merchants which formed the social prop of
political liberty; the only effective political choice the inhabitants
of the typical ancient republic had had was between 'a severe,
jealous Aristocracy, ruling over discontented subjects; and a
32turbulent, factious, tyrannical Democracy'. Despite their ardent
love of liberty, then, the ancient Greeks and Romans had never possessed
the proper sociological conditions necessary for its enjoyment. In
marked contrast, '(trade), manufactures, industry, were no where,
in former ages, so flourishing as they are at present in EUROPE';
technological development, improved communications, enlarged commerce
and such commercial devices as bills of exchange had all produced
the most economically sophisticated civil societies the world had 
33ever seen. Hume felt, in short, that he was living in the first 
great age of luxury; he believed that he was living in the first era 
in human history in which sociological conditions were such that the 
inhabitants of civil society could enjoy to the full all the benefits 
of good government. He felt, indeed, that it was already possible to
30
30
31
32 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', ibid,, iii, p. 409.
33 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', ibid,, iii, pp. 410, 413.
'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', ibid., iii, p. 385. 
'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', ibid,, iii, p. 413.
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claim that 'all kinds of government, free and absolute, seem to have
34undergone, in modern times, a great change for the better'.
Believing as he did that liberty and order were inseparable,
Hume felt that there was yet another sense in which it could be said
that the Europe of his own day was far freer than the classical
world had been; he felt that in fact modern Europe was clearly a
more orderly place in which to live than had ever been the case
in ancient Greece and Rome. Hume believed that most of the civil
societies of the Europe of his day could rightfully claim that they
35enjoyed the rule of law. Interestingly enough, he accounted for 
this fact not so much in terms of the rise of free states like 
Holland or England but rather in terms of what he called 'civilized 
monarchy', the civilized monarchy par excellence being in his estimat­
ion contemporary France. Hume was quite convinced that the rule of 
law originated solely in free states; 'it is impossible, but, in 
time, the necessity of restraining the magistrates, in order to
I
preserve liberty, must at last appear, and give rise to general laws 
and statutes'. But he also felt that the rule of law was extremely 
hardy; although it arose only in free states, it could be 
transplanted to absolute monarchies, where it was perfectly capable 
of taking root and flourishing. Men had to enjoy security against 
arbitrary exertions of power before they could begin to refine their 
taste and reason, and personal security was best buttressed by the 
rule of law; this meant that free states soon became the scene of 
bustling economic, intellectual and cultural activity. Absolute 
monarchs, however, eventually came to emulate them in this respect; 
as soon as they came to realize just how many benefits flowed from the
'Of Liberty and Despotism' (1741), ibid., iii, p. 160, It should be 
noted that in 1758 Hume retitled this essay 'Of Civil Liberty',
35 'Of Liberty and Despotism', ibid., iii, p. 161.
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rule of law, they felt compelled to place their ministers and servants - 
but not themselves - under the yoke of general laws. Such was the origin 
of a French-style civilized monarchy, a form of polity which, despite 
outward appearances, effectively enjoyed most of the advantages 
possessed by free states:
The people depend on none but their sovereign, for the 
security of their property. He is so far removed 
from them, and is so much exempt from private jealousies 
or interests, that this dependence is scarcely felt.
And thus a species of government arises, to which, 
in a high political rant, we may give the name of 
Tyranny, but which, by a just and prudent administration, 
may afford tolerable security to the people, ggd may 
answer most of the ends of political society.
Hume considered that the rise of civilized monarchy in modern Europe
threw into sharp relief the limitations of the ancient republics
so far as the preservation of law and order was concerned. In the
classical world law and order had always been 'more loose and
37irregular' than was the case in modern Europe. Violence,
lawlessness and anarchy had never been far from the surface in all the
various aspects of its way of life and so personal security had
always been extremely precarious. In this respect, modern Europe
was plainly superior: 'We are informed by SALLUST, that CATILINE'S
army was much augmented by the accession of the highwaymen about
ROME; though I believe, that all of that profession, who are at present
38dispersed over EUROPE, would not amount to a regiment'.
Personal freedom and security being inseparable from good 
government, it followed that the enjoyment of liberty had never 
been so widespread and secure; indeed, Hume was inclined to suspect 
2 ' 1 , T
'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences', ibid., iii, 
pp. 178-180, 184^186.
37 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', ibid., iii, p, 413.
'Of Liberty and Despotism', ibid., iii, p, 161.
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that in many ways it was no longer necessary to attempt to buttress
personal liberty by means of constitutional government, by means
of political liberty. The rise of civilized monarchy, the most
spectacular manifestation of the general improvement in politics
and government which was occurring throughout modern Europe,
afforded sufficient reason to believe that this was the case; the
example of France, the civilized monarchy par excellence, clearly
indicated that a civil society need no longer possess political
liberty if it wished to reap the benefits which flowed from widespread
personal security; '(Civilized monarchies) are found susceptible
of order, method, and constancy, to a surprizing degree. Property
is there secure; industry encouraged; the arts flourish; and the
prince lives secure among his subjects, like a father among his
children'. Absolute monarchies were still inferior to free states
in terms of 'gentleness and stability', but with the spread of
'humanity and moderation' the gap had narrowed to such an extent that
staunch Whigs like Addison, with their rant about human civilization
and absolute monarchy being incompatible, sounded positively anach- 
39ronistic. Given this conception of civilized monarchy, Hume's calmness 
when confronted with the prospect that the growth of influence 
might perhaps convert England into an absolute monarchy becomes 
entirely explicable; to live in an age of luxury was to be assured 
of most of the benefits of freedom, irrespective of how far the outward 
appearance of political forms suggested the contrary.
39 'Of Liberty and Despotism', ibid., iii, pp. 158, 161-162.
CHAPTER V
THE RANCOUR OF FACTION
(i)
Notwithstanding all the claims he made to the effect that 
the eighteenth century was the first era in human history in which 
it was possible for the inhabitants of civil society to enjoy to the 
full all the various benefits of good government, Hume did not feel 
inclined to sit back and wait for this desirable state of affairs 
to take shape of its own accord. He was eager to push the trend of 
events along, no doubt fearing that favourable opportunities and 
propitious circumstances might be squandered. He certainly had 
nothing to be complacent about. His sociology might tell him that 
Englishmen ought to be secure in the peaceful enjoyment of all the 
advantages which followed in the train of social and political order, 
but in many ways the brute facts of history conveyed a totally 
different message. For more than a century, if increasing luxury 
and good government were truly inextricable, England ought to have 
been the scene of steady and inexorable progress towards political 
stability and civil peace. But of course Hume was well aware that 
a cursory examination of the history of the previous century 
indicated that this had simply not happened; Of the Parties of 
Great Britain is very largely a catalogue of revolution, civil war 
and unrestrained party zeal, intrigue and spite. In truth, 
irrespective of how far broad social forces were favourable to the 
growth of political stability, what really mattered was that the 
behaviour of individuals and groups in the political scene had to 
be such as to bring about the crystallization of this process, 
and when he examined the modern history of England, it must have 
seemed to Hume that its inhabitants were simply incapable of acting
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in such a way.
As we have already seen, Hume's strong commitment to
political peace can be adequately explained purely in terms of
the political circumstances of early and mid eighteenth-century
Scotland; in itself an awareness of the turmoil of the seventeenth
century could only have strengthened this already pre-existing
commitment. But we need to bear in mind here that in purely
English terms political instability was not only the dominant
theme of the country's immediate past; it was also something
which seemed to be endemic, even inevitable, so far as contemporary
politics was concerned. Early eighteenth-century England, unlike
contemporary Scotland, was never the scene of armed rebellions, but
its political strife was still persistent enough to give Hume cause
for concern. From his reading of history he had become convinced
that the difference between party warfare and actual warfare was
always a very thin line, so that he was inevitably disturbed by the
fact that post-Revolution politics just as much as pre-Revolution
history clearly vindicated all the ideas he held to the effect that
unrestrained party conflict was deeply rooted in English politics.
Far from leading to the growth of political stability, the
Revolution was in many ways inimical to such a development, for it
ensured that the traditionally unruly and turbulent House of Commons
2would occupy an entrenched position in the constitution. The
subsequent protracted warfare with France brought about a rapid
expansion in the complexity of public finance and the size of the
 ^ For a clear account of the divergence between political events and 
the general drift towards stability in late seventeenth-century 
England see J,H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in 
England 1675-1725, London, 1967, chap. i.
2 ibid., chap. ii.
117
bureaucracy, and as a result backbench fear of corruption was
exacerbated and the struggle between the politicians for control of
3the distribution of jobs and places became even more intense.
After 1714 the Tories went into eclipse, but the Whigs immediately
4began to indulge in fierce factional strife amongst themselves.
By the late 1720's, it is true, Sir Robert Walpole had
entrenched himself as chief minister, and it has been suggested that
by this time the political structure of the country was already
beginning to assume massive stability.*’ However, from Hume's
standpoint, it was by no means self-evident that Walpole's period
in office would mark a radical break with the past; the whole
course of England's recent history taught him that periods of
political peace were invariably mere gaps between far longer periods
of chaos and instability. Moreover, when he made his first
appearance as an essayist in 1741-42, political circumstances were
far from propitious; indeed, on the surface of things the course
of events suggested that the political peace which had characterized
much of Walpole's period in office might perhaps be coming to an
end. By 1741 Walpole's star was clearly in the descendant, which
meant that there was a corresponding increase in political controversy;
with the decline in Walpole's fortunes parliamentary politics
heated up, while at the extra-parliamentary level political discontent
was rife, It was no mere coincidence that Hume should have chosen to
make his debut as an essayist in the winter of 1741-42, the period
when the parliamentary opposition's attack on Walpole finally 
~  *
ibid., chaps, iv-v; Kramnick, Bolingbroke's Circle, chaps, ii-iii.
4 J.H. Plumb, Sir Robert Walpole, 2 vols., London, 1956-60, i, chaps, 
vi-vii.
 ^Plumb, Growth of Political Stability, chap, vi.
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culminated in success.^
That the political crisis accompanying the fall of 
Walpole was the main reason why Hume chose to make his first appearance 
as an essayist in the winter of 1741-42 becomes clear when we 
consult the preface he attached to the first volume of Essays Moral 
and Political. In it we find him stating openly that the chief 
intention of many of the essays is to help bring about a cooling of 
party passion:
...I must confess, I feel some Anxiety concerning the 
Success of my Work: But one Thing makes me more
secure; That the READER may condemn my Abilities, 
but must approve my Moderation and Impartiality in my 
Method of handling POLITICAL SUBJECTS... Public Spirit, 
methinks, shou'd engage us to love the Public, and to 
bear an equal Affection to all our Country-Men; not to 
hate one Half of them, under Pretext of Loving the Whole.. 
This PARTY-RAGE I have endeavour'd to repress, as far 
as possible; and I hope this Design will be acceptable 
to the moderate of both Parties; at the same Time^ 
that, perhaps, it may displease the Bigots of both.
But the fact that Hume had specifically English conditions
very much to the fore in his thinking in his early political essays
meant that he had to modify the approach he had taken in Of Morals
in a very important direction. It has previously been argued that
Hume's advocacy of a de facto theory of political obligation becomes
understandable when we take into account his Scottish background.
But when we view Hume the essayist in relation to the state of
contemporary English politics, we find that if he wished to be
effective in helping contribute to the formation of an era of good
feeling, he had to do more than simply expatiate upon the benefits of
a whole-hearted acceptance of the existing structure of political
power. After all, in the early 1740's few politically articulate
For accounts of the events surrounding Walpole's decline and fall see 
William Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert 
Walpole, 3 volC] London, 1800, iii, chaps, 50-60 and Owen, Rise of 
the Pelhams, pp. 1-40, 87-110.
Phil. Works, iii, pp. 41-42.
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Englishmen cared to be classed as anything other than a true 
friend of the essential principles of the British constitution.
This did not, of course, necessarily result in political peace; 
fundamental constitutional principles need not be at stake for 
politicians to indulge in party strife, and there was certainly 
nothing much involved in the conflict which accompanied the fall of
g
Walpole other than a struggle for place. This state of affairs 
interested Hume deeply. In his early political essays his attention 
is very much focused upon the question of the relationship between 
party conflict and broad political consensus; in them we find him 
softening the sternly neo-Hobbesian stance which he had adopted in 
Of Morals to the extent of indulging in speculation concerning how 
far it was possible for political strife to occur within an overall 
context of civil peace. Hume never considered that he could take 
it for granted that such a state of affairs was bound to occur in the 
England of his day; but this did not mean that he despaired of ever 
seeing it come about.
(ii)
Up till now we have simply assumed that, as a result of 
the chronic political stability which plagued the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth-century English-speaking world, Hume automatically 
classed party conflict as a political evil. This was in fact the 
case; in such essays as Of the Parties of Great Britain and Of the 
Populousness of Ancient Nations Hume took it for granted that party 
conflict was undesirable and spent most of his time in outlining in
 ^ ’An essentially personal attack was met at length by an essentially
personal acceptance of defeat’. Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, p, 35,
— —   — 1 ■ ■
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dramatic detail the actual harm which it had caused in specific civil 
societies. But Hume's dislike of party did not always remain an 
unexpressed assumption; one of the essays published in 1741-42,
Of Parties in General, contains a florid set piece in which a funda­
mental opposition to the very existence of party strife is expressed.
The existence of party conflict, we find Hume contending, is completely 
incompatible with that of political order and stability. 'Factions 
subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest 
animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual
assistance and protection to each other'; once these 'weeds' take
9root in a civil society, its 'total dissolution' is inevitable.
Being a formal expression of his elemental hatred of
faction, this tirade against party conflict was no mere piece of
empty rhetoric on Hume's part; he was to spend much of his time as
an essayist in giving it substance and detail, a process which was
to culminate in his depiction in Of the Populousness of Ancient
Nations of the baleful effects of party conflict in the city-states
of the classical world. Hume in fact considered that the party
strife of the ancient world was easily the worst manifestation of
faction which had ever broken out in civil society. In his opinion,
the 'inveterate rage' and 'bloody maxims' characteristic of parties
in the classical world could be found in modern Europe only amongst
religious parties, Moreover, even in Ireland, where the worst
outbreaks of sectarian conflict occurred, political parties were still
unable to match the ferocity and brutality of the factions depicted
by a Thucydides or an Appian.^  But for Hume the difference here
was essentially one of degree, not kind; he never assumed that party
conflict could be anything else than an evil. In Of the Parties Of Great 
9 Phil. Works, iii, pp. 127-128,
^  'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', ibid., iii, pp. 402-404.
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Britain he could point to the chaos which it had caused in seventeenth-
century England, while in Of Parties in General he was able to further
expatiate upon its worthlessness, taking care to point out the
'spite' and ’ill-nature' of the Jacobites,^^  the 'frivolous' and
yet at the same time 'furious and enraged' character of the sectarian
12conflict brought about by the Reformation and the frequently 'trivial'
issues at stake in the party conflict of the classical world and 
, 13Renaissance Italy.
But we need to recall here that Hume's fundamental aim
throughout the whole of his science of man was to build up a
picture of the essential framework of man's mental and social activity
by discovering recurring patterns of human behaviour. Now if the essays
he wrote on party did nothing else, they at least pointed up the 
ubiquity of party conflict in civil society; no matter how they may 
have differed in other ways, ancient Greece and Rome, Renaissance 
Italy, Reformation Europe and seventeenth-century England had all 
shared the common characteristic of being racked by fierce strife 
between parties and sects. Faced with all the examples of destructive 
party conflict which he had so carefully culled from history, Hume 
was forced to conclude that party conflict was inevitable in civil
society. In Of Parties in General he conceded that the frequently trival
character of party differences indicated that 'mankind had...a strong
14propensity to such divisions', while we have already seen that in 
Of the Parties of Great Britain he had to acknowledge that the mixed
government of England was extraordinarily fecund as a source of party
11
12
13
14
ibid., iii, P- 133.
ibid., iii, pp., 129-133.
ibid., iii, pp., 128-129,
ibid., iii, P- 129. This concession was not included in the text of this
essay as it was initially published in 1741, but it was included in the 
form in which the essay appeared in 1742, in the second edition of the 
first volume of Essays Moral and Political; it certainly represents 
the logical outcome of the drift of the argument initially put forward.
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strife. In other words what Hume was in effect saying in these two 
essays on party was that, human nature in general and the British 
constitution in particular being what they were, there was rooted in 
the very nature of England's public life a political phenomenon
- faction - which had led to the collapse of all previous highly- 
developed civil societies.
Hume, it is true, was not prepared to accept the notion 
that party politics was inevitable in civil society without putting 
up at least some show of resistance. We should recall in this context 
that he saw the model form of government which he delineated in Idea 
of a Perfect Commonwealth as a way to bring about the extinction 
of all forms of party conflict.^ However, when Hume did succumb to 
the perfectionism inherent in the concept that skilfully arranged 
laws and constitutions could compel men to act in politically 
virtuous ways, the resulting outbreak of utopian sentiment was a 
very mild affair; in Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth he took pains to 
stress that it was essential that a perfect form of government should 
be introduced 'by such gentle alterations and innovations as may not 
give too great disturbance to society',^ Hume never deviated from 
the view that party was an evil, but he ultimately came to the 
conclusion that the party conflict which arose whenever a civil 
society's institutional arrangements were arranged in an imperfect fashion
- and we must never forget that for Hume the mixed government of England
was very much an imperfect form of government - was practically inerad- 
17icable. To understand why Hume's utopianism was such a very diluted 
affair, all we have to do is to recall once again that his funda­
mental political attitude was loyalty to de facto power, a commitment
^  And in particular conflict between court and country. See ibid., 
iii, p. 491.
'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', ibid., iii, p, 481.
'Of Parties in General', ibid., iii, pp. 128, 130.
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which reflected a deeply-rooted scepticism as to the power and importance
of human reason. Because this was the case, Hume was incapable of
subscribing to a radical or messianic kind of utopianism; his
perfect form of commonwealth, his partyless state, was a model which
actual civil societies might seek to gradually approach, but which
they could not hope to reach by a sudden leap. Hume’s basic loyalty
was to established power, irrespective of how 'botched and inaccurate'
its current manifestation might happen to be; he reserved the
right to suggest improvements which could be carried out with a
minimum of fuss and disorder, but he consciously sought to avoid giving
the impression that he was imbued with any kind of reformist zeal.
Of all the 'artificial contrivances' in the world government alone did
not thrive upon ceaseless innovation; to disturb an established set
of political arrangements was to break the web of custom and habit
and thereby put political stability in jeopardy. The prudent civil
magistrate was indeed a friend of political improvement; but he
always sought to 'adjust his innovations, as much as possible, to the
ancient fabric, and (to) preserve entire the chief pillars and supports
18of the constitution'.
Hume's overall attitude towards party is now clear. At 
its most elemental, that attitude was one of complete hostility; as 
far as Hume was concerned, all previous history indicated that the 
existence of party conflict and the existence of civil society were 
in the long run completely incompatible. So deep was his hostility 
that he indulged in utopian speculation concerning the possibility 
of abolishing faction by means of the skilful arranging of 
institutions, However, Hume's hostility to party conflict was but one 
aspect of an overall commitment to the maintenance of the status quo, 
and being a good de facto theorist, he ultimately came to the conclusion
18 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', ibid., iii, p. 480.
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that it was imprudent to seek some radical alternative to the status 
quo in politics irrespective of how rough and ready its institutional 
arrangements might happen to be. The status quo in politics for Hume 
was the mixed constitution of England, which in his opinion was 
imperfect as a form of government. Although it commanded the loyalty 
of most Englishmen and thereby ensured the existence of an overall 
climate of political harmony, it partitioned political power out in 
an extremely delicate fashion and as a consequence it was a veritable 
breeding-ground of party strife. Nevertheless, this mixed 
government still formed the status quo, and Hume stoically accepted 
it as such, along with all the evils to which it gave rise - for 
example, the struggle between court and country. Moreover, the fact 
remained that most Englishmen were in general agreement concerning 
the excellence of their constitution; this was a state of affairs 
which Hume hoped to exploit in the interests of compromise and 
mediation. He accepted party conflict as an ineradicable fact in 
English politics, but his support of de facto power was never so rigid 
as to prevent him from looking for ways in which political 
improvement could be gradually effected; as an essayist he set out 
to work towards achieving a gradual fading away of the more extravagant 
aspects of party conflict, towards helping suffuse English political 
opinion with humanity and moderation, thereby ensuring that the party 
strife endemic in English politics would never become so fierce as 
to imperil the continued existence of social and political order.
Our next task is to find out how he actually went about trying to 
achieve this goal.
/
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Of all the essays published by Hume in the winter of
1741-42 That Politics may be reduced to a Science is the one which
contains his most elaborate attempt to help cool the party passions of
the time. We have already seen that in this essay Hume set out to
prove that the real worth of a constitution could only be assessed
by discovering the degree to which its institutions were able to
compel men to act according to the public good. Now once he had proved
this point to his own satisfaction, he immediately went on to
postulate that in a civil society which met this requirement there
was a strong inducement to maintain the existing constitution,
seeing that it was the means by which 'liberty is secured, the public
good consulted, and the avarice or ambition of particular men restrained 
19and punished'. Having established this doctrine, he then sought
to draw from it 'a lesson of moderation with regard to the parties,
20into which our country is at present divided'. He sought, in
other words, to convert it into a means of deflating the rhetoric
which was being thrown around as the attack on Walpole grew stronger 
21and stronger; his whole line of reasoning here was designed to 
show that in a civil society like England, with its extensive freedom 
of expression, political debate tended to become unduly heated. Not 
content with arguing that Walpole's conduct is pernicious in itself, 
the country-party contends that he has subverted the constitution, 
thereby jeopardizing the safety of future generations. The court- 
party, on the other hand, is not content with maintaining that Walpole
^  ibid., iii, p . 106.
20 ibid., iii, p. 107.
21 For a sample of the rhetoric employed by court and country in the 
winter of 1741*42 see Parliamentary-History, xii, cols. 290-319, 
332-373, 416-446.
(iii)
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has upheld the honour of the present generation; it also insists that
he has strengthened the constitution, thereby putting England's
freedom upon an impregnable foundation. Because they resort to
such extravagant language, both parties throw each other into a
22ferment and fill the nation with violent animosities,
Hume hoped to rectify this situation by exploiting for 
the purpose of irony all the ambiguities inherent in the fact that the 
crisis of 1741-42 essentially involved a personal attack on Walpole 
in which no fundamental constitutional principles were at stake. 
Country-party spokemen, he argued, have for years echoed Bolingbroke 
in denouncing Walpole while at the same time lauding the constitution. 
However, if the constitution is deserving of their praises, Walpole 
cannot be deserving of their strictures, for a good constitution would 
never have allowed a corrupt minister to stay in power for as long 
as he has. This being so, if Walpole is really wicked and weak, 
he again cannot in all fairness be accused of corrupting an 
excellent constitution, it being of the essence of such a constitution 
to keep wicked and weak ministers in check. The court-party, on 
the other hand, lauds both Walpole and the constitution. However, 
if the constitution is really excellent, a change of ministry is 
nothing to get worked up about, for no matter how bad the new 
ministers may be, the constitution, being excellent, will prevent them 
from abusing their power. But if the constitution should not in 
fact be as excellent as it is universally depicted, a change of 
ministry still ought not to cause members of the court-party too much 
concern, for under a bad constitution an outbreak of the various 
political evils is inevitable, no matter how vigilant or able ministers 
may be. When they become acquainted with the great truth of political 
science - that a constitution is only as good as the degree to which
22 Phil. Works, iii, pp. 107-108,
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it makes maladministration impossible - both sets of partisans will
23come to realize just how misplaced all their passion is.
It is unquestionable that Hume's argument here is in many
ways nothing more than mere quibbling and cleverness; but it is still
important in that it shows us how effectively he could turn irony and
an almost ostentatious impartiality into formidable weapons to be
used against all forms of extravagant rhetoric. Hume's moderation,
we must never forget, was always a political stance; it was never
an attempt to avoid commitment. In his hands, indeed, it was a form
of polemic. Believing in the virtues of peace and acquiescence, he
naturally considered moderation to be true zeal for the public good;
a zealous proclamation of patriotic fervour, in contrast, was, so
far as he was concerned, invariably nothing more than mere pretence,
a mere cynical attempt to hide narrow and base partisan spirit behind
a smokescreen of florid rhetoric, a smokescreen which was best
dissipated by cool and detached analysis of political debate. In
Hume's opinion, true moderation was never a matter of moderation so
far as 'the industry and passion, with which every individual is
bound to pursue the good of his country' was concerned:
I would not be understood to mean, that public affairs 
deserve no care and attention at all. Would men be 
moderate and consistent, their claims might be admitted; 
at least might be examined. The country-party might still 
assert, that our constitution, though excellent, will 
admit of mal-administration to a certain degree; and 
therefore, if the minister be bad, it is proper to 
oppose him with a suitable degree of zeal. And, on the 
other hand, the court-party may be allowed, upon the 
sipp)sition that the minister were good, to defend, and 
with some zeal too, his administration, I would only 
persuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting- 
pro aris § focis.and change a good constituting into 
a bad one, by the violence of their factions.
23 ibid. , iii, pp. 108-109.
24 ibid., iii, pp, 107-109.
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Being well aware of the fact that this very question
of the worth of Walpole as a minister had been canvassed for more than
twenty years, Hume was determined that there should be at least
one item written about him which was characterized by judgement and
impartiality rather than by party passion. Accordingly, he took care
to include in Essays Moral and Political a brief assessment of Walpole's
character and deeds, which he entitled A Character of Sir Robert
Walpole. In this piece he firstly sought to show that Walpole the
man was neither as exemplary nor as heinous as court and country
respectively depicted him. He maintained, for example, that Walpole
was a man of ability but not a genius. Similarly, he was good-natured
but not virtuous. But when Hume considered Walpole solely as a minister,
he found that the country-party had the better of the argument; the
time had come for Walpole to go. Although in expressing this view
Hume was inclined to slip into loose country-party rhetoric, he
never forgot the basic lesson of moderation he was seeking to inculcate;
at a time when impeachment or the threat of it was still considered to
be a useful political tactic Hume took care to insist that Englishmen
had to see to it that the element of sheer physical danger was
removed from party strife:
(Walpole's) ministry has been more advantageous to 
his family than to the public, better for this age 
than for posterity, and more pernicious by bad 
precedents than by real grievances, During his 
time trade has flourished, liberty declined, and 
learning gone to ruin. As I am a man, I love him; 
as I am a scholar, I hate him; as I am a
BRITON, I calmly wish his fall. And were I a
member of either house, I would give my vote for
removing him from ST. JAMES's; but should be 
glad to see him retire to HOUGHTON-HALL, to 
pass the remainder of his days in ease and
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pleasure,25
But although scrupulously striving to be impartial in 
That Politics may be reduced to a Science and actually siding with 
the parliamentary opposition in his Character of Sir Robert 
Walpole, Hume was convinced that the country-party was inherently 
more violent and dangerous than the court-party. He felt that 
country-party spokesmen like Bolingbroke tended to be dogmatic 
and imperious in their approach to political questions because 
they enjoyed the advantage of advocating established and 
popular opinions. Because of their rabid espousal of the 
cause of political liberty, they had succeeded in convincing 
the public at large that they were 'the true WHIGS' and 
that the court-party, in contrast, represented 'the true 
TORIES'. For this reason, they could count upon being called 
zealous patriots whenever they became warm and passionate; 
court-party men, on the other hand, were inevitably regarded as 
shameless mercenaries whenever it was their turn to become
ibid., iv, pp. 395-396, Walpole's political opponents did in fact 
make an attempt to subject him to a political trial. The course 
and eventual failure of this attempt is outlined in Coxe,
Walpole's Life and Administration, iii, pp, 266-278, 306-307 and 
Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, pp. Teil, 105-109. It should also be 
pointed out here that in an advertisement attached to the second 
volume of Essays Moral and Political. Hume says that his 
character of Walpole was 'drawn some months ago, when that 
Great MAN was in the Zenith of his Power’; this would suggest 
that it was written some time after 13 February 1741, when 
Walpole, in what was to be his last great parliamentary triumph, 
easily brushed aside an opposition censure move (see Coxe, Memoirs of 
Walpole's Life and Administration, iii, pp. 180-181 and Owen, Rise of 
the Pelhams, p, 3). He goes on in the advertisement to say the 
following: 'I must confess, that, at present, when (Walpole) seems to
be upon the Decline, I am inclin'd to think more favourably of him, and 
to suspect, that the Antipathy, which every true born Briton naturally 
bears to Ministers of State, inspir'd me with some Prejudice against 
him’. See Phil. Works, iii, p. 45 and Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 142- 
143. For a sequel to this whole venture see Robert C. Elliott, 'Hume's 
"Character of Sir Robert Walpole": Some Unnoticed Additions', The
Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XLVIII (1949), pp. 367-370.
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26 'heated. Believing this to be the case, Hume made sure that it was the
countr>"party's pretensions which bore the full brunt of the deflating impact
of his irony and quizzical impartiality. We have already seen how he sought
to use these weapons against the country-party's traditional demand for the
passage of a Place Bill, He adopted a similar approach when he came to
examine the merits of another item of the country-party's stock programme
- the demand for the binding of members of parliament to their constituents
by means of instructions. The country-party's claim was that such a
reform would greatly lessen the dependence of the Commons upon the
crown, thereby strengthening the foundations of England's mixed
government. But in Essays Moral and Political Hume specifically
rejected this whole line of reasoning; he instead sought to show
that such a reform would weaken rather than strengthen England's mixed
government. It would, he argued, weaken the influence of the crown to
such an extent that England's mixed government would wither away, to be
replaced by a Dutch-style pure republic. Believing as he did that the
form of government enjoyed by the Dutch was superior to that of England,
Hume felt that such a change would involve no great hardship; it
would not lead to the rise of a direct democracy, for the people would
remain scattered throughout the constituencies and would thus
be more susceptible to reason and order and less exposed to demagog- 
27uery. It was the demand for a Place Bill alone which Hume saw
o/:
'Of the Independency of Parliament', Phil. Works, iii, pp, 117-118;
'Of the Parties of Great Britain’, ibid,, iii, p. 143.
^  ’Of the First Principles of Government' (1741), ibid., iii, pp. 112- 
113, For general assessments of the role which the demand for the 
introduction of instructions played in eighteenth-century 
politics see Kemp, King and Commons, pp. 2, 43-47 and Kramnick, 
Bolingbroke's Circle, pp. 124-127, 172-177. It should be pointed 
out that it was the country-party's demand for the introduction of 
instructions which drove Burke into advancing his famous definition 
of the role of the member of parliament.
131
as a move towards anarchy; he no doubt assumed that instructions would
keep the Commons dependent upon an extra-parliamentary power whereas
the passage of a Place Bill could conceivably bring about a situation
in which such restraint was totally lacking.
But for all his concern about country-party extravagance, Hume
could not but have been heartened by the fact that he could depict the
political crisis of 1741-42 solely as a clash between court and
country; nowhere in Essays Moral and Political does he give any
indication that he saw the struggle between Walpole and his opponents
as a clash between Whigs and Tories. All this must have suggested
to him that this struggle was either a mere scramble for place or
a difference of opinion between two groups who were nevertheless
both completely committed to the constitution; a clash between Whigs
and Tories was another matter altogether, involving at it did
such a fundamental political question as the succession issue. In the
years immediately after 1742, however, Hume was compelled to more and
more direct his attention towards this clash between Whigs and Tories
at the expense of his interest in the clash between court and country.
Within a few years of Walpole’s resignation Henry Pelham had firmly
entrenched himself as his successor, and as a result there was a
28marked cooling off in parliamentary politics. On the other hand,
the Jacobite uprising of 1745 indicated in a dramatic fashion that the
succession issue was not wholly moribund. In the 1741 edition of
Essays Moral and Political Hume had rather unguardedly given his
29opinion that Jacobitism had ’almost entirely vanish’d ’, but following
the ’45 such an attitude obviously stood condemned as unrealistically 
__ ■ -
Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, pp. 318-320.
29 ’Of the Parties of Great Britain', Phil. Works, iii, p. 144.
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complacent. As we have already pointed out, Hume's whole political
stance reflected an underlying fear of anarchy and lawlessness and
so it is not being overly tendentious to dismiss a single complacent
reference to the Jacobites as but an example of loose talk. In the
1748 edition of Essays Moral and Political he naturally removed
the offending remark. But he did more; this edition included
three new essays in which Hume set out to thoroughly canvass the
whole succession issue. In Of the Protestant Succession he sought
to debate the respective merits of the claims of Hanover and Stuart;
in Of the Original Contract and Of Passive Obedience he set out
to discuss the worth of the respective ideologies canvassed by the
Whigs and the Tories, the two great parties which he always
30associated with the succession issue.
In the event, Of the Protestant Succession did not get to be
published in 1748. Rigorously upholding his policy of adhering to
the strictest impartiality whenever discussing political questions,
Hume sought to discuss the succession issue 'as coolly and indifferently'
31as if he were examining *the dispute betwixt Caesar and Pompey'.
However, many of his friends were convinced that, given that it was
barely two years since the '45 had been put down, it would be
extremely dangerous for a Scotsman to adopt such an attitude when
treating so touchy a question, and eventually they managed to persuade
him to suppress publication of the essay until 1752, when it appeared
32in Political Discourses. When we analyse the argument Hume advanced,
we find that his friends were right to query his prudence; in Of the 
_
For the history of the writing and publication of these three essays 
see HL, i, pp. 111-113, 167 and Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 174, 
179-180, 268-269.
31 HL_, i>p . 111.
32 For the reaction of Hume's friends to this essay see ibid., i, 
pp. 111-113.
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Protestant Succession we find him in effect contending that, in 
terms of abstract argument, the respective advantages and disadvantages 
involved in submission to either the House of Hanover or the House 
of Stuart very much cancel each other out.
Hume's real aim in this essay was to show that the only 
way the defenders of the political status quo in England could clearly 
justify their position was by insisting that de facto control of 
political power was the decisive argument in settling all really 
serious political disputes, in this case the succession issue. He 
first set out to show that it was impossible to settle this question 
by means of pure argument. The Jacobites can argue that from the 
point of view of political stability tremendous benefits flow from 
the strict maintenance of heriditary succession. The Hanoverians can 
reply to this by pointing out that the only way in which the high 
monarchical principles of the Stuarts were effectively discredited 
was by the creation of an essentially parliamentary monarchy and by 
departing from strict heriditary succession. The Jacobites can point 
to the foreign dominions of the House of Hanover; the Hanoverians
to the notorious bigotry of the Stuarts. The inconveniences caused
by the foreign dominions of the House of Hanover fade into utter
insignificance when compared with the inconveniences which would 
occur should the Popish House of Stuart, along with its train of 
priests and friars, be restored. Moreover, even from the point of 
view of political stability, the Hanoverians can mount a formidable 
case. Under the Stuarts England was plagued with chronic political 
instability; since 1714 there has been uninterrupted harmony between 
crown and parliament. Nevertheless, violations of heriditary 
succession rarely go unchallenged; since 1714 the Jacobites have 
launched two armed rebellions as well as countless plots and 
conspiracies. By tampering with the succession Englishmen have ensured
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that the struggle between court and country - which is perfectly
compatible with continued civil peace - will be complicated by
disputes over who is to occupy the throne - and f(among) contending
titles, the question can only be determined by the sword, and by
33devastation, and by civil war',
Hume was convinced that the only way to cut through this 
Gordian knot and put forward a convincing reason for continued reject­
ion of the Jacobite cause was by falling back upon neo-Hobbesian 
principles; the House of Hanover was ultimately deserving of support 
because it had proved itself capable of doing an effective job:
...the settlement in the House of HANOVER has actually 
taken place. The princes of that family, without 
intrigue, without cabal, without solicitation on 
their part, have been called to mount our throne, by 
the united voice of the whole legislative body.
They have, since their accession, displayed, 
in all their actions, the utmost mildness, equity, 
and regard to the laws and constitution. Our own 
ministers, our own parliaments, ourselves have 
governed us; and if aught ill has befallen us, 
we can only blame fortune or ourselves.
In reality, it was simply too late in the day to hope to secure political
stability by means of a rigid commitment to heriditary succession.
From custom and habit a great part of the nation had come to regard
the Hanoverians as being worthy of obedience on grounds other than
sheer present possession of power; it was no longer possible to
34avoid a disputed title by reverting back to the House of Stuart.
When we turn to Of the Original Contract and Of Passive 
Obedience and examine what Hume has to say concerning the differing 
political ideas of the Whigs and the Tories, the two great parties of 
the succession issue, we find him very largely repeating ideas he had 
already canvassed in Of Morals, albeit in a less rigorously
33 Phil, Works, iii, pp. 470-479,
ibid., iii, p, 479.
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philosophical fashion. Hume’s line of reasoning amounts to the
contention that the ideological quarrel between the Whigs and the
Tories is completely pointless and wrong-headed, a thesis which he
had in effect already expounded in Of Morals, so that his ideas
inevitably have a familiar ring. The Tories, we find him
arguing, are right when they stress that subjects should put
great store upon paying strict obedience to the commands of the
state; but they are misguided whenever they become so extravagant
as to claim that subjects have absolutely no right at all to
resist egregious tyranny, The Whigs are right when they point out
that political power is created by consent alone; but they are
wrong whenever they claim that all governments currently existing in
the world draw the whole of their moral authority from the consent 
35of the governed. As was the case in Of Morals, the writings of 
Locke were uppermost in Hume’s mind when he set out to criticize 
what he took to be the Whig theory of political obligation. Instead 
of seeing it as 'the last refuge in desperate cases, when the 
public is in the highest danger, from violence and tyranny’, Locke 
had looked upon revolution with such complacency that his whole 
political philosophy, with its shrill insistence upon the necessarily 
conditional character of political obedience, was a positive danger 
to peace and order,^
Seen from the point of view of Hume's commitment to de 
facto power, the most important fact to be noted about these two 
essays is that in them he extensively exploits history for avowedly
^  'Of the Original Contract’, ibid., iii, pp. 443-456, 460; 'Of 
Passive Obedience', ibid., iii, pp. 460-461.
’Of Passive Obedience’, ibid,, iii, pp. 461-462.36
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polemical purposes, Of the Original Contract being especially 
noteworthy in this respect, In Of Morals Hume had already sought 
to give his theory of political obligation extra persuasiveness by 
appealing to history. The past being very largely a saga of 
usurpation and rebellion, it was simply pointless to quibble about 
legality or right when confronted with usurped power; subjects were 
best advised to submit with good grace to whoever happened to be the 
present possessor of power. In Of the Original Contract Hume took 
this theme up again; as part of his overall effort to discredit 
what he saw as Locke's undue stress upon the importance of consent, 
he sought to make use of what he took to be the basic message of 
history. In his opinion, Locke's poor grasp of reality was dramat­
ically revealed when his theories were viewed in the light of 
historical fact: the study of history revealed that most governments
currently existing in the world had sprung from 'usurpation or 
conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent, or 
voluntary subjection of the people'. The licence and disorder of 
the popular assemblies of Athens, 'the most extensive democracy, 
that we read of in history', clearly indicated that the common 
people were incapable of accepting the self-restraint which constructive 
political activity demanded. Whenever they were released from the 
grip of authority, politics became largely a matter of lawlessness 
and anarchy; in such a situation prudent men felt compelled to 
follow Roman practice by placing themselves in the service of a 
military dictator. The Glorious Revolution indicated that a popular 
election led to the establishment of a stable form of government only 
when it was controlled by 'the combination of a few great men'. There 
was only one thought which could occur to any observant student of 
history: 'Is there any thing discoverable in all these events, but
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force and violence?’37
In any discussion of the role which history played in 
Hume’s thinking as a political scientist it is always helpful to 
recall that 1752, the year when he largely ceased his work as an 
essayist, was also the year when he began working upon what was to 
become a multi-volume general history of England. The reason why 
he followed such a course becomes explicable when we recall the 
overriding importance in his essays of his interest in the question 
of the relationship between political liberty and public authority 
in the England of his day. One great lesson of Hume's political 
essays was that the mixed constitution of England was not a perfect 
form of government; it did not absolutely ensure the continued 
existence of social and political peace, being instead a veritable 
hot-bed of party strife, of conflict between court and country. If 
it were a truly perfect form of government, it would not suffer 
from such a weakness and England would be a partyless state. Not 
being a perfect commonwealth, England as a civil society was subjected 
to constant stress and strain, to flux and instability, to force 
and violence; it was, in other words,inextricably rooted in the 
sphere of history. By way of contrast, a perfect commonwealth, 
being wholly rational in form, would enjoy the happy condition of 
having no history worth speaking of. In short, the mixed constitution 
of England being imperfect as a form of government, its workings 
had to be studied from a decidedly historical point of view.
In any civil society there was bound to be tension 
between authority and liberty, but under a mixed constitution, with 
its countervailing republican and monarchical elements, this tension 
assumed a highly-developed form, being tightly woven into the 
very fabric of politics. Moreover, a British-style mixed constitution
(iv)
37 ibid., iii, pp. 447-450, 453-454.
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led to a spirit of watchful jealousy springing up amongst the 
partisans of liberty, a development which also ensured that under 
it politics would be inherently unstable, with country-party 
extravagance giving rise in turn to court-party extravagance. That 
Hume was quite capable of viewing the effects of these flaws from 
a decidedly historical standpoint should by now be perfectly clear. 
The essay in which he sought to delineate the essential framework 
of the clash between court and country - Of the Parties of Great 
Britain - was also the essay in which he set out the ideas he held 
at the time concerning the immediate historical origins of the 
eighteenth-century constitution. In this same essay - and in Of 
Superstition and Enthusiasm as well - we also find him linking this 
struggle between court and country to the struggle between 
Anglicanism and evangelical Protestantism, between superstition 
and enthusiasm, the second great set of concepts which he employed 
whenever studying the course of English party politics. Furthermore, 
the fact remained that the republican element of a mixed constitution 
was itself a distinctively historical product; it had to be seen 
as accident, not as essence, and as such it had to be studied in 
terms of the historical experience and social structure of specific 
civil societies. In short, a third concept was needed if it were 
to be explained why England had a mixed constitution in the first 
place. It was in Of Luxury that Hume hit upon this concept - it was 
because of the rise and spread of luxury that England enjoyed a 
mixed constitution. In Hume's opinion, the rise of luxury, along 
with the division between court and country and the rivalry of 
enthusiasm and superstition, represented the central theme of 
seventeenth-century history; together they formed the three great 
concepts which he was to employ when he came to examine the immediate 
historical origins of the eighteenth-century constitution, that is to
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say, when he first began to put his History of England together.
But we need to note here that our discussion of the 
appeals Hume made to history in Of Morals and Of the Original Contract 
has already revealed that his interest in the past was strongly 
polemical in form; whenever he looked back upon the past, he did 
so in an effort to discover evidence which would back up the particular 
political stance he had adopted or which would help discredit rival 
ideas and concepts. In Of Morals he appealed to history in an 
effort to add colour and substance to concepts he had canvassed in 
his capacity as a de facto theorist of political obligation; he 
sought to show that history was a tale of conquest and usurpation 
in order to enforce the notion that prudence dictated that present 
possession should be regarded as the decisive argument in disputes 
concerning the true grounds of political obedience. In Of the 
Qrieinal Contract he once again played upon this theme, this time 
in order to head off what he saw as the unsettling effects of 
Locke's stress upon the importance of consent. All this clearly indicates 
that his interest in history has to be seen as an aspect of his 
overall commitment to de facto power, as an aspect of his overall 
attempt to inculcate a mood of complete acquiescence in the settled 
structure of political arrangements. This being so, it necessarily 
follows that our next immediate task is to discover why he should 
have considered that in the interests of peace and order he had to 
produce a multi-volume study of English constitutional history.
P A R T  I I I
T H E H I S T O R I A N
CHAPTER VI
COURT AND COUNTRY POLITICS AND 
ENGLISH HISTORIOGRAPHY
(i)
At the same time as he was developing his science of politics
through his work as an essayist, Hume was striving to achieve the
financial independence without which he could never hope to attain the
'peace of mind,... Liberty § Independancy on Fortune, $ Contempt of
Riches, Power § Glory'^ which he always cherished. The sale of Essays
Moral and Political provided him with a tidy windfall, but his regular
2income still remained inadequate, so that he was forced to once again
enter 'a more active Scene of Life'. In the summer of 1744 he allowed
himself to become a candidate for a professorship at Edinburgh
University, but after several months of intense politicking he was
forced to withdraw his candidacy, partly because of opposition from
the presbyterian clergy; the unfavourable reviews which had greeted
the Treatise of Human Nature, with their accusations of dogmatic
3scepticism, had not been forgotten.
Hume's next bid to secure regular employment proved to be 
even more disastrous. Early in 1745 he became tutor to the Marquess of 
Annandale, a young nobleman who lived near St. Albans. But unfortun­
ately Lord Annandale was a madman; his family proved equally 
troublesome, picking quarrels with Hume over pay and working conditions. 
After putting up with these difficulties for several months, Hume
1 HL, i, p. 10.
2 Mossner, Life of Hume, p. 145.
For an account of this affair see Mossner and Price's introduction 
to A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh; Hume 
wrote this pamphlet during the controversy provoked by his 
candidacy.
3
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felt compelled to throw up his post. This unfortunate experience 
marked a kind of nadir; never again were Hume's fortunes to be 
so low. Immediately after leaving the Marquess's service, he befriended 
Lieutenant-General James St. Clair, a distant kinsman of his, who 
at varying times between 1746 and 1748 employed him either as a 
private secretary or as his judge-advocate. England was at war 
with France at this time, so that while in St. Clair's service Hume 
was able to obtain first-hand experience of military and diplomatic 
affairs. In 1746 he saw active military service for the first and 
last time when he accompanied St. Clair on a raid upon the French 
coast, while in 1748 he went with the general on a military mission 
to the courts of Vienna and Turin. At the end of 1748, his period as 
St. Clair's client having brought him financial independence as 
well as a wider acquaintance with the world, he returned to 
Ninewells and actively resumed his career as a man of letters.^
In the late 1740's and early and mid 1750's Hume was 
able to see a veritable spate of works through the press, Apart 
from the first revised edition of both volumes of Essays Moral and 
Political, two editions of Political Discourses and the first two 
volumes of what was to become his History of England, this period also 
saw the first appearance of his Philosophical Essays concerning Human 
Understanding (1748) and his Enquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals (1751) , in which he sought to recast in a more popular and 
attractive form certain sections of the argument of the Treatise of 
Human Nature, as well as the first edition of his Essays and Treatises 
on Several Subjects (1753-54), in which he gathered together all of 
his important essays and philosophical writings, with the exception of 
4 Mossner, Life of Hume, chap. 13.
4
5 ibid., chaps. 15-16.
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the Treatise, whose unfortunate reception he was now anxious to
forget. It was also during this period that Hume at last became a man
of property; in 1751 he left Ninewells and moved to Edinburgh,
where he bought a house and threw himself into the bustling cultural
7and social life which the Scottish capital enjoyed.
A few months after Hume moved to Edinburgh, an attempt 
was made to secure his appointment to Glasgow University's Chair 
of Logic,which was about to be vacated by Adam Smith, It was 
blocked, however, by 'the violent and solemn remonstrances of the
g
clergy'. But not long after this rebuff in Glasgow, Hume enjoyed
a triumph in Edinburgh. In January 1752 the Keepership of the
Faculty of Advocates' Library fell vacant, and Hume's friends
immediately nominated him for the post. A 'violent cry of Deism,
atheism, and scepticism' was at once raised, but after what was
virtually a tumultuous political campaign, Hume's supporters were
able to secure his appointment, thereby making him 'master of 
930,000 volumes'. Once comfortably ensconced in the Advocates'
Library, Hume began work upon what were to become the Stuart volumes 
of his History of England.
(ii)
In My Own Life Hume puts forward the following account 
of the precise circumstances under which he became a historian:
 ^ For the essential facts concerning Hume's literary activity at this 
time see My Own Life, HL, i, pp. 3-4; Jessop, Bibliography of 
Hume, pp. 5, 7, 19, 22-23; Mossner, Life of Hume, p p . 174-175, 
223-224. For his attitude to the Treatise see HL, i, p. 158.
 ^ ibid., i, pp. 161-162; Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 240-247.
 ^ HL, i, pp. 163-164; Mossner, Life of Hume, p p , 247-250.
9
HL, i, pp. 164-167; Mossner, Life of Hume, p p . 250-252.
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In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates chose me their 
Librarian, an Office from which I received little or 
no Emolument, but which gave me the Command of a 
large Library. I then formed the Plan of writing the 
History of England; but being frightened with the 
Notion of continuing a Narrative, through a Period 
of 1700 years, I commenced with the Accession of 
the House of Stuart; an Epoch, when, I thought, the 
Misrepresentations of Faction began chiefly to take 
place.10
Unfortunately, the facts of the matter are in many ways not so 
straightforward as this account would suggest. Had Hume had a 
punctilious concern for his subsequent reputation as a serious 
historian, he might have expended more thought before penning it; 
by suggesting that he 'formed the Plan of writing the History of 
England' only after he happened to gain 'Command of a large Library', 
he undoubtedly gives the impression that it was somewhat by chance 
that he ever became a historian. Professor Trevor-Roper presumably 
has this comment in mind when he suggests that Hume became a 
historian 'almost by accident'.^ This implies that Hume's activity 
as a historian was distinct from, and in some way incidental to, his 
activity as a philosopher. But from Hume's point of view no such 
division existed; he was a moral philosopher, and in the eighteenth 
century the moral philosopher was concerned with the totality of 
man's mental and social activity, a line of study in which Hume saw 
history playing an extremely important role. To be worthwhile, moral 
philosophy had to be based upon experience and observation. But should 
the moral philosopher merely rely upon personal experience and 
observation, he would never gain the breadth of knowledge needed for 
the formulation of sound generalizations about human behaviour.
History greatly helped him here, providing him as it did with a
10 ILL, i, p. 41.
H.R. Trevor-Roper, 'Hume as a Historian', D.F. Pears (ed.), David 
Hume: A Symposium, London, 1963, p. 89.
145
wealth of information about many facets of human endeavour. Hume had
arrived at this opinion a full decade before he became a historian;
it can be found expressed in Essays Moral and Political, in Of the 
12Study of History.
It is well-established, furthermore, that Hume’s wish to
undertake actual historical research easily predated his appointment
to the Advocates’ Library. In 1745, while he was in the service
of Lord Annandale, he seems to have found time to start sketching out
13the narrative framework of a general history of England. Similarly,
he looked upon his service with General St. Clair as an excellent
means of obtaining the sort of experience which he believed historians
had to have; in two letters written in 1747 and 1748 we find him
stating that the military and diplomatic knowledge which he could
expect to pick up as the general's client would become invaluable
14should he ever undertake ’historical Projects', By 1749 Hume 
had composed some 164 pages of historical memoranda, which covered 
English history from the Roman invasion down to the reign of George
Hume's decision to become a historian was no bolt from 
the blue; what his appointment to the Advocates' Library did was 
to provide him with the means of putting into effect an intention 
which he had long harboured. In our review of Hume's examination
^  Phil. Works, iv, p. 390.
13 Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 175-176.
14 HL, i, pp. 108-109; NHL, p. 23, Hume did in fact produce a historical 
narrative as a direct result of his service with St. Clair; in 1756 
he put together a manuscript account of the general’s raid on the 
French coast. It is printed in Burton, Hume’s Life and 
Correspondence, i, pp. 441-456; why Hume wrote it is explained 
in Mossner, Life of Hume, pp, 199-202.
^  Ernest Campbell Mossner, 'An Apology for David Hume, Historian’, 
Publications of the Modern Language Association of America,
LVI (1941), pp. 675-676.
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in his essays of the relationship between public authority and political 
liberty in-England’s mixed constitution we contended that he assumed 
that such a topic had to be approached from a decidedly historical 
point of view; the more recondite evidence we have cited above suggests 
that, apart from making frequent references to history in the essays 
themselves, Hume was also thinking about composing a general political 
history of England from at least 1745 onwards, But for all the 
comprehensiveness of his early historical memoranda, the concepts 
which most attracted his interest as a political scientist - court and 
country, superstition and enthusiasm, luxury and liberty - were such 
as to focus his attention upon the constitutional crisis of the 
seventeenth century, the immediate historical matrix of the mixed 
government of the England of his day, the compatibility of which with 
the ends and purposes of civil society was ever his chief concern as 
a political scientist.
But given the strongly polemical character of Hume's 
political science, given his propensity for working out his ideas 
in conscious opposition to other ideas being canvassed at the time, 
it would seem that we have reason enough for accepting at face value 
his claim in My Own Life that disgust at 'the Misrepresentations of 
Faction' was the ultimate reason why he decided to make himself the 
historian of the seventeenth century. His decision to become a 
historian was a wholly logical step; but to find out what actually 
drove him into the study of history, we need to discover if it is 
in fact correct to assume that he was so irked by the view which 
eighteenth-century Englishmen had of their country's past that he 
felt compelled to write a multi-volume political history by way 
of rebuttal. For Hume himself, history was of value only in so far as 
as it was written in a spirit of 'Candor, Disinterestedness, £
Humanity'; he was convinced that '(the) first Quality of an Historian
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is to be true § impartial'. But we have already seen enough of his 
notion of impartiality to realize that it was never an attempt to 
avoid political commitment; it was very much a political stance, very 
much an aspect of a commitment to peace and acquiescence. For Hume 
there could be no such thing as neutrality where political peace was 
concerned. His concept of impartiality only came into play when he 
began applying his neo«-Hobbesian values to concrete political 
situations; he considered that the best way he could contribute 
to the growth of political peace in England was by means of a cool 
and sceptical examination of the language used by the various 
political groupings of the day in order to expose and deflate all 
forms of extravagant rhetoric.
(iii)
The debilitation and collapse of the Whig interpretation 
of English history has perforce led modern historians to reassess the 
reasons why the parliamentary opponents of the four Stuart princes 
acted as they did. We are no longer permitted to view the 
parliamentarians of the seventeenth century as a group of disinterested 
patriots manfully resisting the attempts of a short-sighted and 
incompetent dynasty to circumvent constitutional government and the 
rule of law. Instead, we have to see them as a bunch of ’sturdy 
reactionaries' who were devoid of any positive forward - looking 
programme, being motivated mainly by an old-fashioned dislike of 
'efficient, centralised government', a dislike which reflected an 
obscurantist wish 'to restore the 'ancient constitution' of a century, 
perhaps even two or three centuries before' as well as a desire to 
secure 'the maintenance of their own class power'. The various
16 HL_, i,pp. 210, 242.
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constitutional crises of the Stuart period culminating in the Revolution
'stamped England as a wildly eccentric country outside the mainstream
17of European political development'.
It was in their very conservatism, it was in their staunch
commitment to the 'ancient constitution', that the strength of the
parliamentary opponents of the Stuarts lay. They were certain in their
own minds that the legal and constitutional structure inherited by the
Stuarts was no mere royal concession which could be abolished at will.
It had not been created by a sovereign; it had instead existed unchanged
in England since remotest antiquity, since, indeed, time immemorial,
and as such its existence necessarily predated that of any single
individual lawmaker. The peculiar strength of this belief was an
aspect of the tremendously important role which the common law concept
of custom played in shaping the political thought of Englishmen in the
18early seventeenth century. This meant that the myth of the ancient 
constitution was never the sole preserve of a single party; it was 
instead a real and vital aspect of the way in which the politically 
articulate Englishman of this time thought about the existing constitu­
tion. Throughout the early seventeenth century supporters as well as 
opponents of royal policy subscribed to it; members of both groups 
claimed to be loyal defenders of the ancient constitution, a constitu­
tion of which both prerogative and parliament were deemed to be
19essential ingredients.
This is not to say that in the first half of the seven­
teenth century belief in the unbroken continuity and extreme antiquity 
of the English constitution was universal and absolute; this period
^  J.P.Kenyon (ed.), The Stuart Constitution 1603-1688, Cambridge, 
lg 1966, pp.l, 3-4,7.
J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, Cambridge, 
1957, chaps, i-iii.
Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, pp. 9-11; Pocock, Ancient Constitution 
and Feudal Law, pp. 54-55, 148-151.
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produced a number of chroniclers and antiquarians who were perfectly
capable of writing accounts of English history based upon the premise
that the Norman invasion of 1066 - always the great bugbear of the myth
of the ancient constitution - had led to a complete restructuring of
20political power in the country. During the Civil War and Interregnum
doubts about the political worth as well as about the historical veracity
of the myth of the ancient constitution began to proliferate. As we
have already seen, during this period a school of de facto theorists of
political obligation sought to spread a mood of quiescence by contending
21that history - and English history was no exception - revealed that
political power was invariably obtained through force and violence alone
rather than through the observation of constitutional niceties. For a
completely different reason - in order to bring about the overthrow of
'the Norman yoke' - the Levellers, too, argued that the previous six
centuries of English history had been a saga of conquest and tyranny
22rather than of liberty and legality.
In the wake of the violence of the 1640's some royalists
began to recoil from appeals to an antiquity in whose name subversion
23and revolution had been carried on. Sir Robert Filmer, for one,
sought to direct royalist political thought away from appeals to antiquity
24and more towards a concept of sovereignty. This process rapidly
21
24
Skinner, 'History and Ideology in the English Revolution', pp. 154-155, 
156-160. See also Pocock, Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, 
chaps, iv-v.
Skinner, 'History and Ideology in the English Revolution', pp. 165-167.
Christopher Hill, 'The Norman Yoke', John Saville (ed.), Democracy 
and the Labour Movement , London, 1954, pp. 11-66, especially pp.11-38.
For a specific example see J.G.A. Pocock, 'Robert Brady, 1627-1700.
A Cambridge Historian of the Restoration', Cambridge Historical Journal, 
X(1951) , pp. 186-191.
See his 'Freeholder's Grand Inquest Touching our Soveraigne Lord the 
King and his Parliament' (1648), Patriarcha and Other Political Works, 
pp.127-184. See also Pocock, Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, 
pp. 151-162.
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crystallized in the 1680’s, during the Exclusion crisis, when a school
of distinctively royalist historians set out to expose the elaborate
historical fantasies which the parliamentary opposition - this time in
the guise of the early Whig party - had to fall back upon when arguing
that the House of Commons was an essential part of the ancient
constitution. Led by the Cambridge don Dr. Robert Brady and making
use of techniques of historical scholarship pioneered by the
antiquarians, this school set out to show that the Commons was in no
sense immemorial nor even particularly ancient. They began their
attack by contending that the real significance of the Norman invasion was
that it had led to the introduction of feudal tenure into England.
This meant that the House of Commons could not be immemorial; under
feudal law parliament was a council of the crown's feudal tenants
and definitely not an assembly of freeholders' representatives. Believing
that to acknowledge that this had been the case would amount to conceding
that the Commons had been created by a sovereign prince and was thus
forever dependent upon the crown for its existence, the Whig
antiquarians were forced more and more to openly assert that the English
constitution was in no way a product of history, that it had in no
25way been exposed to flux and change.
But as matters turned out, Brady and his followers proved 
to be only too successful in showing just how effective an ally of 
absolute monarchy scientific historiography could be; with the fall 
of James II their ideas, for all their analytical value, were 
immediately discredited as being those of a beaten and despised 
political cause. The Revolution in fact administered a sharp setback
25  ' ' ' ^For the arguments canvassed by Brady and his associates see ibid., 
pp. 193-228; for the basic presuppositions of the Whig 
antiquarians see ibid., pp. 51-53, 186-193, 229-235. See also 
David C. Douglas, English Scholars, London, 1939, chap. vi.
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to the development of English historiography, succeeding as it
did in propping up the fantasies of the Whig antiquarians and putting
a deep stain of political heterodoxy upon a critical and iconoclastic
26approach to the study of constitutional history. Buttressed by its
massive authority, the myth of the ancient constitution as it had
been expressed through the propaganda of the parliamentary opponents
of the Stuarts lingered on throughout the eighteenth century, its
influence strongly pervading the orthodox interpretation of the
political events from which the country’s constitution had emerged.
The parliamentary opponents of the Stuarts had claimed to have had
’no thought to alter government’, being perfectly satisfied with
27their 'ancient liberties' and the 'ancient government'. Consequently,
as late as the 1790's Edmund Burke, as part of his overall effort to
assert the English political tradition in opposition to all the forces
let loose by the French Revolution, was still prepared to claim
that the various crises which had culminated in the Revolution
represented attempts 'to preserve our ancient indisputable laws and
liberties, and that ancient constitution of government which is our
only security for law and liberty'; the Bill of Rights thus joined
Magna Carta in the long line of reaffirmations or confirmations of the
28ancient constitution that had occurred since remotest antiquity.
The parliamentary opponents of the Stuarts had been convinced that 
'the form of government in any state could not be altered without
26
27
For a perceptive contemporary assessment of the effects of 
power politics upon English historiography following the Revolution 
see Edmund Burke, 'An Essay towards an History of the Laws of England', 
Works, 14 vols., London, 1815-22, x, pp. 549-566.
This was the opinion of Sir Arthur Haslerigg when he looked back in 
1659 upon the events of 1642. It is quoted in Kenyon, Stuart 
Constitution, p . 7.
Reflections on the Revolution in France, Works, v, pp. 74-76. For a 
more detailed assessment of the significance of the stand Burke took 
here see J.G.A. Pocock, 'Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A
Problem in the History of Ideas', The Historical Journal, III (1960), 
pp. 125-143.
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apparent danger of ruin to that s t a t e t h e  polity was only healthy
29when the pristine integrity of the ancient constitution was intact.
But of course at various times in the seventeenth century England
had quite plainly been in 'apparent danger of ruin'; this obviously
meant that somehow the ancient constitution had become corrupted
30or undermined. For all the disagreement at the time, the eighteenth
century had little permissible scope for speculation concerning
who was responsible for this state of affairs occurring. After all,
did not the Bill of Rights say that the Revolution was essentially
a matter of Englishmen 'vindicating and asserting their ancient
rights and liberties' which the House of Stuart, with 'the assistance
of divers evil counsellors, judges, and ministers', had sought to
31'subvert and extirpate'?
When Hume came to the study of the constitutional crisis
of the seventeenth century, the authoritative expression of the orthodox
interpretation of the period was to be found in the History of
England of Paul Rapin de Thoyras (1661-1725), a French Protestant man
of letters who fled his country following the revocation of the Edict
of Nantes and who thereafter spent a life of exile in England, Holland 
32and Germany. Written in French and published in ten volumes
31
This was the opinion of John Pym in 1628, See Kenyon, Stuart 
Constitution, pp. 16-18.
Rival opinions concerning the source of England's political troubles 
expressed during 1640-42 may be found in ibid., pp. 204, 206-207, 
213-216 (Pym), 211-213 (Strafford), 222-223, 229, 231-232 (the 
House of Commons), 240-241 (Charles I).
See Williams, Eighteenth-Century Constitution, pp. 26, 28.
For an account of Rapin's life, writings and subsequent reputation 
see the DNB,
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between 1723 and 1727, this work was originally intended by its
author to meet the requirements of continental readers, but upon
becoming translated into English, it became accepted by Englishmen
as the standard general history of their country, a status which
it still enjoyed in the early 1750's. Rapin felt himself to be a
33'good neuter Historian’, and he was always keen to detect
34distortion or bias in his sources. But his treatment of English 
history would never have become accepted as the standard account 
had it not been suffused with the dominant myths of the day; 
when we consult his interpretation of the constitutional crisis 
of the seventeenth century, we find that it is markedly Whiggish 
in tone.
Rapin frequently stressed the difficulty of determining
with any degree of precision the constitutionality of the respective
stances taken by the early Stuarts and their parliaments in the
35course of their disputes, but at the same time he felt that the 
sheer fact that such disputes had broken out at all clearly 
indicated that James I and Charles I had harboured evil intentions.
A wise and prudent English monarch could not but be aware that the 
surest way of obtaining a steady flow of power and revenue was by 
respecting 'the restraint which the Laws, Customs, and Privileges 
of the English Nation had lain on his Predecessors'; prudence and 
good policy dictated that he should scrupulously avoid getting 
involved in constitutional disputes: 'the Kings of England, who
were most famous, and most esteemed, as Edward I, Edward III,
Henry V, Henry VIII and Elizabeth, constantly followed (this) 
maxim, and thereby rendered their Reigns prosperous and happy'.
33 ^  ’
Paul Rapin de Thoyras, The History of England, trans. N. Tindal,
2 vols., London, 1732-3'3, ii, p. 347\ ’ "
34 See e.g. ibid., ii pp. 347-349.
See e.g. ibid.., ii, pp. 185, 189, 212-213..
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In contrast, princes ’least eminent for their prudence and capacity,
such as Henry III, Edward II, Richard II, were ruined, for raising
such sort of disputes’. For Rapin, both James and Charles clearly
fitted into the latter category; they stirred up totally unnecessary
constitutional disputes, thereby making their reigns miserable and in- 
36glorious. James was ’the first cause of the troubles which
afflicted England’; ceaselessly proclaiming the virtues of absolute
monarchy, he gave the Commons just cause to fear that his principles,
if implemented, would lead 'to no less than arbitrary power, and of
37course to the subversion of the English constitution’. His son outdid
him in this respect, seeking from the very outset of his reign
’to carry the Regal Authority much higher than the King his Father,
38or any of his Predecessors had done’. Faced with all this
provocation on the part of their monarch, the Commons knew just
what course it had to follow: ’There was...no medium: his
pretensions were either to be complied with, or opposed with open 
39force’.
Civ)
When he is viewed as a de facto theorist of political 
obligation, the general framework within which Hume's attitude towards 
the myth of the ancient constitution took shape becomes clear. As 
we have already noted, some of the fiercest seventeenth-century 
critics of the view of English history subscribed to by the 
parliamentary opponents of the Stuarts were the de facto theorists
36 ibid., ii, pp. 163, 213, 238, 284-285.
37 ibid., ii, pp. 160-161, 168, 178.
T O
ibid., ii, p . 237.
ibid., ii, pp. 238-239.39
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of the 1650's. As part of their overall effort to spread the notion 
that the loyalty of subjects was best directed towards all de facto 
rulers, irrespective of how they had got their power, these writers 
contended that the study of history indicated that successful use 
of force, and not the observation of legal and constitutional 
niceties, was the decisive argument in all disputes to do with 
political obedience. This line of reasoning represented a direct 
attack upon the myth of the ancient constitution; belief in the 
unbroken continuity of English institutions necessarily involved 
a denial that violence and conquest had played decisive parts in 
shaping the nature of the constitution. Hume was perfectly 
capable of emulating the de facto theorists of the Interregnum in 
this respect; in both Of Morals and Of the Original Contract we 
find him stressing the importance of conquest and usurpation in human 
history in an effort to enforce the idea that subjects ought always 
to support de facto power.
In both Of Morals and Of the Original Contract the thrust 
of Hume's appeal to history, his insistence that the past was a saga of 
force and violence, was directed against what he took to be the 
Lockean concept that government drew its moral authority entirely from 
the consent of the governed. But anyone seeking to refute Locke 
by means of an appeal to history in general and English history in 
particular faces insuperable problems. Our brief examination of 
the myth of the ancient constitution has to a large extent revealed 
the reason why in the English-speaking world of the eighteenth 
century Lockean political doctrines tended to attract the attention 
not so much of the whole-hearted supporters of the existing constitution 
but rather of groups who felt alienated from it. We have previously 
seen that Locke's theory of political obligation was worked out in 
terms of a set of abstract concepts concerning the essential principles
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of human sociability. But in this respect he was well out of step
with the constitutionalist tradition of seventeenth and eighteenth-
century England; the continued strength of the myth of the ancient
constitution throughout this period suggests a persistent refusal
by English constitutionalists to use abstract concepts in political
debate. In Locke's lifetime and for many years after most of them
would have agreed with one of his fellow early Whigs, the antiquarian
William Atwood, when he claimed that the rights of Englishmen were
but mere 'naked Rights', mere 'thin and metaphysical Notions, which
few are Masters or Judges of' unless they had enjoyed an unbroken
40existence since the remotest antiquity.
This way of thinking lingered on well after the 
Revolution, as our previous reference to Burke's anti-French Revolution 
propaganda has already revealed. Burke's commitment to the myth 
of the ancient constitution had as one of its corollaries an insistence 
that a central element in the English way of conducting politics was 
'the principle of reference to antiquity'. Burke saw Englishmen 
'claiming their franchises not on abstract principles "as the 
rights of men," but as the rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony 
derived from their forefathers'; they rejected ''that vague 
speculative right, which exposed their sure inheritance to be
41scrambled for and torn to pieces by every wild litigious spirit'.
But Locke, let us repeat, did not subscribe to such a line of 
thinking; he made few attempts to buttress the teaching? of his 
political philosophy by means of an appeal to antiquity. When he 
came to outline a case on behalf of the idea that government was a 
matter of trust, he could have easily made use of the concept of an
Atwood's opinion is quoted in Pocock, 'Robert Brady', p. 190. 
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, pp. 75, 76-77.
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ancient constitution. But he made no sustained effort to do so,
choosing instead to confine himself to exploring the implications of
a set of abstract concepts concerning the essential principles of
human sociability. Had he subscribed to the notion of an original
contract, he would have inevitably resorted to the flourishing of
ancient parchments and records; at the end of the seventeenth
century Englishmen were apt to define an original contract as an
42oath to preserve the ancient constitution. But his notion of
trust was an assumption about basic human nature and his arguments
43were unfolded with but slight reference to antiquity, However 
much the myth of the ancient constitution retained its destructive 
foice in the eighteenth century - and the history of the previous 
century showed that revolutionary political action and belief in the 
overriding authority of antiquity were perfectly compatible - 
Locke could not be blamed.
But we do not have to restrict ourselves to saying that 
most supporters of the eighteenth-century British constitution lacked a 
truly Lockean political outlook. We can also say that throughout 
much of the eighteenth century the most important current of political 
thought working against the development of a mood of complacency and 
contentment in England was no offshoot of Lockean political philosophy 
either; as our discussion of his concept of luxury has already 
revealed, Hume was very much aware that it was in fact the country- 
party's fear of corruption which formed the most important stream 
of radical political thought in eighteenth-century England. In terms
of political developments within the English-speaking world of the
42 ' ' r_Pocock, Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, pp. 229-231.
43 The problem of Locke's indifference to the ancient constitution is 
noted but not explained by Laslett in his introduction to Two 
Treatises, pp. 75-78, 114-115 and Pocock, Ancient Constitution 
and Feudal Law, pp. 235-238.
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eighteenth century, events in Ireland and to a lesser extent in
America were to vindicate Hume's fears concerning the inherently
44anarchical character of Locke's theory of political obligation; 
but within England itself the greatest potential threat to political 
stability throughout much of the century was not posed by an 
ahistorical or rationalistic form of radicalism. The equilibrium 
of the constitution was most in jeopardy whenever political stress 
and strain resulted in the country-party's fear of corruption proving 
especially attractive to the independent country gentlemen, a process 
which we find exemplified in the rise of Christopher Wyvill's
45Yorkshire Association during the great political crisis of 1779-80.
Far from rejecting the established constitution - had they done so, 
they would have automatically debarred themselves from effective 
political action - independent country gentleman of Wyvill's ilk 
yearned rather to see its true principles restored to full operation, 
to see its pristine integrity refurbished, to see it cleansed of the 
dross of executive tyranny and corruption; they yearned, in short, 
to see the ancient constitution restored to its full glory. Whenever 
the country-party advocated parliamentary reform as a means of curbing 
corruption, it invariably denied that it was indulging in either 
innovation, subversion or radicalism; parliamentary reform was of value
only in so far as it represented an attempt to place the constitution
46back upon its true and ancient foundations.
For Locke's Irish followers see Robbins, Eighteenth-Century 
Commonwealthman, chap, v; for two sceptical appraisals of Locke's 
reputation amongst the Americans see Bailyn, Ideological Origins 
of American Revolution, pp. 26-30 and Dunn, 'The Politics of 
Locke', pp. 69-80.
For accounts of the events surrounding the rise of the Yorkshire 
Association see Butterfield, George III, North and People, chaps, 
v-vi and Christie, Wilkes, Wyvill and Reform, chap. iii.
The conception of English history subscribed to by Wyvill and his 
colleagues is examined by Butterfield, George III, North and People, 
pp. 343-352.
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In their efforts to portray themselves as the defenders of 
the traditional virtues and ancient liberties of Englishmen, country- 
party critics of corruption enjoyed the tremendous advantage of being 
able to take over the official interpretation of the immediate 
historical origins of the constitution and exploit it for polemical 
purposes; this was the reason, if any, why the country-party was able
to convince the public at large that its members were 'the true WHIGS'
%
That it was the opponents rather than the supporters of the settled 
order of things who were best able to make use of orthodox historio­
graphy in party warfare throughout much of the eighteenth century will 
not appear paradoxical when we recall that, as expounded by Rapin, 
official historiography was in many ways country-party history, 
being a lineal descendant of the political myths and attitudes of the 
parliamentary opponents of the Stuarts. Rapin provided the 
eighteenth-century country-party with ideal polemical ammunition. By 
in effect explaining the constitutional crisis of the seventeenth- 
century in terms of a clash between an evil intentioned court on the 
one hand and the great bulk of Englishmen who were loyal to the 
ancient constitution on the other, he enabled the opponents of the 
eighteenth-century court-party to plausibly depict themselves as the 
direct heirs of the patriots of the previous century. The writings 
which Bolingbroke directed against Walpole's ministry exemplify this 
process. According to Bolingbroke, the struggle by the country- 
party to protect England's traditional virtues from all the forces 
of luxury and corruption at loose in Walpole's England had to be 
seen in a broad historical context; it was yet another episode in the 
perennial struggle between the supporters and the enemies of the 
ancient constitution, a struggle which formed the basic underlying 
theme of all recorded English history. The ancient constitution was 
the political embodiment of all the traditional virtues of Englishmen
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their manly love of independence, their hatred of slavery and tyranny, 
their austere rejection of effete enervating luxury - so that its 
continued existence could not but be gravely threatened by the methods 
of government which Walpole employed; if they were truly the descend­
ants of the patriots of the seventeenth century and indeed of every 
generation of Englishmen which had ever leapt to the defence of the 
ancient constitution in times of trouble, eighteenth-century Englishmen 
would support the country-party in its opposition to Walpole and his 
court-party henchmen. ^
Faced with this attack, the eighteenth-century court-party
was driven into denying that references to antiquity had any place in
political debate, into asserting that history was irrelevant so far as
all true defenders of the existing constitution were concerned. By the
time Hume turned to the study of English history in the early 1750's,
it was already clear that this was so. Provoked by the extravagantly
Whiggish history peddled by Bolingbroke in the 1730's, court-party
journalists and pamphleteers soon discovered that the best way they could
set about refuting him was by simply rejecting the notion that the past
was a model or guide which eighteenth-century Englishmen were obliged
to slavishly copy. England's liberties, they contended, were not
the product of remote antiquity; they were instead completely modern
in origin, having only come into existence since the Revolution.
There was no ancient free constitution for Walpole to corrupt,
English history up till 1688 being very largely a saga of tyranny,
oppression, slavery, conquest, brutality and degradation; Walpole's
England stood out in comparison as a positive paradise of
^  Bolingbroke's Remarks on the History of England (1730-32) is very 
largely an attempt to depict English history as a perpetual struggle 
between the court and the nation, with the former attacking, and the 
latter defending, the country's liberties. See e.g. letters iv-viii, 
Works, i, pp.313-354; for his Whiggish interpretation of the troubles 
of the seventeenth century see letters xvii-xxiii, ibid., i, pp.438-521.
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freedom and happiness.
This whole line of reasoning amounted to a total rejection of
official historiography, But in their efforts to discredit Bolingbroke's
politics of nostalgia Walpole's court-party journalists and pamphleteers
found that they had no option but to subscribe to it. Indeed, they had
to do more; they soon discovered that the refutation of Bolingbroke
necessarily entailed reviving the ideas of the Tory historians of the
1680’s. They found that if they wished to refute Bolingbroke, they had to
echo Brady; they had to contend that in 1066 the English constitution
had become a feudal constitution under which the vast majority of
Englishmen had lacked any effective political voice, being instead the
vassals of the King and his feudal tenants, who alone were entitled to
political rights and privileges. The true friends of the constitution
had to recognize that the Revolution Settlement represented - thankfully -
a radical break with the past; England’s liberties were ultimately rooted
not in antiquity but in extra-historical principles of reason and human 
49nature. Walpole's scribblers, in short, rediscovered the great lesson
of the 1680's: the best way the country-party's pretensions could be
deflated was by means of a critical and iconoclastic approach to English
constitutional history. Our major task in examining Hume's activity
as a historian will be to discover how successful he was in following
up this lead. Being a supporter of de facto power, he was implacably
opposed to the radical-reactionary style of politics which flowed from
the country-party's concern with corruption, an opposition which, as we
have already seen, comes through strongly in his essay Of Luxury, in
which he sought to discredit this fear of corruption by stressing the
essential modernity of England's liberties. The complete establishment
of this concept was to be his major aim as a historian.
Isaac Kramnick, 'Augustan Politics and English Historiography: The
Debate on the English Past, 1730 - 1735', History and Theory,
VI (1967), pp. 33-56, especially pp. 40-46.
ibid., pp. 42-43, 45-46.49
CHAPTER VII
THE SPIRIT OF INNOVATION UNMASKED
(i)
Looking back in later life to the period when he first
became a historian, Hume was to confess that, despite his protestations
of impartiality, he had in fact been thoroughly infected with 'the
plaguy Prejudices of Whiggism'; he had been so 'corrupted with Whig
Rancour' as to have 'really deserv'd the Name of a party Writer'.'*'
If by all this he meant that in 1752 his view of the constitutional
crisis of the seventeenth century was heavily influenced by Rapin's
account of the period, then he was not being unduly self-critical. For
all his scepticism as to the worth of country-party criticism of the
existing structure of political arrangements, at no time before 1752
did he give any indication that he was seriously dissatisfied with the
official interpretation of the seventeenth century in general - even
though it formed a vital aspect of the rhetoric used by the country-
party- and with Rapm in particular, being ' carry'd away with the usual
2Esteem pay'd to that Historian'; in 1752 he was still prepared to go 
on record as stating that he considered Rapin to be the most judicious
3of historians. In Of the Parties of Great Britain, Hume, with his 
stress upon the evil consequences flowing from the 'misguided' attempts 
by the Stuarts to undermine 'the ancient government', was certainly very
1 NHL, pp. 69-70.
2 HL, i, p.258.
3 'Of the Protestant Succession', Phil. Works, lii, p.473.
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much under the spell of the Frenchman»
But for all his willingness to fall in with the views of 
orthodox historiography, Hume had, at the time he became a historian, 
just discovered that if he wished to discredit country-party rhetoric, 
and in particular the campaign against corruption, he had no choice but 
to frame an interpretation of seventeenth-century history at variance 
with that put forward by Rapin. He had just discovered that the best 
way the country-party's pretensions could be deflated was by stressing 
the modernity of England's mixed government; 1752 was the year in which 
he published Of Luxury. This brings us to the question of what may be 
called Hume's Harringtonianism. During our discussion of Idea of a 
Perfect Commonwealth we noted in passing that Hume considered Oceana 
to be a 'valuable model of a commonwealth'. This outburst of praise 
should be seen as merely the tip of the iceberg in terms of the esteem 
in which Hume held Harrington's ideas. In the present context it is 
especially important to note that Hume's belief in the inseparability 
of luxury and liberty - the key concept which he employed whenever 
discussing the rise of mixed government in England - formed easily the 
most important aspect of his Harringtonianism. Furthermore, we should 
recall that in his essays Hume showed himself perfectly capable of
This is not to say that in his essays Hume was incapable of expressing 
opinions which clashed with individual aspects of orthodox historio­
graphy. Thus, his reference to Rapin's judicious scholarship 
appeared in a passage in which he contended that the early Stuarts 
could be partially excused for their behaviour on the grounds that 
their political principles were very common at the time. Similarly, 
we have previously noted that in 'That Politics may be reduced to a 
Science' Hume classed Elizabethan England as an absolute monarchy and 
that in 'Of the Original Contract' he stressed the importance of 
force and violence in bringing about the Revolution. See ibid., 
iii, pp. 98-99, 448-449, 473. But these are isolated expressions of 
opinion. 'Of the Parties of Great Britain', the most considered 
statement of opinion concerning English history which Hume made as 
an essayist, is, as we have stated above, strongly orthodox.
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converting this concept of luxury, his Hamngtonianism, into a critique 
of the country-party's fear of corruption; the reasoning put forward 
in Of Luxury - the essay in which his contempt for this phobia stands 
out most clearly - reveals in a paradigmatic way the extent to which 
he expressed his opposition to the radical-reactionary politics of the 
country-party in Harringtonian terms.
We can reveal the way in which Hume used Harringtonian 
concepts in his criticism of country-party rhetoric by restating the 
basic principles of the argument advanced in Of Luxury. Only men of 
property - notably tradesmen, merchants and prosperous peasants - can 
enjoy political freedom. To be a man of property is to escape the 
fate of being dependent upon another for one's subsistence; to be 
dependent in this way is to be a vassal, and vassals are fit only for 
slavery and subjection. To be rich, to own property, is to be independ­
ent, to be politically autonomous. In contrast, poverty, lack of 
property, is inseparable from meanness of spirit and submission to 
slavery; those who lack property lack political independence, having 
instead no choice but to serve the political cause of their master, of 
the person who provides them with their livelihood. Once these ultimately 
Harringtonian^ concepts had been posited, the rest of Hume's case 
against the country-party's fear of corruption followed easily along. 
Encouraging the growth of agriculture, industry and commerce and thereby 
swelling the power of the men of property, the rise of luxury contributes 
to the growth of a free society and thus prepares the way for the rise 
of political liberty, whose existence is now called for because of the 
incompatibility of arbitrary power and security of property. Luxury
The concept of property Harrington bequeathed to the eighteenth 
century is outlined in Pocock, 'Civic Humanism and Anglo-American 
Thought', pp. 90-93 and 'Machiavelli, Harrington and English 
Ideologies', pp. 106-115, 126-128.
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is a wholly modern phenomenon - it is incompatible with the power which 
the Gothic barons wield over their tenants - so that political liberty 
itself is wholly modern in origin; it is the height of sociological 
naivety to claim that England's liberties are rooted in an ancient 
constitution and that they are being corrupted as a result of the 
concentration upon private economic gain so characteristic of modern 
England,
In itself the notion that property conveyed freedom and
power was a commonplace in the English-speaking world of the eighteenth
century.^ Hume himself was the first to admit this; he believed that
'all the world' acknowledged that the power of parliament sprang from
the extensive property possessed by the social groups its members 
7represented. Indeed, Hume was inclined to suspect that too many of 
his contemporaries were uncritical in their Harringtonianism; he felt 
that an occasional dose of scepticism was called for in order to ensureg
that a more balanced appraisal prevailed. But the fact that Harringtonian 
ideas concerning the role of property in politics were conventional to 
the point of banality posed no real inconvenience to Hume the historian, 
for should he succeed in developing a coherent interpretation of the 
events which had made a Harringtonian conception of citizenship relevant 
in English conditions, he could count upon unfolding an argument whose 
central concern would not be queried, irrespective of how iconoclastic 
its findings might happen to be. Moreover, we need to realize that the 
country-party of his day possessed what has been described as an essent­
ially neo-Harringtonian political outlook. The set of traditional
6 For Harrington's reputation at this time see H.F.Russell Smith,
Harrington and his Oceana, Cambridge, 1914, chaps, vi-viii.
'Of Luxury', Phil. Works, iii, p. 307.
 ^See 'Of the First Principles of Government', ibid., iii, p. Ill;
'Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, 
or to a Republic', ibid., iii, pp. 122-123; 'Idea of a Perfect 
Commonwealth', ibid., iii, pp. 481-482.
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v i r t u e s  which i t  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  Englishmen - t h e i r  manly love o f  in depend­
ence ,  t h e i r  a u s t e r e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  luxury  and so on - was d e r iv e d  from 
th e  c l a s s i c a l - m i n d e d  concep t ion  o f  c i t i z e n s h i p  which H a r r in g to n  had 
s u b s c r i b e d  t o ;  t h e  c o u n t r y - p a r t y  tended  t o  d e p i c t  t h e  a n c i e n t  c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n  as a H a r r in g to n i a n  commonwealth, as a p o l i t y  in  which landownership  
was d i s t r i b u t e d  amongst a h o s t  o f  independen t  c oun t ry  gent leman and 
s t u r d y  yeomen, whose r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in  t h e  House o f  Commons formed
p a r t  o f  a mixed or  ba lan ced  type  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  H a r r i n g t o n ' s  immortal
9
commonwealth in  e f f e c t .
There was an obvious d i f f i c u l t y  f a c i n g  th e  n e o -H a r r in g t o n ia n s
o f  t h e  c o u n t r y - p a r t y  h e r e :  H ar r in g to n  h i m s e l f  had d e p i c t e d  t h e  p r e -
Tudor c o n s t i t u t i o n  not  as ' t h e  on ly  i n v e n t i o n  whereby a t  once to  m a in ta in
the  S o v e ra in ty  o f  a P r i n c e ,  and th e  L i b e r ty  o f  th e  P e o p l e ' , b u t  as 'no
o t h e r  tha n  a w r e s t l i n g  m a t c h ' . ^  H a r r in g to n  was k een ly  aware o f  th e
im por tance  o f  feuda l  t e n u re  in  Engl ish  h i s t o r y .  He r e j e c t e d  t h e  n o t io n
t h a t  medieval  England had en joyed  genuine l i b e r t y  on th e  grounds t h a t
i t  had i n s t e a d  been th e  scene  o f  e n d le s s  s c u f f l i n g  between t h e  crown
and a f e u d a l  n o b i l i t y  which could  c a l l  upon i t s  t e n a n t s  t o  s u ppo r t  i t
in  i t s  b r o i l s ;  the  way had been c l e a r e d  f o r  t h e  r i s e  of  a genu ine  f r e e
s t a t e  in  England only  a t  the  end o f  th e  f i f t e e n t h  c e n tu ry ,  fo l l o w in g
th e  d i s m a n t l i n g  o f  feuda l  dependence by Henry VII.'*-''' In th e  1730 ' s
W alpo le ' s  c o u r t - p a r t y  a p o l o g i s t s  p o in t e d  up the  d i s c r e p a n c y  between
H a r r in g to n  and th e  n e o -H a r r in g t o n ia n s  o f  th e  c o u n t r y - p a r t y  conce rn ing
12t h e  a n t i q u i t y  or  o the rw ise  o f  E ng land ' s  l i b e r t i e s ,  and in  t h i s  r e s p e c t
9
Pocock,  ' M a c h i a v e l l i , H a r r in g to n  and Eng l ish  I d e o l o g i e s ' ,  pp.  126-137.
^ The Oceana o f  James H a r r in g to n ,  and h i s  Other  Works, ed.  John To land,  
London, 1700, p .6 8 .
^ S e e  'The Second Par t  of  th e  P r e l i m i n a r y s ' ,  i b i d . ,  pp.  63-70 .  The 
im por tance  o f  feuda l  s c h o l a r s h i p  in  shaping H a r r i n g t o n ' s  th o u g h t  i s  
p o i n t e d  out  i n  Pocock,  Ancien t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and Feudal Law, chap,  v i .
Kramnick,  B o l in g b ro k e ' s C i r c l e , p .  133.12
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Hume was t o  fo l low up t h e i r  l e ad .  As a h i s t o r i a n  o f  s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
England he was t o  contend t h a t  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i n h e r i t e d  by th e  S t u a r t s
was in  r e a l i t y  n o th in g  more than  H a r r i n g t o n ’ s w r e s t l i n g  match and t h a t
t h e r e f o r e  E ng land ' s  mixed government was wholly  modern in  o r i g i n ,  be ing
the  o f f s p r i n g  o f  a s e t  o f  f a c t o r s  whose r e l e v a n c e  in  any d i s c u s s i o n  o f
how th e  power o f  t h e  Commons r e s t e d  upon p r o p e r t y  the  n e o -H a r r in g to n ia n s
o f  t h e  c o u n t r y - p a r t y  could  s c a r c e l y  query  - f a c t o r s  such as ' t h e
a l i e n a t i o n s  o f  the  b a r o n s '  e s t a t e s ' ,  ' t h e  p r o g r e s s  o f  t r a d e ' ,  and th e
i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  S t u a r t s  t o  r e p l a c e  ' t h e  o ld  Gothic  m i l i t i a '  w i th  a
p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a n d in g  army ( the  e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  c o u n t r y - p a r t y ' s
f e a r  o f  a s t a n d i n g  army was an a s p ec t  o f  i t s  n e o -H ar r in g to n ian is m :  a
p r o f e s s i o n a l  s o l d i e r  was not  a t r u e  c i t i z e n ,  f o r  he depended upon h i s
commander to  supply  him with  food;  he was p o l i t i c a l l y  c o r r u p t ,  having
renounced h i s  autonomy in  favour  o f  economic dependence upon exe c u t iv e  
13p o w e r ) . The c o u n t r y - p a r t y  knew t h a t  i t  was exposed along t h i s
f r o n t .  No l e s s  a personage  than  Bolingbroke  sought t o  shore  up i t s
de fences  h e re  by con tend ing  t h a t  t h e  only  im p o r tan t  change brought
about  by t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  amount o f  p r o p e r t y  h e ld  by th e  commons in
Tudor t imes  was t h a t  Eng land 's  a n c i e n t  l i b e r t i e s  were pu t  upon a sound
14s o c i o l o g i c a l  f o u n d a t io n .  What Hume had to  do he re  was t o  show t h a t
changes in  landownership  in  Tudor t imes  had in  f a c t  c r e a t e d  E ng land ' s
l i b e r t i e s  by b r i n g i n g  t h e  confused  s c u f f l i n g  o f  medieval  p o l i t i c s  to
an end and t h e r e b y  c l e a r i n g  th e  way f o r  an e n t i r e l y  new phenomenon - 
_
Humes c i t e s  t h e  above t h r e e  f a c t o r s  in  th e  course  o f  e x p l a i n i n g  
why ' t h e  p r i v i l e g e s  o f  th e  peop le  have ,  du r ing  n e a r  two c e n t u r i e s ,  
been c o n t i n u a l l y  upon th e  i n c r e a s e ' .  See 'Of t h e  P r o t e s t a n t  
S u c c e s s i o n ' ,  P h i l .  Works, i i i ,  p .  472. For t h e  n e o - H a r r in g to n ia n  
r o o t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y - p a r t y ' s  f e a r  o f  a s t a n d in g  army see Pocock,
' M a c h i a v e l l i , H a r r in g to n  and E n g l i s h  I d e o l o g i e s ' ,  pp.  115-128.
See h i s  Remarks on the  H i s to ry  o f  England , l e t t e r s  x i - x i i ,  Works, 
i ,  pp.  369-389 and D i s s e r t a t i o n  on P a r t i e s , l e t t e r  x v i , i b i d . ,  i i ,  
pp. 207-219.
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mixed government.
Once Hume actually took up the study of the seventeenth
century, his Harrmgtonianism rapidly undermined his respect for
orthodox historiography. When he came to examine Rapin closely, he
soon found him 'altogether despicable^ he discovered that adherence
to the notion that the widespread enjoyment of liberty was a wholly
modern phenomenon in England entailed disowning Rapin's account of the
early seventeenth century, based as it was upon the premise that the
events of the period revolved around an attempt on the part of the
nation to prevent its traditional liberties being subverted by the
Stuarts. If liberty were an entirely modern element in the constitution,
it followed that in the early seventeenth century its partisans had had
to set about engrafting it upon the established political structure
of the country. This meant that the parliamentary opposition and the
country-party generally had been the restless and aggressive element
in the politics of the time. This in turn meant that the real defender
of the ancient constitution had in fact been the House of Stuart.
Within a few months of having been appointed to the Advocates' Library
Hume had already decided to make such a line of reasoning - which was
the real cutting edge of his iconoclasm, for the court-party had long
since disowned the notion of ancient liberties - the thesis of his
account of the early seventeenth century; we find him endorsing it in
a letter written to Adam Smith on 24 September 1752:
I confess, I was once of the same Opinion with you, $
thought that the best Period to begin an English History 
was about Henry the 7th. But you will please to observe, 
that the Change, which then happen'd in public Affairs, 
was very insensible, and did not display its Influence 
till many Years afterwards. Twas under James that the 
House of Commons began first to raise their Head, § then 
the Quarrel betwixt Privilege § Prerogative commenc'd.
15 HL, i, p .258.
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The Government, no longer opprest by the enormous Aut ho r i t y  
of the Crown, display'd its Genius.. 16
The more Hume studied the period, the more did his esteem
for orthodox historiography ebb away. By the beginning of 1753, having
covered the reign of James 1, he had come to the conclusion that Rapin
17was 'extremely deficient', while six months later, having come down
to 1640, he was firmly convinced that the Frenchman was 'totally
despicable', being guilty of the grossest forms of ignorance and 
18partiality. In October, having reached the execution of Charles I,
Hume ceased his labours, being eager to pause for some time in order
19to read, think and revise. A year later, in the autumn of 1754, his 
account of the reigns of James and Charles was published; Hume intended 
it to form the first part of a three volume History of Great Britain
i , 20which would cover the period from 1603 to 1714. As adumbrated in 
Of Luxury and as actually unfolded in this first volume of the History 
of Great Britain, the fundamental purpose behind Hume's approach to 
English history was a desire to show that it was crass sociological 
ineptitude to talk about English history being dominated by a struggle 
between the supporters and opponents of the country's ancient liberties. 
We must now examine the actual arguments he employed in an effort to 
establish this point.
(Ü)
As we have already indicated, if Hume wished to develop a 
critique of the orthodox interpretation of the constitutional crisis
ibid., i, pp. 167-168. For Adam Smith's version of the rise of the 
House of Commons see Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, 
pp.39-44.
17 1U, i , p. 170.
1 B ibid., l, p .179.
19 ibid., i, p.180.
^  ibid., i, p,170; Mossner, Life of Hume, pp. 302-304.
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of the seventeenth century based upon sound Harringtonian principles, 
the first thing he had to do was to show that the constitution inherited 
by the Stuarts in 1603, the ancient constitution in effect, was indeed 
the wrestling match of Harrington's account. Certainly, Hume felt that 
his analysis of the disputes between the early Stuarts and their 
parliaments would be deficient if he failed to prove this point; we 
can find him defending just such a proposition, and doing so with 
considerable relish. Under the ancient constitution, that is to say, 
under 'the antient Gothic constitution, of which the English partook 
with other European nations', the exact boundary between privilege 
and prerogative was indeed extremely hazy and ill-defined. But this 
did not mean that the ancient constitution could be described as a 
precursor of eighteenth-century mixed government. For one thing, it 
lacked any regular republican element. Composed of ignorant rustic 
barbarians and meeting rarely and briefly, parliament at that time was 
incapable of participating in the regular administration of the country. 
It was of so small weight in the balance of the constitution that the 
crown enjoyed the sole direction of affairs in the ordinary course of 
events. Nevertheless, taxes could not be raised and new laws enacted 
without at least some show of common consent. But this state of affairs 
was not an effect of the regular and methodical operation of laws and 
institutions. It was instead a reflection of the violence and 
lawlessness of the times; under the ancient constitution the crown was 
checked not by liberty but by anarchy. The laws of the land and 
parliamentary institutions being imperfect and unformed, great stretches 
of prerogative were apt to occur during the reign of an able, fortunate 
or popular prince. But 'by the nature of the feudal tenures' the power 
of the sword belonged not to the prince but to the people, or to be 
more precise, to the barons. At all times, therefore, the crown had
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to maintain some show of legality, while under a weak or unpopular
king the barons could resort to armed force in order to extort
privileges from the monarchy. The ancient constitution thus bestowed
upon both sides in the disputes of the seventeenth century a variety
21of precedents to appeal to. It is only necessary to add here that 
in Of Luxury Hume had already adumbrated the sociological underpinning 
of the politics of the ancient constitution: a population consisting
mainly of poverty-stricken and ignorant feudal tenants who were 
absolutely dependent upon, and who therefore had to fight for, their 
landlords, the barons.
But as we have already seen, Hume considered that by 1603 
the crown had well and truly 'thrown' the nobility; in the late 
sixteenth century the constitution was 'opprest by the enormous 
Authority of the Crown'. The increase in the political weight of the 
commons was 'insensible'. It was the outcome of a set of broad socio­
logical forces which did not begin to affect politics until the early 
seventeenth century; it was not a development which crystallized under 
Elizabeth following upon an outburst of anti-feudal legislative activity 
on the part of Henry VII. In Hume's opinion, the power and influence 
of the old Gothic nobility was broken up more by careless prodigality 
induced by the first stirrings of luxury than by the disappearance of 
their 'extensive jurisdictions'; while the growth of luxury was still 
in its early stages, there was an interval between the decline of the 
nobility and the rise of the commons during which time the Tudors 
assumed exorbitant power and almost annihilated the constitution under 
the weight of their prerogative. Hume did not accept Harrington's 
notion that Elizabeth had had to resort to 'perpetual Lovetricks' in 
order to keep the commons at bay, while in an obvious allusion to
21 HGB, i, pp. ii, 79-80, 91.
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Bolingbroke he disassociated himself from such 'pamphlets, and daily 
writers' as depicted Elizabethan government as a model of liberty. The 
last of the Tudors was instead an almost unlimited monarch; she was 
possessed of 'a very extensive authority: An authority, in the
judgement of all, not exactly limited; in the judgement of some, not 
limitable'.^
In 1603 England's established political system was still 
the old Gothic constitution, but in a form which greatly reflected a 
century of Tudor success in keeping anarchy at bay. By vigorously 
seizing the opportunities presented by the break with Rome and the dis­
sipation of the economic and social power of the old Gothic nobility, 
the Tudors were able to assert to the full the already ill-defined 
powers of the crown; had they but controlled a standing army, England 
would have been as pure a monarchy as Turkey. Under Elizabeth the 
country's spirit of liberty reached its nadir. The combined authority 
of the prerogative courts alone was enough to make the power of the 
crown arbitrary and unlimited. The monarchy had at its disposal a 
whole host of discretionary powers which for more than a century 
had been constantly exercised without ever once having been called 
into question; it also claimed possession of a limitless fund of 
latent powers. Its attitude towards the early Tudors having been one 
of 'great complaisance', parliament had become degraded and obscured; 
constitutional lawyers regarded it as an excrescence in a constitution 
whose essence was prerogative. The sanction of religion was also applied, 
with churchmen zealously preaching the sinfulness of rebellion. When 
the Elizabethans examined the history of their country, they found the
22 ibid., i, pp.34, 106, 121, 124. For Harrington's view of Elizabethan 
government see 'Second Part of the Preliminarys', pp.69-70; for 
Bolingbroke's see Remarks on the History of England, letters xii-xvi, 
Works, i, pp.379-437.
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teachings of their lawyers and preachers vindicated to the full; they
discovered that the alternative to a strong monarchy was not constitutional
23government but rather 'violence, convulsion, civil war, and disorder'.
Succeeding the glorious Elizabeth, 'the most renowned and 
most popular of all the princes, who had ever filled the throne of 
England', James 1 naturally sought to take up her principles and methods 
of government. But he was aware that he cut a poor figure in comparison 
with his predecessor, and so he was all the more jealous of his formal 
royal authority, establishing within his own mind a speculative system 
of absolute government. Yet he never considered that he had to set 
about imposing this ideology upon his English subjects; he saw it as 
merely a description of the existing constitution. Wherever he looked, 
he found abundant proof for believing that his political principles were 
in complete accord with the settled order of things - and so he felt 
little inclined to exert himself on their behalf. Studying the behaviour 
of his continental colleagues, he observed the contempt which they 
exhibited for the old Gothic government, forgetting all the time 
that they had standing armies and that he did not. Examining the polit­
ical practices of his predecessor, he noted her extensive authority.
But he failed to observe that the power of the Tudors - which he ascribed 
to their royal birth alone - was an aspect of their prudence and spirit 
as well as of the particular circumstances of their day. Furthermore, 
he was slow in realizing that, lacking either a sizable fund of 
revenue and patronage or a standing army, the Tudors had depended for 
their power upon no more secure a source than the opinion of their 
subjects, influenced by precedent and history, while he was unaware
23 HGB, i, pp.34, 36, 80-81, 116-121.
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that in his own day a general if gradual revolution occurring within
English political opinion was making the maxims of Tudor government
24increasingly anachronistic.
In short, Hume believed that the death of Elizabeth would 
have precipitated a constitutional crisis no matter who her successor 
had been; by the beginning of the seventeenth century England was in 
need of sweeping political changes, for the major prop of its form of 
government - opinion - was in a state of flux. With the spread of 
learning and letters and the growth of commerce and industry which 
followed in the wake of the Renaissance and the discovery of the New 
World, a universal fermentation broke out in Europe and the ideas of 
men expanded on all sides. In England the social group which benefited 
most from the economic and social changes caused by the rise of luxury 
was not the old Gothic nobility or the small proprietors but rather 
the gentry - 'or that rank which composed the house of commons'; 
landownership passed into the hands of men who were rich enough to 
afford fashionable expenses but who were not exempted from some care 
and attention in their domestic expenditure. This development had 
important political consequences. Wealth and prosperity engendered 
a spirit of freedom and independence amongst the gentry; their 
growing economic and social power meant that they no longer had to 
pay much heed to the entreaties or menaces of their sovereign. As 
their political consciousness expanded as a result of their increasing 
wealth and education, they came to realize just how precarious 
personal liberty and security had become after a century of Tudor 
government. They came to realize that if personal security were to 
be preserved, it would have to be put upon a far stronger foundation
24 ibid., i, pp.15-16, 81, 121.
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than it had ever enjoyed under the ancient constitution; in short, it 
would have to be buttressed by political liberty, by mixed government.
The gentry did not hesitate to commit themselves to the cause of liberty; 
love of freedom was inseparable from the cultivated understanding which 
was beginning to prevail amongst them. They enjoyed, moreover, every 
opportunity of bringing about the creation of a truly constitutional 
form of government. The discovery of the New World's gold and silver 
sparked off an unprecedented outburst of inflation throughout Europe.
In England itself inflation meant that the traditional financial 
independence of the crown came to an end. Parliament's power to 
grant supply thus became of supreme political importance; the gentry 
could count upon bringing the crown to heel in an entirely regular 
fashion.^
Elizabeth managed to keep the first stirrings of gentry 
restlessness within narrow bounds by steadfastly pursuing a policy of 
severity and frugality. But her successor totally lacked such qualities. 
James was not a Nero - 'Could human nature ever reach happiness, the 
condition of the English gentry, under so mild and benign a prince, 
might merit that appellation'. The very opposite was the case; his real 
trouble was that he suffered from an excess of humanity. Showering a 
constant stream of gifts unon his friends and favourites, James 
caused the inevitable quarrel between crown and parliament over 
financial matters to flare up much sooner than it would have done other­
wise; had he been more frugal, he might have warded off this crisis 
for a time, thereby maximizing his chances of increasing and fixing 
his revenue and securing the extensive authority he had inherited.
But despite this and other advantages - the art of parliamentary
25 ibid # ^ i, pp. 15, 33-34, 123-124.
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management was n e c e s s a r i l y  p r i m i t i v e  and James was a d e s p i s e d  Scotsman -
t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s  a c q u i t t e d  themse lves  p o o r ly .  They were comple te ly
unaware o f  how a mixed government a c t u a l l y  worked and were thus  unab le
to  t u r n  J a m e s ' s  n e c e s s i t i e s  to  good account by b r i b i n g  him i n t o
d e p a r t i n g  from t h e  more e x o r b i t a n t  o f  h i s  powers.  They were ap t  t o
be thrown i n t o  an alarmed  r e c a l c i t r a n c e  by th e  i n c r e a s i n g  i n t e r e s t
which t h e  crown i n e v i t a b l y  took in  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  a f f a i r s .  S i m i l a r l y ,
no t  ye t  be ing  accustomed to  th e  r e g u l a r  v o t i n g  o f  t a x e s ,  th e y  were
26i n v a r i a b l y  unduly pars im onious  when v o t i n g  supply .
This  d id  no t  mean t h a t  th e  Commons was any th e  l e s s  i n s i s t e n t  
in  the  demands i t  made upon th e  crown. P o s s e s s in g  too  l i t t l e  d i g n i t y  
t o  command r e s p e c t  and too  much goodness t o  impress f e a r ,  James was not  
th e  p e rson  t o  f r i g h t e n  i t s  members i n t o  abandoning t h e i r  schemes o f  
cu rb in g  p r e r o g a t i v e .  Beginning in  1604, when th e y  secu red  c o n t r o l  o f  
t h e i r  own membership,  and c u lm in a t in g  in  1621, when th e y  proceeded  
to  i n t e r e s t  themse lves  in  th e  conduct  o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  h i s  p a r l i a m e n t s  
became i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e s t l e s s ,  d i s s a t i s f i e d  and a g g r e s s i v e .  Faced wi th  
t h e i r  p r o v o c a t i o n ,  James found i t  n e c e s s a r y  to  have the  maxims o f  
Tudor government 'more open ly  i n c u l c a t e d  and more s t r e n u o u s l y  i n s i s t e d  
o n ' ; l a c k in g  bo th  money and a s t a n d i n g  army, he was a l l  the  more 
j e a l o u s  o f  p r e r o g a t i v e .  But he conducted  h i s  propaganda campaign in  
so r a s h  and i n d i s c r e e t  a f a s h io n  t h a t  he only  succeeded in  f u l l y  
a l e r t i n g  t h e  Commons to  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  was f u l l  o f  
a l l  k inds  o f  am bigu i ty ;  i t s  zea l  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r t y  th us  became 
a l l  t h e  more s t r o n g  and a r t i c u l a t e .  In 1610 i t s  a t tachm en t  to  l i b e r t y ,  
' t h o '  s t r o n g l y  su p p o r ted  by ( i t s )  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n  as w ell  as 
d i s p o s i t i o n ,  was too  new and r e c e n t  t o  be as ye t  founded on s y s t e m a t i c a l  
p r i n c i p l e s  and o p i n i o n s ' ;  bu t  by 1621 a s t r o n g  c o u n t r y - p a r t y  had taken
26 i b i d . ,  i ,  p p .2 ,  15, 18-19,  29, 34, 52-53,  124-126.
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s h a p e ,  w i th  l e a d e r s  who knew j u s t  what had t o  be done: 'From long
p r a c t i c e ,  th e  crown was now p o s s e s s e d  o f  so e x o r b i t a n t  a p r e r o g a t i v e ,
t h a t  i t  was not  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  l i b e r t y  to  remain on th e  d e f e n s i v e ,
o r  endeavor t o  secu re  t h e  l i t t l e  ground,  which was l e f t  h e r :  I t  was
become r e q u i s i t e  t o  c a r ry  on an o f f e n s i v e  war,  and t o  c i r c u m s c r ib e ,
w i t h i n  n a r row er ,  as wel l  as more exac t  bounds ,  th e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  the  
27s o v e r e i g n ' .
Since  he saw i t  as an e f f e c t  o f  u n d e r ly in g  p a t t e r n s  o f  
s o c i a l  and i d e o l o g i c a l  change,  Hume was no t  s u r p r i s e d  by the  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  t e n s i o n  which c h a r a c t e r i z e d  r e l a t i o n s  between crown and p a r l i a m e n t  
under  James I d id  not  a b a te  when h i s  son came to  th e  t h r o n e .  When he 
examined Char le s  I as a -pr ivate man, he found i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  imagine 
anyone more r e s p e c t a b l e  and am iab le .  Fu r therm ore ,  C har les  e x c e l l e d  in  
the  e x t e r n a l  q u a l i t i e s  demanded o f  a monarch,  w h i le  he was not  d e f i c i e n t  
in t h e  e s s e n t i a l  ones .  Had h i s  p o s i t i o n  been u n ch a l l e n g e d ,  h i s  humanity 
and good sense  would have r e s u l t e d  i n  h i s  hav ing  a happy r e i g n  and a 
p r e c i o u s  memory. Had th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  upon p r e r o g a t i v e  been f i x e d  and 
r i g i d  i n  h i s  day,  h i s  i n t e g r i t y  would have r e s u l t e d  i n  h i s  be ing  an 
e x c e l l e n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  monarch. But u n f o r t u n a t e l y  he became k ing  
a t  a t ime when England was changing from an almost  pure  monarchy i n t o  
a mixed government;  he simply la cked  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  
needed a t  a t ime when th e  p r e c e d e n t s  o f  many former r e ig n s  smacked o f  
a r b i t r a r y  power w h i le  t h e  gen ius  o f  th e  peop le  ran  towards l i b e r t y .  
Lacking sup p len es s  and d e x t e r i t y ,  he r e f u s e d  to  d e p a r t  from some o f  
h i s  powers in  o rd e r  t o  keep th e  r e s t .  From h i s  f a t h e r  he had d e r iv e d  
l o f t y  ide as  o f  monarch ica l  power,  id e as  which seemed wholly  p l a u s i b l e  
when viewed in  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  h i s t o r y  and c o n s t i t u t i o n ;  he 
looked upon any a t tem p t  to  t r i m  p r e r o g a t i v e  as l i t t l e  b e t t e r  than  open
27 i b i d . ,  i ,  p p . 11-15,  38, 81, 85-89,  91,  120-121.
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rebellion. But he lacked prudence and vigour; he never had any
real idea as to how he should subdue his parliamentary opponents. A
good but not a great man, he was overwhelmed by a set of problems which
would have tried a masterly genius. Few Englishmen were aware of the
great power the commons had recently attained, whereas the whole weight
of the country's past indicated that parliament was a peripheral part
of the constitution; 'nothing less than fatal experience could engage
the English princes to pay a due regard to the inclinations of that
28formidable assembly'.
But at this stage we have to qualify our account of Hume's 
treatment of the early seventeenth century in that we have to take 
note of the fact that he considered that settled monarchical power 
was brought to heel by the rising spirit of liberty only because James 
and Charles allowed themselves to get involved in other than strictly 
political disputes. Hume certainly considered that by the time Charles 
came to the throne the rise and spread of luxury and the subsequent 
growth of country-party sentiment had created the sociological and 
ideological foundation upon which a mixed government could rest. But 
he also considered that throughout the four decades preceding 1640 
the majesty of the crown, with all its ancient powers and prerogatives, 
was such that in the struggle between court and country there was an 
inbuilt bias favouring the former and hampering the latter. Notwith­
standing all the advantages acquired by liberty in this period, royal 
authority was so extensive and firmly established that the country- 
party would probably have despaired of attacking it had it been 
governed solely by political motives. But then Hume did not believe 
that this had been the case; as we have seen in our examination of his
28 ibid., i, pp.148, 155, 198-199, 238, 468-469.
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essays, he considered that the struggle between liberty and authority
in Stuart England was as much a religious as a political affair, with
tension between superstition and enthusiasm occurring alongside tension
between court and country. The parliamentarians launched a determined
bid to curb prerogative only because they were 'stimulated by religious
motives, which inspire a courage, unsurmountable by any human obstacle'.
This was a European theme; the history of Scotland, the Netherlands
and Bohemia, as well as that of England, proved that the only seventeenth-
century nations capable of resisting the rise of absolute monarchy were
those which were animated with a zeal for religious as well as political
freedom; the exceptional strength of the spirit of liberty in the
dominions of the House of Stuart signified that 'of all European
nations, the British were, at that time, and till long after, sunk
29into the lowest and most odious bigotry'.
Hume believed that the constitutional crises out of which
England's mixed constitution had arisen could not be adequately
explained purely in terms of Harringtonian and neo-Harringtonian ideas
concerning the relationship between property and liberty; movements
within religious opinion had to be taken into account as well.
Harrington, it has been said, 'habitually underestimates the dynamic
30power of religious conviction', a natural enough state of affairs, 
however, if he truly was 'primarily a historian of feudalism and only 
in a most rudimentary sense an observer of contemporary social processes'. 
In this respect Hume differed from Harrington; as a historian of 
seventeenth-century England his interest lay in social processes in
29 ibid., i, pp.9, 31, 76-77, 81-82, 150, 245.
30 R.H. Tawney, 'Harrington's Interpretation of his Age', Proceedings 
of the British Academy, XXVII (1941), p.221.
31 Pocock, Ancient Constitution and Feudal Law, p.141.
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general rather than in the decay of feudal dependence in particular.
When he came to cast around for these broad social forces, he made sure
that he used one of his favourite concepts as a political scientist -
the political consequences of religious belief. From personal experience
alone - we need only recall here the successful presbyterian opposition
to his two attempts to secure a university appointment as well as the
furore surrounding his election to the Advocates' Library - he had
gained a vivid awareness of the unsettling effects of religious zeal.
His experience was such that he was incapable of adopting anything
other than a deeply unsympathetic attitude towards the enthusiasts
of the seventeenth century; when we find him talking about the 'rustic
severity' and 'mysterious jargon' of the Puritans and the 'barbarous
32zeal' and 'theological fervor' of their Scottish allies, we
naturally wonder whether he is really referring to the Calvinists of
his own day. But for all this, his personal experience of the unsettling
effects of zealous religiosity meant that as a historian of the
seventeenth century he was always particularly aware of the power of
33religious fanaticism. He was of the opinion, indeed, that it was 
the struggle between the monarchy and the Anglican hierarchy on the 
one hand and the Puritans and the Presbyterians on the other which 
formed the decisive aspect of the constitutional crisis of Stuart 
England. The rise of luxury and the birth of the country-party created 
the foundation upon which a mixed government could rest; but it was 
the rise of enthusiasm which created most of the energy and zeal needed 
to bring about the triumph of liberty in the sphere of actual political
32 HGB, i, pp.9, 266, 290.
33 And not only with respect to the activity of enthusiasts. See his 
vivid accounts of the Gunpowder Plot, ibid., i, pp.20-25 and of the 
Irish rebellion of 1641, ibid., i, pp.293-302.
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conflict. '(The) same lofty pretensions, which attended them in their
familiar addresses to their Maker, of whom they believed themselves
the peculiar favorites, induced (the enthusiasts) to use the utmost
34freedoms with their earthly sovereign'; this meant that the country-
35party was far more formidable than it otherwise would have been.
Hume's belief that the decisive factor in the crisis of the 
early seventeenth century was tension between superstition and enthus­
iasm, and not tension between court and country, can be found clearly 
expressed in his denial that the period 1629-40 was an eleven years' 
tyranny. By the late 1630's with the last parliament having met in 
1629, the country-party was longing for a new parliament to be 
summoned. Being 'almost intirely governed by a set of men of the most 
uncommon capacity and the largest views', it was well aware that the 
raising of revenue through the revival of obsolete laws and the 
violation of the nation's privileges could not but culminate 'in a 
total disuse of parliaments, and in the establishment of arbitrary 
authority'. But the great bulk of the nation scarcely shared the fears 
and apprehensions of the country-party. The way Charles used his power 
was not in itself particularly burdensome or inhumane; only the 
consequences of his method of government were inimical to liberty -
which meant that Charles 'dreaded no opposition from the people, who
36are not commonly much affected with consequences'. The spirit of 
liberty got out of hand only when Charles and Archbishop Laud set about 
with all the intemperate zeal of sectaries to add a dash of ritualism
34 ibid., i, p.9.
For the most incisive statement Hume made to this effect see ibid., 
i, p.266.
ibid., i, pp. 147, 205, 219, 220.36
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to the worship of Englishmen and Scotsmen; 'the people are always most 
affected by what is external and exposed to the senses'. Moreover, 
Charles and Laud were only undone when they inflamed the Scots, the 
most bigoted and turbulent section of Calvinist opinion. The 
collapse of their Scottish policy precipitated the summoning of the 
Long Parliament. For Hume political liberty in England was very much
37the offspring of religious bigotry - and of Scottish bigotry at that.
Meeting in the wake of the revolt of the Scots and dominated
by the 'zealous innovators' of the country-party, the Long Parliament
at once set about launching 'a revolution in the government', 'an
innovation in the constitution': its members 'disarmed the crown; they
established the maxims of rigid law and liberty; and they spred the
38terror of their own authority'. Hume was well aware that men like
Pym claimed that what parliament had to do was to put the enemies of
39the ancient constitution to rout; but he was certain that his self- 
proclaimed commitment to ancient liberties was either delusion or 
pretence. The summoning of the Long Parliament marked the beginning 
of the death throes of the old Gothic constitution inherited by the 
Stuarts in 1603. By the autumn of 1641, following the abolition of 
many of the prerogative courts and the securing of regular meetings of 
parliament, this process was in full swing; the Commons had moved from 
the periphery to the very centre of the constitution. The early 
legislation of the Long Parliament amounted to an 'experiment'.
37 For Hume's account of the attempt on the part of Charles and Laud 
to curb the enthusiasts see ibid., i, pp.200-205, 207-210, 213-217, 
220-236, 242-243; for his assessment of Laud's character see ibid., 
i, pp.393-396.
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ibid., i, pp. 250-252, 256-257, 266, 270.
39 ibid., i, pp.253, 255, 261.
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Before 1641 there had never been a civil society 'which subsisted 
without the mixture of some arbitrary authority, committed to some 
magistrate' and which instead sought 'to support itself with no other 
control, than the general and rigid maxims of law and equity'; but in 
1641 a totally new type of polity took shape in England - a mixed 
government in which the republican and libertarian element predominated 
at the expense of executive authority. The Long Parliament did not 
preserve the old Gothic constitution; it crippled it, and this was the 
reason why it was deserving of 'very ample praises from all lovers of 
liberty'
Hume's stress upon the revolutionary nature of the early 
reforms of the Long Parliament amounted to a direct rejection of the 
country-party's fear of corruption; if mixed government in England 
were an entirely modern phenomenon, it necessarily followed that the 
country-party's canvassing of the cause of parliamentary reform in 
the name of the ancient constitution, in the name of England's ancient 
liberties, was either an example of crass sociological ineptitude or 
a mere pretence, a mere verbal smokescreen designed to conceal the fact 
that, as in the seventeenth century, the country-party, and not the 
court-party, was the party of subversion and innovation. England's 
liberties were not ancient; the reason why England had the sort of 
government it had could only be explained in terms of a set of completely 
modern factors. A consistent reading of Harrington indicated that under 
the ancient constitution England had never enjoyed true freedom; politics 
under the Gothic constitution was largely a matter of confused scuffling 
between the crown and a feudal nobility. The existence of republican 
elements in the country's constitution had to be explained in terms 
of a set of factors which had not come into play until after the House
40 ibid., i, pp. 258, 268- 270, 287-288.
184
of Tudor had come to the throne and which had only begun to gather 
momentum following the accession of the Stuarts. The rise of luxury 
and the absence of a standing army led to the House of Commons 
becoming dominated by a restless and aggressive country - party.
The rise and spread of Calvinist religion meant that the country-party 
could count upon attracting a far more formidable level of support than 
would otherwise have been the case. These broad sociological develop­
ments finally came into line with the trend of political events in the 
late 1630's, when the revolt of the Scots led to a political crisis 
which culminated in the collapse of the ancient constitution, thereby 
clearing the way for the rise of mixed government.
Critical analysis of the origins of the eighteenth- 
century constitution revealed, then, that, despite its self-proclaimed 
adherence to the ancient constitution, the county-party was in reality 
a party of innovation and radicalism. It revealed, furthermore, just 
how dangerous innovation and radicalism could be; it showed that those 
who set about to effect sweeping political change usually had to go
beyond 'mere force of argument and reasoning', having instead to resort
41to measures savouring 'often of artifice, sometimes of violence'.
For Hume this process was exemplified by the fate of that great prop 
of order, Lord Strafford: 'it may safely be affirmed, that the sentence,
by which he fell, was an enormity, greater than the worst of those,
42which his implacable enemies prosecuted with so much cruel industry'.
But this was only a foretaste of all the violence which occurred once 
the spirit of innovation was no longer kept in check by settled 
monarchical power. Charles's imprudent handling of the Short as well
^  ibid., i, p .288. 
^  ibid., i, p .286.
185
of the Long Parliament plus the lack of a sizable fund of patronage
and revenue at the disposal of the crown meant that no strong court-
43party took shape within the Commons, and so its newly won power soon 
went to its head. By 1642 it was clear that the country-party wished 
to completely abolish monarchical power - when civil war broke out,
44Charles, and not the parliamentarians, was defending mixed government. 
Following the breakdown of the traditional structure of authority^the 
country-party had to resort to increasingly despotic methods of 
government in order to keep lawlessness in check as well as to prosecute 
the war: ’Never in this Island, was known so severe and arbitrary a
4government, as was generally exercised, by (these) patrons of liberty'.
Feeling that the holiness of their cause justified any action, no
matter how extravagant, the Puritans became increasingly fanatical and
46unruly; this culminated in the rise of the Independents. These two
developments fused in that 'height of all iniquity and fanatical
47extravagance' - the public trial and execution of the king. But by
1649 parliament had lost power to the army: 'The sacred boundaries of
the laws being once violated, nothing remained to confine the wild
projects of zeal and ambition. And every successive revolution became
48a precedent for that which followed it'. For Hume, the events of the
For Hume's attitude towards Charles's handling of the Short 
Parliament see ibid., i, pp. 241-242; for his attitude towards his 
handling of the Long Parliament up till 1642 see ibid., i, pp.268- 
271, 282, 316-324. For Hume's stress upon the importance of the 
absence of influence at this time see ibid., i, pp.243-245.
44 ibid., i, pp.329-335.
45 ibid., i, pp.356-358, 359-360, 430-432, 449, 456.
46 ibid., i, pp.380-383.
4  ^ ibid., i, pp.460-468.
48 ibid., i, pp.424-425.
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period 1641-49 vindicated the great lesson of Roman history: when
unrestrained by authority, liberty degenerates into anarchy, thereby
necessitating the creation of military despotism. The fate of its
predecessors in the 1640's indicated to the eighteenth-century country-
party that it was well advised to curb its excessive libertarianism;
it showed that to drastically weaken settled monarchical power was to
expose oneself to 'the: madness of the people, the furies of fanaticism,
49and the danger of mercenary armies'.
(iii)
Hume's readiness to expatiate upon what he saw as the rather 
sordid events which followed in the wake of the first stirrings of 
mixed government in England, it should be pointed out, in no way 
reflected a less than wholehearted commitment to the mixed government 
of England as it stood in his own day. Being a de facto theorist of 
political obligation, Hume considered that history had absolutely no 
role at all to play in determining where his political obedience should 
rest; if the eighteenth-century constitution upheld peace and order, 
it was deserving of total obedience, no matter how sordid its origins 
might be. Hume was well aware that, if allowed to become firmly entrenched, 
political systems began to attract an increasing level of support as 
a result of the passage of time and that therefore history was twisted 
for polemical purposes; he was well aware of the country-party's 
propensity for advocating innovation in the name of the ancient 
constitution. In ideal circumstances, Hume believed, the prudent man 
would willingly accept the fact that the passage of time tended to 
make subjects overlook the importance of violence and injustice in
49 ibid., i, p .471.
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history; prudence would tell him that the natural affection which 
subjects had for well-established royal dynasties and forms of govern­
ment was extremely conducive to political peace.^ But Hume did not 
consider that these ideal circumstances prevailed in the England of 
his day. An idealized conception of the country's past was in fact 
associated with political radicalism; the country-party was able to 
avoid having recourse to the opprobrious concept of innovation by 
depicting the various parliamentary reforms it canvassed as attempts 
to reinvigorate traditional virtues and ancient liberties. Confronted 
with this state of affairs, Hume was forced to come out and make explicit 
the insistence upon the essential irrelevance of history which flowed 
from the de facto theory of political obligation. Hume's radically 
iconoclastic, sceptical, demythologizing approach to English history 
was a profoundly conservative stance politically; his insistence upon 
the utter modernity of political liberty in England amounted to an 
outright attack upon the country-party's fear of corruption and the 
whole radical-reactionary style of politics which flowed from it. In 
Hume's opinion, a 'philosophical', that is to say, a scientific approach 
to English constitutional history revealed that it was improper for 
any political party to exploit history in party warfare. To relate 
political narrative to 'the state of the kingdom, with regard to 
government, manners, finances, arms, trade, learning' was to show that 
the events of the past were wholly explicable if not inevitable and 
that therefore it was naive to discuss them in terms of moral excellence 
and opprobrium, which in turn meant that it was improper for history 
to be dragged into political debate:
50 'Of the Protestant Succession', Phil. Works, iii, pp.471-472.
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The philosophy of government, accompanying a narration of 
its revolutions, may render history more intelligible as 
well as instructive. And nothing will tend more to abate 
the acrimony of party-disputes, than to show men, that those 
events, which they impute to their adversaries as the 
deepest crimes, were the natural, if not the necessary 
result of the situation, in which the nation was placed, 
during any period.
But we need to remember that the English reading public of
the 1750's lacked any acquaintance with the argument Hume had put forward
in Of Morals, which meant that it was ignorant of the fact that his
political science was underpinned by a de facto theory of political
obligation. It was unaware that he was of the opinion that subjects
should not allow their loyalty to be affected by the attractiveness or
otherwise of the historical origins of the civil magistracy governing
them; it was not aware that his radically iconoclastic attitude towards
English constitutional history in no way reflected a radical rejection
of the eighteenth-century constitution and that in fact it sprang from
extreme political conservatism. We need to bear in mind here that the
myth of the ancient constitution was never the sole possession of any
single political party; the belief that England's institutions had
enjoyed unbroken historical continuity was ever a truly national out-
52look, as Burke and later commentators have pointed out. In the late 
1750's, as much as in the 1690's, iconoclastic historiography was 
associated with political heterodoxy. Taking up Brady's assertion that 
political liberty in England was not rooted in remote antiquity, Hume 
similarly found himself relegated to an unpopular area of the political 
spectrum. His stress upon the traditional insignificance of the pre- 
Stuart House of Commons and his subsequent insistence that the efforts 
of James and Charles to prevent the rise of political liberty represented
51 HGB, i, pp.116, 245-246; HL, i, p.193.
52 See H. Butterfield, The Englishman and His History, Cambridge, 1944.
189
'the natural, if not the necessary result of the situation, in which
the nation was placed' stirred up a veritable hornet's nest; within
a few weeks of his account of their reigns being published Hume found
himself 'assailed by one Cry of Reproach, Disapprobation, and even
Detestation'. The reading public considered that the work was vitiated
by pro-Stuart bias; Hume was especially denounced for having dared
'to shed a generous Tear for the Fate of Charles I, and the Earl of 
53Strafford'. This pro-Stuart bias was accounted for in varying ways.
54Hume found himself initially depicted as a 'candid Tory', a charge 
which, because of his nationality, soon became transmuted into an 
allegation of Jacobitism,^ while within a few years he was being 
openly denounced as a brazen apologist for absolute monarchy;*^ his 
iconoclastic conclusions could thus be shrugged off on the grounds that 
they were meant to serve a politically subversive end. Such talk was 
completely misguided; in terms of practical political obedience, Hume 
totally supported the eighteenth-century constitution. But he did so 
solely on the grounds that it happened to be the status quo of the day, 
the current present possessor of power. His conservatism was not 
based upon reverence for the English past; being based upon a de facto 
theory of political obligation, it was perfectly compatible with
My Own Life, HL, i, p.4.
54 ibid., i, pp.185, 214, 222, 237.
^  ibid., i, pp.214, 222, 264, 314. See also Mossner, Life of Hume, 
pp.309-311 and The Letters of Horace Walpole, ed. Mrs Paget Toynbee, 
19 vols., Oxford, 1903-1925, iii, p.294.
^  The most elaborate statement of this point of view was to be The 
History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the 
Brunswick Line of Mrs Catherine Macaulay, 8 vols., London, 1763-83; 
see in particular i, pp.vii-xviii. For accounts of Mrs Macaulay see 
the DNB and Lucy Martin Donnelly, 'The Celebrated Mrs Macaulay',
The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. series, VI (1949), pp.173-207. 
For Hume's recognition that this work was directed against him 
see NHL, pp.80-82.
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iconoclastic historiography. By way of contrast, however, most English­
men tended to rationalize their support of the existing constitution 
in terms of what they saw as its antiquity; they therefore considered
that Hume’s repudiation of the constitution's antiquity amounted to a
57repudiation of the constitution itself.
The English reading public, then, completely misunderstood 
Hume's attitude towards the place of history in political debate.
But at the same time it seems that Hume completely under-estimated the 
importance of 'the principle of reference to antiquity' in the English 
constitutionalist tradition. Believing as he did that a scientific 
and iconoclastic approach to the writing of history could in no way 
prejudice the defenders of an established government - their stance was 
completely justified in terms of the basic needs of human nature, the 
final court of appeal in matters of political obedience - Hume took 
up the study of the seventeenth century without paying due consideration 
to English sensibilities. He was quite confident that in his account 
of the troubles of the early Stuarts he had produced 'a History full 
of Candor § Disinterestedness'; having 'at once neglected present Power, 
Interest, and Authority, and the Cry of popular Prejudices', he 
'expected proportional Applause'. Consequently, he was greatly
5 8discouraged when the work was instead 'torne in Pieces by Calumny'.
The distate which Hume invariably exhibited whenever examining the 
political activities of the various religious parties of the early 
seventeenth century also landed him in hot water, especially in 
Scotland. See Mossner, Life of Hume, pp.305-309, 344-352. It 
has to be pointed out, furthermore, that all this controversy did 
not result in the first volume of the History of Great Britain 
enjoying a succes de scandale in terms of sales. This was because 
Hume's publishing arrangements were not to the liking of the London 
booksellers. See Ernest Campbell Mossner and Harry Ransom, 'Hume 
and the "Conspiracy of the Booksellers": The Publication and Early
Fortunes of the History of England', University of Texas Studies 
in English, XXIX (1950), pp.162-182.
58 HL, i, pp,221-222; My Own Life, ibid., i, p*4.
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It was with 'infinite Disgust § Reluctance' that he pressed on with
the second volume of the History of Great Britain, which covered the
reigns of Charles II and James II; he had already written much of
this work by the autumn of 1754, and it was finally published in the 
59autumn of 1756. The main reason why Hume persevered with it was
because he felt that it would be far less obnoxious to the English
reading public than its predecessor had proved; writing to his publisher
on 12 April 1755 he explained why he considered that this would be so:
I have always said to all my Acquaintaince that if the 
first Volume bore a little of a Tory Aspect, the second
wou'd probably be as grateful to the opposite Party. The
two first Princes of the House of Stuart were certainly 
more excusable than the two second. The Constitution was 
in their time very ambiguous § undetermin'd, § their 
Parliaments were, in many respects, refractory § obstinate: 
But Charles the 2d knew, that he had succeeded to a very 
limited Monarchy: His long Parliament was indulgent to
him, § even consisted almost entirely of Royalists; yet 
he cou'd not be quiet, nor contented with a legal 
Authority. I need not mention the Oppressions in Scotland 
nor the absurd Conduct of K.James the 2d. These are 
obvious 5 glaring Points. Upon the whole, I wish the two 
Volumes had been publish'd together. Neither one Party 
nor the other, wou'd, in that Case, have had the least 
Pretext of reproaching me with Partiality.^0
But for all the less consciously iconoclastic spirit in 
which it was written, the second volume of Hume's History of Great 
Britain was scarcely a more Whiggish work than its predecessor; Hume's 
basic theme remained the same: mixed government in England was wholly
modern in origin, only having come into existence in 1689, following 
the final collapse of the ancient constitution. The Revolution was 
not a matter of ancient liberties being vindicated and confirmed. The 
events of 1688-89 marked the final collapse of the old Gothic constitu­
tion inherited by the Stuarts in 1603; 'all the points, which had, of 
late years, been disputed between King and people, were finally
59 ibid., i, pp.170, 188, 189, 194, 231-232, 233-235, 242.
60 ibid., i, pp.217-218.
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determined; and the powers of royal prerogative were more narrowly 
circumscribed and more exactly defined, than in any former period of 
the English government'.^  The abolition of the dispensing power 
exemplified this process. This power was an integral aspect of the 
old Gothic constitution, being derived from ancient and almost uniform 
practice; but it was completely incompatible with all 'the recent plans 
of liberty', with all the 'late innovations introduced into the govern­
ment'. Only when it was abolished in 1689 did a regular mixed govern- 
ment finally appear.  ^ Sweeping away the last vestiges of the ancient 
constitution, the Revolution gave Englishmen an opportunity of develop­
ing a politics devoid of disputes over basic constitutional issues:
'To decry with such violence, as is affected by some, the whole line 
of Stuart; to maintain, that their administration was one continued 
encroachment on the incontestible rights of the people; is not giving 
due honor to that great event, which not only put a period to their 
heriditary succession, but made a new settlement of the whole constitu­
tion'. The Revolution marked the beginning of a new epoch in English
history, for it gave such an ascendancy to popular principles as to
6 3put the nature of the constitution beyond all controversy.
But although he was convinced that the Revolution had 
cleared the way for the rise of a politics devoid of gaping ideological 
divisions, Hume still felt such a development had clearly failed to 
materialize; the division between Whigs and Tories still existed, 
which meant that such a fundamental aspect of the constitution as the 
succession to the throne was still involved in political controversy. 
This discrepancy troubled Hume. Such was his concern, indeed, that he
61 HGB, ii, pp.442-443.
62 ibid., ii, pp.394-397, 401-402.
63 ibid., ii, p.443.
made one of his rare post - 1752 appearances as an essayist in order 
to account for it; in 1758 he published Of the Coalition of Parties,
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in which he set out to examine this problem of the continued existence
of a division between Whigs and Tories. By this time Hume was well and
truly reconciled to the existence of a division between court and 
64country; but in Of the Coalition of Parties, as in his previous essays
on party, he made it clear that he considered the division between
Whigs and Tories to be another matter altogether. In itself the
division between court and country did not place political peace in
peril; but by way of contrast, the division between Whigs and Tories
was based upon irreconcilable differences of opinion concerning the
very nature of the constitution:
To abolish all distinctions of party may not be practicable, 
perhaps not desirable, in a free government. The only 
dangerous parties are such as entertain opposite views 
with regard to the essentials of government, the succession 
of the crown, or the more considerable privileges belong­
ing to the several members of the constitution; where 
there is no room for any compromise or accomodation, and 
where the controversy may appear so momentous as to justify 
even an opposition by arms to the pretensions of antagonists. 
Of this nature was the animosity, continued for above a 
century past, between the parties in ENGLAND; an animosity 
which broke out sometimes into civil war, which occasioned 
violent revolutions, and which continually endangered the 
peace and tranquillity of the nation.^5
It has been pointed out in recent years that by the middle
decades of the eighteenth century a Whig could only be defined in
terms of the prior existence of the Tory party: a Whig was a non-
66Tory. Hume himself seems to have believed that this was the case; 
in Of the Coalition of Parties we find him depicting the disappearance 
of the quarrel between Whigs and Tories very much in terms of the 
disappearance of the Tory party. In Hume's opinion, the continued
ibid., i, p .91.
Phil, Works, iii, p.464.
64
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66 Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, pp.69-70.
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existence of the Tory party was a glaring anachronism. The spirit of
political liberty had dissociated itself from religious fanaticism
and had assumed a more genuine and engaging aspect; having retrenched
exorbitant prerogative, it could afford to pay due respect to the
monarchy, the nobility and all other ancient institutions. Moreover,
by virtually behaving as a country-party the Tory party was acting in
flagrant violation of its monarchical principles; it was no longer the
leading defender of order and authority and the chief opponent of
innovation and revolution, roles which had been assumed by the Whig
party. But despite all this the blatant anti-Stuart bias of official
historiography amounted to a continuing exclusion of the Tories from
national politics,. Should this bias be removed, the Tory party would
soon be reintegrated within the political nation:
... this is certain, that the greater moderation we now 
employ in representing past events; the nearer shall we 
be to produce a full coalition of the parties, and an entire 
acquiescence in our present establishment. Moderation is 
of advantage to every establishment: Nothing but zeal
can overturn a settled power: And an over-active zeal in
friends is apt to beget a like spirit in antagonists.
The transition from a moderate opposition against an 
establishment, to an entire acquiescence in it, is 
easy and insensible.^
To fly in the face of historical fact by asserting that
the Stuarts had sought to undermine the ancient constitution was to
allow the Tory party to enjoy continuing dialectical success. The
Whigs could best discredit the Tory party by pointing out that exorbitant
prerogative was long since annihilated and that the oppression and
violence to which it often gave rise were ills which the established
6 8liberty of the current constitution happily prevented. The Whigs 
were in fact best advised to eschew all forms of high country-party 
rhetoric. England's mixed constitution was settled and stable; it
^  Phil. Works, iii, pp.469-470. 
ibid. , iii, p .470.
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did not need the support of revolutionary ideologies. Being a 
court-party, the Whigs, if they were to be consistent, had to adopt a 
sympathetic attitude towards those Englishmen who had defended the 
established order of things in Stuart England« The seventeenth- 
century country-party had undoubtedly been large and noble in its 
outlook; but at the time it was not apparent that any worthwhile 
benefits would accrue from its agitation. In the early seventeenth 
century the defenders of the status quo were in a position to mount 
a formidable case:
The only rule of government, they might have said, known 
and acknowledged among men, is use and practice: Reason
is so uncertain a guide that it will always be exposed to 
doubt and controversy: Could it ever render itself
prevalent over the people, men had always retained it as 
their sole rule of conduct: They had still continued in
the primitive, unconnected, state of nature, without sub­
mitting to political government, whose sole basis is, 
not pure reason, but authority and precedent. Dissolve 
these ties, you break all the bonds of civil society, and 
leave every man at liberty to consult his private interest, 
by those expedients, which his appetite, disguised under 
the appearance of reason, shall dictate to him. The spirit 
of innovation is in itself pernicious, however favourable 
its particular object may sometimes appear: A truth so
obvious, that the popular party themselves are sensible of 
it; and therefore cover their encroachments on the crown 
by the plausible pretence of their recovering the ancient 
liberties of the people.69
(iv)
The popular party, knowing just how pernicious innovation 
is, depicts its attack upon prerogative as an attempt to recover ancient 
liberties: such indeed was the ultimate lesson of Hume’s account of
the early seventeenth century, the keystone of his achievement as a 
historian. During the four decades of tension preceding the Civil War 
the country-party, for all its self-proclaimed adherence to the ancient
69 ibid., iii, ppo465-466, 469.
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constitution, zealously worked for innovation and change, while events 
in the period 1641-49 revealed just how pernicious the effects of inn­
ovation could be. This sceptical attitude towards the country-party's 
conception of English history also formed the unifying theme of Hume's 
account of the more remote periods of English history, the study of 
which occupied his attention from 1757 to 1761. Hume's original 
intention, we should remember, was to round off his History of Great 
Britain with a third volume dealing with the period 1689-1714. But 
after completing his account of the reigns of the latter Stuarts, 
he was at first undecided as to whether or not he should press on
with this project, finally deciding, in the spring of 1757, to abandon
70it for the time being and to instead go back to the Tudors. His
reason for doing so was avowedly polemical, as he explained in a
letter written to a friend on 3 September 1757:
... I am now very busily engaged in writing another volume 
of History, and have crept backwards to the reign of 
Henry the VII. I wish, indeed, that I had begun there:
For by that means, I should have been able, without making 
any digression, by the plain course of the narration, to 
have shown how absolute the authority was, which the 
English kings then possessed, and that the Stuarts did 
little or nothing more than continue matters in the former 
tract, which the people were determined no longer to admit. 
By this means I should have escaped the reproach of the 
most terrible ism of them all, that of Jacobitism.71
By the summer of 1758 he had completed the manuscript of his account
of the Tudor period, and in the winter of 1758-59 he had it published,
72entitling it The History of England under the House of Tudor.
Hume's account of Tudor history strongly reflected his 
original intention; his thesis was that, when seen in relation to their 
Tudor predecessors, the early Stuarts could in no way be accused of
70 HL, i, pp.243, 246, 249.
7 ^ ibid., i, p .264.
72 ibid., i, pp.278, 281, 294-295.
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seek ing  to  impose r a d i c a l l y  new methods o f  government upon t h e i r  Engl ish
s u b j e c t s .  Coming to  the  t h ro n e  a f t e r  a long and b loody c i v i l  war
had dec imated  th e  n o b i l i t y ,  who a lone could  r e s i s t  h i s  a u t h o r i t y ,
Henry VII was ab le  t o  e x p l o i t  f o r  h i s  own purposes  th e  c o u n t r y ' s  deep
longing  f o r  s t r o n g  government.  P r e r o g a t i v e  had t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been
somewhat i r r e g u l a r ,  b u t  a f t e r  1485 i t  r eached  unp receden ted  h e i g h t s ;
once f i r m ly  e n t r e n c h e d ,  the  new king  was ab le  t o  indu lge  h i s  n a t u r a l
73r a p a c i t y  to  th e  f u l l .  But i f  o p p r e s s i v e ,  h i s  r u l e  was so much th e
l e s s  burdensome in  t h a t ,  by cu rb ing  th e  n o b l e s ,  he became th e  s o le
t y r a n t  in  th e  kingdom; d e p re s s in g  th e  n o b i l i t y  and e x a l t i n g  churchmen,
la wyers ,  and men o f  new f a m i l i e s ,  who were more dependent  upon him,
he c l e a r e d  th e  way f o r  the  r i s e  o f  th e  commons, whose power was
beg inn ing  to  wax fo l low ing  the  f i r s t  s t i r r i n g s  o f  luxury .  Freed  from
the  ty ranny  o f  th e  n o b i l i t y ,  th e  peop le  en joyed ,  i f  no t  e n t i r e  l i b e r t y ,
74then  a t  l e a s t  many o f  i t s  advan tages .  But they  s t i l l  p o s s e s s e d
scan t  p o l i t i c a l  power; from th e  o u t s e t  Henry V I I ' s  p a r l i a m e n t s  were
obsequ ious ,  w h i le  under  Henry V III  p a r l i a m e n t ' s  mood was one o f  a b j e c t  
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s e r v i l i t y .  Under E l i z a b e t h ,  w i th  th e  sp read  o f  Ca lv in ism,  th e
Commons began t o  d i s p l a y  s ig n s  o f  s p i r i t ,  bu t  t h i s  i n v a r i a b l y  melted
away when co n f ro n te d  wi th  th e  q u e e n ' s  h a u g h t in e s s  and b i t t e r n e s s  o f
e x p r e s s io n .  D esp i te  t h i s  avowed contempt f o r  th e  s p i r i t  o f  l i b e r t y ,
E l i z a b e t h  became th e  most p o p u la r  sov e re ig n  England had ev e r  known; h e r
h igh  monarchica l  maxims were in  complete accord  wi th  the  p r e v a l e n t
76p o l i t i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e  day.
At the  t ime o f  i t s  p u b l i c a t i o n  Hume was convinced t h a t  h i s  
c a r e f u l  d e l i n e a t i o n  o f  the  e x t e n s i v e  power w ie lded  by the  Tudors had
The Tudors ,  i ,  p p . 54-56,  60-61.
74 i b i d . ,  i ,  pp.  40,  63,  65-66.
^  i b i d . ,  i ,  pp.  6 -9 ,  230.
76 i b i d . ,  i i ,  p p . 507-509,  520-528,  726.
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'effectually stopped the mouths of all those villainous Whigs' who
77had railed at his account of the early seventeenth century. But
this judgement was premature: 'The Clamour against this Performance
was almost equal to that against the History of the two first Stuarts.
78The Reign of Elizabeth was particularly obnoxious'. Whiggish opinion
was set 'anew in a Rage'; believing that Hume had set out 'to conjure
up the spirit of absolute power', it considered that 'he (had) judged
it necessary to the charm, to reverse the order of things, and to
evoke this frightful spectre by writing (as witches use to say their
79prayers) backwards'. Hume was by now 'callous against the Impressions
of public Folly', and his initial reaction was to simply ignore the
fresh storm he had aroused: 'If my past Writings do not sufficiently
80prove me to be no Jacobite, ten Volumes in Folio never would'.
Nevertheless, this second hostile reception must have been one of the
reasons why he decided, in the summer of 1759, to carry his stress upon
the modernity of political liberty in England to its logical conclusion:
he decided 'to write the History of England from the Beginning till
81the Accession of Henry the VII'. If the attacks upon his accounts
of Tudor and Stuart history sprang from the conviction that mixed 
government had existed in England since the remotest antiquity, it 
obviously followed that the best way they could be refuted was by 
showing that the more the historian approached the very beginnings of 
English history, the more difficult did he find it to detect signs 
of constitutional government and the rule of law. Hume's labours in
HL, i, p .294.
7 0
My Own Life, ibid., i, p.5.
79 This opinion was expressed by Bishop Richard Hurd in his Moral and 
Political Dialogues of 1759. See ibid., i, pp.313-314.
My Own Life, ibid., i, p.5; ibid., i, p.314.80
81 ibid., i, p .314.
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this field reached fruition in the autumn of 1761, when he published 
his History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the
on
Accession of Henry VII.
From the very outset Hume's account of early English history
takes the form of an insistent denial of the antiquity of constitutional
government in England; his treatment of the Anglo-Saxon period revolves
around this thesis. Hume did not deny that the Anglo-Saxons were 
83'extremely free'; but he insisted that this freedom took the form of
licentiousness rather than of true liberty. In Anglo-Saxon England
monarchical authority and the administration of justice were both
extremely feeble, while the absence of any economic activity other than
primitive agriculture meant that few men were occupied in honest industry;
the country was thus plagued by wars, insurrections, convulsions and 
84rapine. Most Englishmen were either the slaves or the tenants of a 
few aristocratic families, whose abuse of this power was the cause of 
most of the prevailing unruliness. The inhabitants of the cities, 
being few in number, despised, unskilled, ignorant and poverty-stricken, 
had, if they were unable to secure protection through forming private 
confederacies, no choice but to become clients of the aristocrats. 
Notwithstanding the seeming liberty - or rather licentiousness - of 
its inhabitants, there was far less true freedom to be found in Anglo- 
Saxon England than in civil societies where the chief magistrate upheld 
the law and demanded the strictest subordination and obedience from 
his subjects. The Norman conquest was no great disaster; the Normans 
put Englishmen 'in a situation of receiving slowly from abroad the 
rudiments of science and cultivation, and of correcting their rough
82 For the history of the writing of this work see ibid., i, pp.317,
321-325, 332, 335, 351-352 and Mossner, Life of Hume, pp.401-402.
—
Caesar to Henry VII, i, p.141.
84 ibid., l, p .69.
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and licentious manners'.
Having dealt with the Anglo-Saxons, Hume proceeded to
employ the weapon which had been regularly used since the 1680's by
all enemies of the notion that political liberty in England was rooted
in antiquity: the feudal interpretation of medieval history. William
of Normandy pushed the right of conquest to the utmost extremity; he
carried out 'almost a total revolution in the landed property of the
kingdom'. He confiscated the estates of the Saxon nobility and
distributed them amongst his Norman followers on condition that they
86accepted the duties entailed by feudal law. Englishmen thus remained
exposed to the exactions of a rapacious aristocracy and continued to
lack any political power; under feudal law only the immediate tenants
of the crown were entitled to a say in the running of the country.
Not until the late thirteenth century, when the feudal system began to
87decay, did the House of Commons take shape, and even then its power
was rudimentary and precarious; it occupied a modest place in the
structure of power in comparison with the monarchy, with its extensive
if ill-defined prerogative, the nobles, with their ability to resort
to anarchy to get their way, and the church, with its skill in exploit-
8 8ing the credulity of the times. Although personal freedom increased 
as the feudal system broke up, law and order was still precarious.
The people were still exposed to the exactions of an oppressive 
aristocracy; they were most likely to be shielded from lawlessness 
not when the monarchy was weak - for it was then that the nobility
85
85 ibid. , i, pp.141-153, 163. 
ibid., i, pp.179-181, 200-202.
For Hume's account of the feudal system and the causes and effects 
of its decay see ibid., i, pp.397-424; ii, pp.46-47, 84-95.
ibid., ii, pp.240-241.88
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was most unruly - but when it was strong and able to keep anarchy at
bay. Tudor rule thus marked a real step towards the development of
liberty; with their exorbitant power the Tudors were able to pull
down the disorderly and licentious nobility and establish an orderly
execution of the laws, which in the following century enabled the
89people to erect a regular scheme of liberty.
(v)
Hume's account of medieval history marked the culmination
of his historical labours; he never made any sustained effort to produce
the third volume of the History of Great Britain, even though through-
, 90out the 1760's he was to repeatedly state that he intended to do so.
The reason why he wrote no more history after 1762 is clear. Given
that his approach to the study of constitutional history was essentially
polemical, his account of medieval history did in fact mark the
completion of his activity as a historian. His basic intention as a
historian was to discredit the mythology of the country-party by
denying the antiquity of political liberty in England, and if he were
incapable of establishing this point as the historian of the remoter
periods of English history, it was obvious that he would never be able 
91to establish it. Hume was certainly convinced that the study of the
ibid., ii, pp.281-282, 443-445.
For Hume's wavering attitude concerning whether or not he should 
begin work upon this third volume see HL, i, pp.352, 359, 368-369, 
370, 378, 380, 381-382, 385-387, 433, 465, 491-492; ii, pp.6, 83,
98, 106, 151, 162-163, 172, 174, 177, 188, 208, 223.
Hume's contemporaries certainly believed that his account of early 
English history marked the culmination of his attack upon the concept 
of an ancient constitution. See the Annual Register, IV (1761), 
pp. 301-302.
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feudal period of English history provided ammunition which could be
used to mount a devastating attack upon country-party rhetoric:
Under what pretence can the popular party now speak of 
recovering the ancient constitution? The former controul 
over the kings was not placed in the commons, but in the 
barons: The people had no authority, and even little or
no liberty; till the crown, by suppressing these factious 
tyrants, enforced the execution of the laws, and obliged 
all the subjects equally to respect each others rights^ 
privileges, and properties. If we must return to the 
ancient barbarous and Gothic constitution; let those 
gentlemen, who now behave themselves with so much 
insolence to their sovereign, set the first example. Let 
them make court to be admitted as retainers to a neigh­
bouring baron; and by submitting to slavery under him, 
acquire some protection to themselves; together with the 
power of exercising rapine and oppression over their 
inferior slaves and villains. This was the condition of 
the commons among their remote ancestors.^
Philosophical history revealed that at no stage in English 
history had there ever been a political system which could be regarded 
as the standard against which the current structure of political power 
had to be compared in order to determine the degree of its goodness with 
respect to freedom and happiness. It revealed instead that England’s 
constitutional history had taken the form of a successive series of 
political systems, each of which had risen and then decayed, to be 
replaced by a qualitatively different political system, a process which 
had involved a gradual growth of personal and then political liberty. 
Philosophical history thus revealed that country-party condemnation of 
a corrupt modern England in the name of ancient liberties and trad­
itional virtues was completely baseless:
In each of these successive alterations, the only rule 
of government, which is intelligible or carries any 
authority with it, is the established practice of the age, 
and the maxims of administration, which are at that time 
prevalent, and universally assented to.Those who, from a 
pretended respect to antiquity, appeal at every turn to an 
original plan of the constitution, only cover their 
turbulent spirit and their private ambition under the
92 Of the Coalition of Parties', Phil. Works, iii, p.467.
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appearance of venerable forms; and whatever period they 
pitch on for their model, they may still be carried back 
to a more antient period, where they will find the measures 
of power entirely different, and where every circumstance, 
by reason of the greater barbarity of the times, will appear 
still less worthy of imitation.^
In the last words he was to write as a historian of pre- 
Tudor England, that is to say, in the last words he was ever to write 
as a historian, Hume took pains to hammer this message home. Philoso­
phical history revealed above all else that Englishmen ought not to 
waver in their support of the current structure of power, no matter 
how seductive the country-party's call for political action on behalf 
of the ancient constitution might seem; it showed that, in terms of 
freedom and happiness, modernity, the status quo, was altogether superior 
to antiquity:
... a civilized nation, like the English, who have happily 
established the most perfect and most accurate system of 
liberty, that ever was found compatible with government, 
ought to be cautious of appealing to the practice of their 
ancestors, or regarding the maxims of uncultivated ages 
as certain rules for their present conduct. An acquaintance 
with the history of the remote periods of their government 
is chiefly useful by instructing them to cherish their 
present constitution from a comparison or contrast with 
the condition of those distant times. And it is also 
curious, by showing them the remote, and commonly faint 
and disfigured originals of the most finished and most 
noble institutions, and by instructing them in the great 
mixture of accident which commonly concurs with a small 
ingredient of wisdom and foresight, in erecting the 
complicated fabric of the most perfect government.^
In these his final words as a historian, with their insistence upon
the usefulness of history in pointing up the prudence of falling in
with the status quo, Hume makes no effort to conceal the inseparable
connection between his historical labours and his de facto theory of
political obligation; in 1761, as much as in 1752 or even 1740, his
whole attitude towards history and historiography was irrevocably
shaped by a desire to inculcate a mood of acquiescence in the current
structure of political arrangements.
Caesar to Henry VII, ii, p.446. See also NHL, pp.197-199. 
Caesar to Henry VII, ii, p.446.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Hume's accourt o f  the  more remote p e r io d s  o f  Eng l ish  h i s t o r y
marked th e  c u lm ina t ion  o f  h i s  a c t i v i t y  as a p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t ;  i t  was
th e  l a s t  s u s t a i n e d  p i e c e  o f  w r i t i n g  which he produced  as a s t u d e n t  o f
c i v i l  s o c i e t y .  Even b e fo re  p u b l i s h i n g  i t ,  he had a l r e a d y  b rought  out
a second e d i t i o n  o f  th e  H i s to r y  o f  Great  B r i t a i n  as w e l l  as a t h i r d  e d i t i o n
of  Essays and T r e a t i s e s  on S ev e ra l  S u b j e c t s ,^ and as has been a l r e a d y
p o i n t e d  o u t ,  he was s t i l l  r e v i s i n g  what he had w r i t t e n  as a h i s t o r i a n
and e s s a y i s t  in  the  very  l a s t  months o f  h i s  l i f e ;  i t  shou ld  a l s o  be
n o te d  t h a t  in  1762 he p u b l i s h e d  h i s  account  o f  e a r l y  Eng l ish  h i s t o r y  along
with  h i s  Tudor volumes and a t h i r d  e d i t i o n  o f  h i s  account  o f  S t u a r t
h i s t o r y  under  the  t i t l e  o f  The H i s to r y  o f  England from th e  Invas ion  o f
2
J u l i u s  Caesar  t o  t h e  Revo lu t ion  in  1688. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  h i s  p e r i o d  o f  
c r e a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  as a p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  had come to  an end. A f t e r  
1762 he was to  s t r i k e  out  in  no f r e s h  d i r e c t i o n s  i n  h i s  s tudy  o f  the  
workings o f  c i v i l  s o c i e t y ;  as has been p r e v i o u s l y  i n d i c a t e d ,  the  only 
com ple te ly  new i n d i v i d u a l  p i e c e  o f  w r i t i n g  which he produced  as a 
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  in  the  l a t t e r  y ea r s  o f  h i s  l i f e  was t o  be one o f  
the  b r i e f e s t  i f  a t  t h e  same t ime one o f  the  most im por tan t  o f  h i s  e s s a y s ,
Of the  O r ig in  o f  Government.
This  marked f a l l i n g  away in  the  i n t e n s i t y  o f  Hume's a c t i v i t y  
as a p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  r e f l e c t e d  the  f a c t  t h a t  by th e  e a r l y  1 7 6 0 ' s ,
3
hav ing  a t  l a s t  'become no t  on ly  inde pendan t ,  b u t  o p u l e n t ' ,  he could  
a f f o r d  to  th in k  about  an i n c r e a s e d  involvement  on th e  a f f a i r s  o f  the  
world .  In 1763, fo l low ing  t h e  end o f  th e  Seven Years '  War and th e  sub­
sequen t  resumpt ion  o f  d ip l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  between London and P a r i s ,
 ^ J e s s o p ,  B ib l iog raphy  o f  Hume, p p . 6 ,  28-29.
 ^ i b i d . , p p .29-30.
 ^ mY Own L i f e , HL, i , p .5.
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he became secretary to the Earl of Hertford, the new British Ambassador
to the French court. He remained attached to the British Embassy in
Paris until 1766, eventually leaving the French capital with considerable
regret, for in addition to his diplomatic duties he had led an extremely
4active and variegated social life. In 1767 Lord Hertford’s brother, 
General Seymour Conway, who was Secretary of State in charge of the 
Northern Department, appointed Hume as his deputy, a post which he held 
for twelve months.^ In 1769 Hume returned to Edinburgh, determined to 
enjoy a restful and serene retirement. He spent the remaining seven 
years of his life in the Scottish capital enjoying the company of a 
wide circle of friends, relatives, acquaintances and admirers as well 
as devoting some time to literary activity, such as revising his History 
of England and Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects.
But Hume's last years were by no means spent in complete 
autumnal serenity; in the years after 1763, just as much as in any previous 
period of his life, he found it a difficult task to attain peace of mind.
In particular, he was greatly disturbed by the trend of English politics; 
his long-standing fear of anarchy and popular licentiousness was fanned 
into vigorous life by the political instability of the early years of 
the reign of George III. The rise to prominence of John Wilkes caused 
him particular distress; from the appearance of the North Briton in 
1762-63 onwards, Hume's attitude towards Wilkes and his supporters was 
one of bitter hostility. His immediate reaction was one of disgust at 
the way in which Wilkes sought to exploit anti-Scottish bigotry in order 
to discredit Lord Bute; Wilkes' use of so 'low, vulgar, § ungenerous' 
a tactic as 'national Reflections' offended Hume both as a Scotsman and
4 Mossner, Life of Hume, chaps. 30-34.
 ^ ibid., chap. 36.
 ^My Own Life, HL, i, pp. 6-7; Mossner, Life of Hume, chaps. 37,39.
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as a would-be cosmopolitan man of letters. The prevailing anti-Scottish 
feeling which Wilkes was able to stir up, along with the memory of the 
indifference or hostility which had usually greeted his works in England, 
increasingly irked Hume, especially after his stay in Paris, where he
g
was lionized by aristocrats and intellectuals alike.
With the outbreak of the 'Wilkes and Liberty' campaign
following Wilkes' return from exile in 1768, Hume's attitude towards
the state of contemporary English politics became even more hostile.
He became convinced that all his long-standing fears as to the dangerous
weakness of executive power under England's mixed constitution were
fully vindicated by the turmoil and confusion which followed in the wake
of this outbreak of popular agitation. He considered that the inability
or unwillingness of the ministry to put a stop to the'Madness about
Wilkes' indicated in a dramatic fashion that government in England had
become dangerously vitiated by the large element of liberty in the
constitution and was therefore powerless when confronted with mob
licentiousness and the factious designs of the parliamentary opposition
and the City of London. He was thus convinced that the strength of the
agitation on Wilkes' behalf was no mere flash in the pan; it was instead
indicative of a deep-seated structural weakness within the constitution.
In a letter written to a friend on 21 February 1770 Hume expressed this
opinion in the following straightforward fashion:
I am glad of (all ministerial) Victories; tho' I look upon 
them all as temporary and imperfect, like the fallacious 
Recoveries of a hectic Person who is hastening to his 
Dissolution. Our Government has become a Chimera; and is 
too perfect in point of Liberty, for so vile a Beast as 
an Englishman, who is a Man , a bad Animal too, corrupted 
by above a Century of Licentiousness. The Misfortune is,
HL, i, pp. 382-383, 470.
ibid., i, pp. 414-415, 417, 436-437, 491, 492, 497-499, 516-517, 
521.
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that this Liberty can scarcely be retrench'd without Danger 
of being entirely lost; at least, the fatal Effects of 
Licentiousness must first be made palpable, by some extreme 
Mischief, resulting from it. I may wish that the Catastrophe 
shoud rather fall on our Posterity; but it hastens on with 
such large Strides, as leaves little Room for this hope.
Confronted with a serious outbreak of lawlessness, Hume fell back upon
a familiar line of reasoning: government in England having become vitiated
by the excessive suspicion of prerogative harboured by Englishmen, the
country could count itself lucky if it were able to escape the resulting
outbreaks of popular licentiousness without falling into the clutches
9of a military despot.
Believing as he did that the strength of the agitation on 
Wilkes' behalf reflected a fundamental weakness within the constitution, 
Hume was not surprised by the fact that 'the despicable London Mob' 
continued to strongly influence the trend of English politics even after 
the Wilkes and Liberty campaign had subsided; in 1771, while rejoicing 
at the 'total and deservd Contempt' into which 'the Wilkites and the 
Bill of Rights-men' had fallen, he was bitterly bemoaning what he 
saw as Lord North's weakness when confronted with yet another outbreak 
of popular licentiousness, this time in the form of a demand on the part 
of the bellicose City of London that England should go to war with Spain 
over the Falkland Islands. Such a war, Hume believed, would precipitate 
a general European war; this would lead to England being overwhelmed 
by a rapidly mounting national debt.^  Hume took these fears concern­
ing the future course of English politics with him to the grave; he
For Hume's attitude towards the events surrounding the Wilkes and 
Liberty campaign see ibid., ii, pp. 178, 180-181, 182, 184, 189, 197- 
198, 208-218, 221, 224, 226, 227. For an account of the events them­
selves see George Rude, Wilkes and Liberty, Oxford, 1962.
10HL_, ii, pp. 234-235, 236-237, 240-242, 244-245, 248. For an account 
of the Falkland Islands agitation see S. Maccoby, English Radicalism 
1762-1785, London, 1955, pp. 150-159.
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considered that the country's willingness to go to war with the rebels 
in America was bound to produce a grave constitutional crisis. He 
felt that such a war was neither prudent nor winnable; once it was lost, 
the ministry, having already lost much of its credit, power and authority, 
would be unable to prevent a complete outbreak of anarchy and confusion, 
which would culminate in at best arbitrary government and at worst in 
total ruin and destruction.^
In the years after 1763, on those occasions when he came to
revise what he had written as a historian and essayist, Hume made no
attempt to conceal his mounting concern at the apparent inability of
the British constitution to curb popular licentiousness. When revising
his History of England and essays, he made it his cardinal principle to
'either soften or expunge' all the 'villanous seditious Whig Strokes'
he could find, seeking all the time, however, not to let his 'Indignation
12at the present Madness' drive him 'into the opposite Extreme'. In
1758, the year in which he formally dissociated himself from the views
13of orthodox historiography, he had already begun to revise his account
of the early seventeenth century in order to bring it into full conformity
14with his account of the extensive powers possessed by the Tudors, and
he continued this task after 1763, having become convinced that a reading
public disgusted by the excesses of the mob had at last come round to
his way of thinking. Having 'maintained a due regard to magistracy and
established government, suitably to the character of an historian and
15a philosopher', he found his authority 'growing daily'. He himself
HL, ii, pp. 300-301, 303, 304-305, 307-308, 314. 
ibid., ii, p.216.
^  See 'Of the Parties of Great Britain', Phil. Works, ii, p.144. 
14 HL, i, p .281.
^  ibid., ii, pp.191-192.
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c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  r e v i s i o n s  he gave t o  h i s  account  o f  t h e  e a r l y  seven­
t e e n t h  c e n tu ry  as be ing  ’ i n v a r i a b l y  to  the  Tory S i d e ' ;  t h e y  were des igned  
t o  show t h a t  i t  was r i d i c u l o u s  t o  d e p i c t  t h e  p r e - S t u a r t  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
' a s  a r e g u l a r  Plan  o f  L i b e r t y A  s i m i l a r  p ro c e s s  took p l a c e  when 
Hume re -examined h i s  e s s a y s ;  he took care  to  expunge any p assag es  which 
smacked o f  a l e s s  than  s taunch  commitment to  s e t t l e d  a u t h o r i t y .  Con­
s c i o u s l y  r e a c t i n g  a g a i n s t  what he saw as t h e  abuse o f  t h e  freedom o f  th e  
p r e s s  p e r p e t r a t e d  by Wilkes and h i s  a l l i e s ,  he removed a pas sage  from
Of t h e  L i b e r ty  o f  t h e  P res s  in  which he had r e j e c t e d  th e  n o t i o n  t h a t  an
17unshack led  p r e s s  was an i n h e r e n t  source  o f  p o l i t i c a l  u n r e s t .  S i m i l a r l y ,
when he came to  re -exam ine  Of S u p e r s t i t i o n  and E n thus ia sm , he made sure
t h a t  he removed t h e  passage  in  which he had sugges ted  t h a t  the  Church o f
18England was s t i l l  p o l l u t e d  by e lements  o f  pop ish  s u p e r s t i t i o n ;  he 
had always b e l i e v e d  t h a t  the  Anglican  h i e r a r c h y  was p o t e n t i a l l y  one o f  
t h e  g r e a t  p rops  o f  monarch ica l  a u t h o r i t y ,  so t h a t  h i s  h e i g h te n e d  r e g a rd  
f o r  t h e  l a t t e r  n a t u r a l l y  caused him t o  d i s p l a y  a h e ig h ten ed  r eg a rd  f o r  
t h e  former.
The i n c r e a s i n g l y  s h r i l l  i n s i s t e n c e  upon the  impor tance  o f  
s t r i c t  submiss ion  t o  government which came to  dominate Hume's p o l i t i c a l  
s t a n c e  in  t h e  y e a r s  a f t e r  1763 was a c l e a r  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  h i s  fundamental  
commitment to  de f a c t o  power.  But t h i s  ought  n o t  t o  b l i n d  us to  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  Hume's neo-Hobbesian ism a l s o  had a r a d i c a l l y  i c o n o c l a s t i c ,  
l i b e r a t i n g ,  a f f i r m a t i v e  s i d e .  In Hume's own day,  i t  was the  c o u n t ry -  
p a r t y ' s  f i x a t i o n  w i th  c o r r u p t i o n  which formed t h e  most im p o r tan t  m a t r ix
^  My Own L i f e , i b i d . ,  i ,  p . 5 .  For a sample o f  the  a l t e r a t i o n s  Hume 
made to  h i s  account  o f  th e  e a r l y  s e v e n te e n th  c e n tu ry  see  Burton,
Hume's L i fe  and C or respondence , i i ,  p p . 73-81;  E rn es t  Campbell Mossner, 
'Was Hume a Tory H i s t o r i a n ?  F ac t s  and R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' ,  J o u r n a l  of  
th e  H is to ry  o f  I d e a s ,  I I  (1941),  p p . 225-236;  NHL, p p . 69-71.
17 HL, i i ,  p p . 180-181; P h i l .  Works, i i i ,  p p . 97-98.
1 R
i b i d . , i i i ,  p .148 .
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of radical political thought. Derived from a classical-minded conception 
of citizenship which had been introduced into English political thought 
by way of the writings of Harrington, this fixation took the form of a 
fear that the increasing willingness on the part of Englishmen to pursue 
luxury, to pursue the satisfaction of private economic needs, was bound 
to lead to the corruption and decay of the freedom and independence of 
the community as a whole in that it was culminating in a growing propen­
sity to seek luxury by means of economic and therefore political 
dependence upon executive power, as proved by the existence of stock­
jobbers, placemen and professional soldiers. An obvious way of prevent­
ing such corruption, of preventing the House of Commons from becoming 
involved in lucrative yet degrading dependence upon executive power, was 
by means of parliamentary reform, by, for example, excluding placemen 
from the Commons and by tying its members more closely to their consti­
tuents through such devices as annual elections and instructions. These 
reforms were depicted by the country-narty not as innovations but rather 
as attempts to restore and reinvigorate the ancient liberties of English­
men; the ancient constitution which the patriots of the previous century 
had sought to preserve was in fact a mixed constitution of the type 
idealized by Harrington.
Committed as he was to de facto power and the preservation 
of the status quo, Hume naturally adopted a sceptical attitude towards 
the country-party's fear of corruption, given its implications in terms 
of radical politics. Throughout much of his political science Hume's 
basic aim was to undermine the country-party's pretensions and in part­
icular its classicist and medievalist conception of the past by insisting 
upon the utter modernity of political liberty. In Of the Populousness 
of Ancient Nations he argued that, for all their republican ideals, the
ancient Greeks and Romans had never possessed the sociological conditions
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necessary for the enjoyment of true freedom. In Of Luxury he contended 
that the ancient constitution of England had in fact been a feudal 
constitution and that therefore the bulk of the inhabitants of medieval 
England had not been free citizens, being instead the brutalized 
tenants of an unruly and tyrannical Gothic nobility. A close reading 
of Harrington revealed that it was the height of crass sociological 
ineptitude to contend that England's freedom was rooted in antiquity. 
Having established this point, Hume went on his capacity as a student 
of the constitutional crisis of the seventeenth century to stress that 
the rise of mixed government in England marked a radical break with the 
past. The rise of luxury - which began under Henry VII but which did 
not begin to affect politics until the reign of James I - brought about 
the creation of a completely new type of civil society - one which 
possessed the sociological conditions necessary for the enjoyment of 
regular liberty. The increase in the power of the men of middling 
property meant that the House of Commons became both willing and able 
to work towards the establishment of the rule of law and constitutional 
government. The spread of Calvinism in England and Scotland meant that 
the parliamentarians were able to command a far more formidable level 
of support than would otherwise have been the case. By 1640, when 
these two developments finally fused, the way was cleared for the Commons 
to set about creating a polity in which political authority was circum­
scribed by regular constitutional forms and the rule of law. A wholly 
modern form of society - for neither the classical nor the feudal world 
had been acquainted with luxury - had as its corollary a wholly modern 
form of government.
Hume saw the rise of liberty in England as in itself a 
desirable development. 'Till they push'd their Advantages so far as 
to excite a civil War, so dangerous § unnecessary', Charles I's
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parliaments pursued a ’laudable' course of action; they only sullied
their ’noble Cause' when they allowed their 'low Bigotry', 'their
19furious Zeal for Presbytery', to get out of hand. Hume never denied 
that personal security was most secure when it was backed up by const­
itutional government and the rule of law; he never asserted that a 
civilized monarchy - which he saw as easily the most acceptable type 
of absolute monarchy - could be superior to a free state in terms of 
the stable enjoyment of good government. But being a good neo-Hobbesian, 
he considered that the difference between one particular civil society 
and another was dwarfed by the difference between any form of civil 
society and no form of civil society at all. Liberty did indeed consti­
tute the perfection of civil society and as such was highly desirable; 
but authority alone formed the essential framework of civil society, 
and without civil society there could be no worthwhile form of liberty 
at all, given man's natural selfishness. If unchecked, authority could 
destroy itself by becoming excessive, so that the best form of civil 
society existed where authority was balanced by legal and constitutional 
restraints. But should authority become unduly circumscribed by 
liberty, the restraint upon man's natural selfishness was at once removed 
and civil society was exposed to the danger of being overwhelmed by 
popular licentiousness. Absolute monarchy and civil society were not 
necessarily incompatible and the mere existence of civil society ensured 
the existence of an irreducible amount of personal freedom; it was 
anarchy which formed the true antithesis of liberty.
Hume's attitude towards the eighteenth-century constitution 
was fundamentally ambivalent. He undoubtedly believed that since 1485 
England had more and more come to possess the sociological conditions
19 HL, i, p.222.
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necessary for the enjoyment of regular liberty. Yet he also felt that 
in the sphere of actual political conflict Englishmen had perhaps 
enjoyed too much success in bringing about the crystallization of this 
process. Civil society in England was no longer confronted with the 
danger that authority would destroy itself by becoming excessive. The 
very opposite was the case. The great danger was that liberty would 
overwhelm authority and degenerate into anarchy. This was a fear which 
Hume harboured long before the outbreak of popular unrest in the 1760's. 
As early as 1741, as our analysis of the argument advanced in Of the 
Liberty of the Press has revealed, he expressed himself of the opinion 
that fervent zeal on the part of the supporters of liberty, and not 
excessive prerogative, was the greatest potential source of unrest and 
turbulence in the politics of eighteenth-century England. Hume simil­
arly expressed himself of the opinion that this situation was far from 
desirable well before the appearance of Wilkes on the scene. In the 
first volume of his History of Great Britain he contended that with the 
decay of Tudor despotism the greatest threat to order and therefore 
to liberty was posed not by royal authority but by the friends of liberty 
themselves: 'By the changes, which have since been introduced, the
liberty and independence of individuals has been rendered much more full,
20intire, and secure; that of the public more uncertain and precarious'. 
Believing this to be the case, Hume made sure that the country-party, 
rather than the court-party, attracted the cutting edge of his political 
science. He attacked the classical-minded notion that luxury and 
corruption were inseparable. He stressed the insignificance of liberty 
in Anglo-Saxon, medieval and Tudor England. He denied that the Stuarts 
had been innovators. He emphasized the radical nature of the demand
20 HGB, i, p .121.
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for the exclusion of placemen from the Commons and for the introduction 
of instructions. The deflating of the country-party's pretensions in 
order to prevent the element of liberty in England's existing mixed 
constitution degenerating into anarchy: this was easily the most
important aspect of Hume's political science.
But in his struggle against country-party ideology Hume 
considered himself to be fighting very much of an uphill battle. He 
believed that the country-party was able to indulge in extravagance 
because, with its rabid espousal of liberty, it was advocating a cause 
which could arouse national as well as party spirit. It could count 
upon exploiting the pugnaciously libertarian spirit exhibited by the 
public at large; ever since 1603 the whole trend of English politics 
had favoured the partisans of liberty. Following the unrest of the 
1760's Hume came more and more to believe that there was scant indica­
tion that this situation was about to come to an end, even though there 
was a distinct possibility that liberty was about to degenerate into 
anarchy. In his essays and in his account of the early seventeenth 
century he had looked upon the influence which the crown obtained through 
possessing a fund of revenue and patronage as the means by which authority 
could preserve itself against the encroachments of liberty. But by 
1771 he was of the opinion that the spirit of liberty abroad amongst 
Englishmen simply could not be controlled; in a private letter written 
in that year we find him lamenting the growing restrictions upon all 
forms of political authority:
Only consider how many Powers of Government are lost in 
this short Reign. The right of displacing the Judges was 
given up; General Warrants are lost; the right of Expulsion 
the same; all the co-ercive Powers of the House of Commons 
abandon'd; all Laws against Libels annihilated; the Authority 
of Government impair'd by the Impunity granted to the 
Insolence of Beckford, Crosby, and the common Council: 
the revenue of the civil List diminishd. For God's sake, 
is there never to be a stop put to this inundation of the
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Rabble? We shall have fine work... if the people above and 
below continue in the same dispositions, the one insolent 
and the other timid.21
In the England of George III, as much as in the England of
Charles I, the basic fact which the political scientist had to take
into account was that the country-party, and not the court-party, enjoyed
the advantage of canvassing popular opinions. Hume expressed this belief
in its most elaborate form in his History of Great Britain, in the
following description of the mood of the Short Parliament:
(By 1640) the minds of men, thro'out the nation, had taken 
such a turn as to ascribe every honor to the refractory 
opposers of the king and the ministers. These were the 
only patriots, the only lovers of their country, the only 
heroes, and, perhaps too, the only true Christians. A 
reasonable compliance with the court, was slavish dependance; 
a regard to the king, servile flattery; a confidence in his 
promises, shameful prostitution. This general cast of 
thought,... has, more or less, prevailed in England, during 
a century and a half, and... has been the cause of much 
good and much ill in public affairs...^
English political opinion having retained the marked libertarian bias
which it had taken on at the beginning of the seventeenth century,
England would never pass willingly into the clutches of arbitrary
authority; yet at the same time the lesson of the previous century was
that it was precisely this fervent love of liberty, and not tyranny,which
posed the greatest threat to England’s peace and freedom. Writing to
a friend in 1772 Hume noted that the British constitution’is certainly
happy, though probably not calculated for Duration, by reason of its
23excessive Liberty'. Having in effect conceded that he had failed to 
alert the reading public in time to the dangers of an uncritical accept­
ance of country-party mythology, Hume was forced to acknowledge that 
in terms of the sole grounds of obedience which he as a supporter of
21
22
HL, ii, pp.244-245. 
HGB, i, p.237.
23 HL, ii, pp.260-261.
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de facto power could recognize - the ability to preserve social peace - 
the support he extended to England's mixed government in the last 
resort lacked any element of confidence or firmness. He was forced 
to acknowledge that he could not hope to shield his Hobbesian commit­
ment to de facto power behind a Harringtonian insistence upon the 
excellence of the political system that had taken shape in England 
since 1603.
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